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1.1. Background and aims of the study
I mourn in my complaint, and make a noise,
because of the voice of the enemy,
because of the oppression of the wicked;
for they cast iniquity upon me, and in wrath they hate me.
My heart is sore pained within me;
and the terrors of death are fallen upon me.1 
Experiences as described by the composer of psalm 55 are for many people the 
order of the day. Violence and war, natural disasters, life threatening diseases 
and personal losses – it is as current as it was for centuries ago. They are the basis 
of what Edward Schillebeeckx has called negative contrast experiences: human 
experiences of negativity on both personal and social levels which evoke 
indignation and protest; experiences which are accessible for all human beings.2 
They are a confrontation with the vulnerability and fragility of human beings. The 
field of medicine, and more specifically oncology, may be regarded as one of the 
habitats of these experiences. In oncology, this is first of all the case because for 
many patients the diagnosis cancer implies a direct confrontation with the 
possibility of death. Cancer is a leading cause of death worldwide and accounted 
for 7.6 million deaths (~13% of all deaths) in 2008. Deaths from cancer worldwide 
are projected to continue to rise to over 11 million in 2030. Even when the threat 
of imminent death can be removed by cancer treatment, patients may suffer 
from the side effects of these treatments causing physical, psychological and 
social symptoms and hindering proper functioning. Side effects of cancer 
treatment may be temporary, but some can remain for the rest of a patient’s life, 
such as loss of energy, tiredness, change in sexuality and infertility.3 Next to 
physical problems, patients have to cope with loss of control of their lives, anxiety 
or depression and the fear of recurrence.4 They have to relate to family and 
friends who may not know how to respond to the diagnosis and with practical 
problems in their work or with health insurance.5
1 Psalm 55,3-5. All bible citations in this thesis are taken from the authorized King James Version, Collins’ 
Clear-Type Press, London and New York, 1994. This psalm inspired Dorothee Sölle for the introduction of 
her book Leiden, 1973; Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag.
2 Schillebeeckx E. Mensen als verhaal van God. 1989; Baarn: Uitgeverij H. Nelissen, p.24-25. In this thesis, 
in each chapter all references will be given in full when cited for the first time. Thereafter, only the first 
author, publication year and, when applicable, page numbers are given.
3  Fredette SL. Breast cancer survivors: concerns and coping. Cancer Nurs. 1995;18:35-46. Peuckmann V, 
Ekholm O, Rasmussen NK et al. Chronic pain and other sequelae in long-term breast cancer survivors: 
nationwide survey in Denmark. Eur J Pain. 2009;13:478-485. Servaes P, Gielissen MF, Verhagen S et al. 
The course of severe fatigue in disease-free breast cancer patients: a longitudinal study. Psychooncology. 
2007;16:787-795. Servaes P, Verhagen S, Bleijenberg G. Determinants of chronic fatigue in disease-free 
breast cancer patients: a cross-sectional study. Ann Oncol. 2002;13:589-598.
4 Fredette SL, 1995; Dow KH, Ferrell BR, Leigh S et al. An evaluation of the quality of life among long-term 
survivors of breast cancer. Breast Cancer Res Treat. 1996;39:261-273.
5 Hansen JA, Feuerstein M, Calvio LC et al. Breast cancer survivors at work. J Occup Environ Med. 
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 The experience of human vulnerability and fragility almost inevitably evokes 
the question ‘Why?’.6 Why does this disaster happen to me? Why do I have to 
suffer from cancer? The sharpness of the question ‘why’ may be mitigated by dif-
ferentiating between the different origins of these experiences of vulnerability 
and fragility. For example, the willingly performed, unjust deeds of human beings 
may be easier to understand and cope with than natural disasters or diseases 
which occur independent of human actions. For unjust deeds there is someone to 
blame; it could be prevented if people just behaved properly. In contrast, natural 
disasters and diseases happen accidently. It is innocent in the sense that there is 
none to blame. Nevertheless, in all cases the question ‘why’ keeps resonating. In 
a religious context, this question ‘why’ is closely connected to the question ‘how 
can it be?’. How can it be that human beings have to put up with losses, pain and 
tragedy if there is a God? As expressed by Boethius: “If […] there be a God, from 
whence proceed so many evils? And if there be no God, from whence cometh any 
good?”7 Confrontation with dismal  may call into question the existence of God 
and, vice versa, the longing for a God as the Supreme, the Ultimate, or the Good, 
makes one aware of the imperfections of the world. Theodicy models have 
provided several answers to this question, for example considering human 
suffering as divine punishment for sin, as part of a divine plan, or inimical to a 
caring and compassionate God.8 
 For patients with cancer, the confrontation with their vulnerability and 
fragility also implies a confrontation with the fact that human life is transient. 
This confrontation is most clearly exemplified by the confrontation with death. 
Human life is perishable and human beings are mortal. Confrontation with our 
mortality can evoke questions about the nature of this finitude. Does the finitude 
of human life imply that it is all over after death? Confirmative answers to this 
question can be easily found . As Martin Buber held: “… it suits us to assume that 
[death] is the end of all we can imagine. To imagine something that lies beyond 
dying, to anticipate what only death can reveal, seems to me unbelief disguised 
as belief.”9 Nevertheless, according to classic religious imagery, in our death we 
2008;50:777-784. Lavigne JE, Griggs JJ, Tu XM et al. Hot flashes, fatigue, treatment exposures and work 
productivity in breast cancer survivors. J Cancer Surviv. 2008;2:296-302.
6  Vossen HJ. Vrijwilligerseducatie en pastoraat aan rouwenden. 1985; Kampen: Kok. Vermeer P. Learning 
Theodicy. The Problem of Evil and the Praxis of Religious Education. 1999; Leiden: Brill. 
7  “Si quidem deus […] est, unde mala? Bona uero unde, si non est?”, Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. 
With the English translation of «I.T.» (1609) revised by H.F. Stewart. 1926; London: William Heinemann 
LTD, p.151.
8 For a summary of the different models, cf. Vermeer P, 1999, p.22-46.
9   “…[het past ons] … aan te nemen dat [de dood] het einde is van alles wat wij ons kunnen voorstellen. 
Ons iets willen voorstellen dat aan gene zijde van het sterven ligt, in de geest vooruit willen lopen op wat 
alleen de dood kan openbaren, lijkt mij als geloof vermomd ongeloof.” M. Buber, Sluitsteen, Rotterdam 
1966. Cited in: Ter Linden N. De dag zal komen, Janus. Gedachten over de dood en over de fantasie van 
hemel en hel. 2003; Amsterdam: Stichting Collectieve Propaganda van het Nederlandse Boek, p. 38-39.
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will meet God, who will judge us and refer us to heaven, hell or purgatory.10 Or, in 
death we may be forgiven, saved and reconciled with God. Thus, several models 
can be identified that reach for an existence beyond death.11 
 The experience of human vulnerability and fragility not only alerts us of the 
finitude of human life due to the boundary of death, but also makes us aware of 
perishableness within our finite lives. Indeed, what is lost in the course of time 
cannot be regained. ‘Time heals all wounds’, the proverb says, but this may not be 
the whole story. Certainly, bruises can heal, damage can be repaired, diseases 
can be cured, but the negative experience that has taken place, cannot be wiped 
out. The ravages of time are unrelenting. Indeed, the experience of the passage 
of time, the experience of its speed, of the future which irreversibly rushes 
through the present into the past, may not necessarily mitigate the experience of 
human vulnerability and fragility (‘time heals all wounds’), but, on the contrary, 
can contribute to it. 
 In medicine, experiences of pain and loss, vulnerability and fragility as 
described above, are often described as experiences of distress. In fact, distress 
is an important term in the field of oncology. Alleviation or amelioration of 
patients’ distress is one of the aims of psychosocial support of cancer patients. 
The National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) guideline for distress 
management recommends screening of all cancer patients for distress, since 
distress has a negative impact on quality of life, recovery after treatment, and 
even survival.12 Screening for distress and discussing the results with patients 
would lead to better adherence to treatment protocols, fewer medical contacts 
related to anxiety, improved communication between health care providers and 
patients, and prevention of new (long term) problems.13 However, what does the 
word distress mean? 
 Etymologically, the term distress is derived from the old French destresse 
(900-1400 A.C.) which referred to a circumstance that caused anxiety or hardship.14 
Destresse, in turn, is derived from the vulgar Latin districtia, meaning restraint or 
10 In the current teachings of the church the images of hell and purgatory have not been fully abandoned, 
but rather the emphasis is placed on the admonishing character of these images. (De geloofsbelijdenis van 
de Kerk, p. 419-420.) This is illustrated by the answer of  pope John XXIII when he was asked whether hell 
existed: “Yes, indeed. However, there is none in there.” Cited in: Ter Linden N, 2003, p.47.
11 See below, section 1.4.4, for a more extensive exposé of models on life after death.
12 National Comprehensive Cancer Network.  Distress Management. NCCN Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Oncology. v.1, 2008. Vitek L, Rosenzweig MQ, Stollings S. Distress in patients with cancer: definition, 
assessment, and suggested interventions. Clin J Oncol Nurs. 2007;11:413-418. Ryan H, Schofield P, 
Cockburn J et al. How to recognize and manage psychological distress in cancer patients. Eur J Cancer Care 
(Engl ). 2005;14:7-15. Groenvold M, Petersen MA, Idler E et al. Psychological distress and fatigue predicted 
recurrence and survival in primary breast cancer patients. Breast Cancer Res Treat. 2007;105:209-219. 
Falagas ME, Zarkadoulia EA, Ioannidou EN et al. The effect of psychosocial factors on breast cancer 
outcome: a systematic review. Breast Cancer Res. 2007;9:R44.
13 National Comprehensive Cancer Network, 2008. Hoffman BM, Zevon MA, D’Arrigo MC et al. Screening for 
distress in cancer patients: the NCCN rapid-screening measure. Psychooncology. 2004;13:792-799.
14 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=distress, last accessed 26-7-2011.
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narrowness. Districtia draws back on the Latin districtus, the past participle of 
distringere which means ‘draw apart’, or ‘hinder’. In medieval Latin it was also 
known as dis-stringere, ‘draw tight’ or ‘press together’. From this etymological 
origin distress is used in a wide variety of (research) contexts, ranging from a 
biomedical use of the term to psychosomatic, psychological, social, moral and 
existential uses of the concept.15 In biomedical contexts, the term is most 
frequently used in clinical practice to describe a patient with severe physical 
symptoms. For example, a patient with severe pain or severe dyspnea can be 
described as a patient in severe distress. The term is specifically used in Acute 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome to refer to life threatening respiratory failure due 
to lung injury from a variety of precipitants.16 Leaving the biomedical use of the 
term and concentrating on other uses of the concept distress, what can be 
learned about the definitions of distress that arise from the currently available 
literature?
 First of all, it is relevant to note that several studies on distress do not use a 
formal definition of distress. For example, social distress has been described by 
stating that social difficulties related to cancer and cancer treatments may add to 
the physical burden, psychological distress and uncertainty already experienced 
by patients and their families.17 Leung et al. refer to existential distress in cancer 
patients only by stating that existential concerns can lead to severe distress in 
acutely ill cancer patients and long-term survivors of cancer.18 In other studies on 
distress no attempt to define distress is given at all.19 In these studies the meaning 
of the concept distress is implied in the research instruments that are used to 
measure distress. This is illustrated by the study of Ryan et al., as well as several 
other studies, that used the Distress Thermometer (DT) to measure distress.20 
15 Dushianthan A, Grocott MP, Postle AD et al. Acute respiratory distress syndrome and acute lung injury. 
Postgrad Med J. 2011;87:612-622. Bidstrup PE, Johansen C, Mitchell AJ. Screening for cancer-related 
distress: Summary of evidence from tools to programmes. Acta Oncol. 2011;50:194-204. Ziegler L, Hill K, 
Neilly L et al. Identifying psychological distress at key stages of the cancer illness trajectory: a systematic 
review of validated self-report measures. J Pain Symptom Manage. 2011;41:619-636. Giacaman R, Rabaia 
Y, Nguyen-Gillham V et al. Mental health, social distress and political oppression: The case of the occupied 
Palestinian territory. Glob Public Health. 2010;6:1-13. Rittenmeyer L, Huffman D.  How professional nurses 
working in hospital environments experience moral distress: a systematic review. JBI Library of Systematic 
Reviews 2009;7:1233-1290. 
16 Dushianthan A, Grocott MP, Postle AD et al. Acute respiratory distress syndrome and acute lung injury. 
Postgrad Med J. 2011;87:612-622.
17 Smith AB, Wright P, Selby P et al. Measuring social difficulties in routine patient-centred assessment: a 
Rasch analysis of the social difficulties inventory. Qual Life Res. 2007;16:823-831.
18 Leung D, Esplen MJ. Alleviating existential distress of cancer patients: can relational ethics guide clinicians? 
Eur J Cancer Care (Engl ). 2010;19:30-38.
19 Ugalde A, Aranda S, Krishnasamy M et al. Unmet needs and distress in people with inoperable lung cancer 
at the commencement of treatment. Support Care Cancer. 2012;20:419-23. Ryan H, Schofield P, Cockburn 
J et al. How to recognize and manage psychological distress in cancer patients. Eur J Cancer Care (Engl ). 
2005;14:7-15.
20 Ryan DA, Gallagher P, Wright S et al. Sensitivity and specificity of the Distress Thermometer and a two-
item depression screen (Patient Health Questionnaire-2) with a ‘help’ question for psychological distress 
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The DT is a visual analogue scale with scores from 0 (‘‘no distress’’) to 10 (‘‘extreme 
distress’’) with a midpoint of 5 labeled as ‘‘moderate distress.’’21 It includes a short 
self-report measure on problems encountered in the domains of physical, 
emotional, social and spiritual functioning. This measure implies that problems in 
physical, emotional, social and spiritual functioning are elements of the distress 
concept. However, it remains unclear why, i.e. on what grounds, these elements 
should be considered. Also, an explicitation of the relation between these 
elements is lacking.
 When looking at formal definitions of distress, almost all definitions of distress 
define the term in psychological terms. For example, psychosomatic distress has 
been defined as somatic symptoms that are either subjectively experienced or 
objectively observed as excessive and their intensity is not explained by a known 
medical etiology.22 Psychological distress is the experience of significant 
emotional upset and arises from various psychological and psychiatric conditions.23 
In nursing literature, moral distress has been described as the psychological 
disequilibrium and negative feeling state experienced when a person makes a 
moral decision but does not follow through by performing the moral behavior 
indicated by that decision.24 Or, alternatively, moral distress involves the 
perception that core personal values and ethical obligations are violated that can 
result in psychological disequilibrium.25 In a study on health care managers moral 
distress was defined as the physical and emotional response to feeling prevented 
from carrying out ethically proper action.26 Healthcare managers experienced 
moral distress when they set priorities within highly resource-constrained 
environments, when they observed inequities between budget allocations and 
management responsibilities, and when organizational priorities did not align 
with their personal values. In more general terms, according to the stress-coping 
and psychiatric morbidity in patients with advanced cancer. Psychooncology. 2011; epub ahead of print. 
Bauwens S, Baillon C, Distelmans W et al. The ‘Distress Barometer’: validation of method of combining 
the Distress Thermometer with a rated complaint scale. Psychooncology. 2009;18:534-542.Tuinman 
MA, Gazendam-Donofrio SM, Hoekstra-Weebers JE. Screening and referral for psychosocial distress in 
oncologic practice: use of the Distress Thermometer. Cancer. 2008;113:870-878. Gessler S, Low J, Daniells 
E et al. Screening for distress in cancer patients: is the distress thermometer a valid measure in the UK and 
does it measure change over time? A prospective validation study. Psychooncology. 2008;17:538-547.
21 Roth AJ, Kornblith AB, Batel-Copel L et al. Rapid screening for psychologic distress in men with prostate 
carcinoma: a pilot study. Cancer. 1998;82:1904-1908.
22 St-André M, Twomey JE. A Transgenerational Conceptualization of Psychosomatic Distress During 
Pregnancy: Implications for Infant Mental Health. Infant Mental Health Journal. 1996;17:43-57.
23 Bidstrup PE, Johansen C, Mitchell AJ. Screening for cancer-related distress: Summary of evidence from 
tools to programmes. Acta Oncol. 2011;50:194-204.
24 Lawrence LA. Work engagement, moral distress, education level, and critical reflective practice in intensive 
care nurses. Nurs Forum. 2011;46:256-268.
25 Maiden J, Georges JM, Connelly CD. Moral distress, compassion fatigue, and perceptions about medication 
errors in certified critical care nurses. Dimens Crit Care Nurs. 2011;30:339-345.
26  Mitton C, Peacock S, Storch J et al. Moral Distress among Healthcare Managers: Conditions, Consequences 
and Potential Responses. Healthc Policy. 2010;6:99-112.
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model of Lazarus and Folkman, distress arises when the appraisal of a threat 
outweighs the resources of the patient.27 The NCCN defines distress as a 
multifactorial unpleasant emotional experience of a psychological (cognitive, 
behavioral, emotional), social, and/or spiritual nature that may interfere with the 
ability to cope effectively with cancer, its physical symptoms and its treatment.28
Where do all these definitions of distress lead us? Clearly, no singular, generally 
accepted definition of distress exists. However, from the abovementioned definitions 
and descriptions we could retain several aspects. First of all, in most definitions 
distress is described as a subjective experience. Also, distress is multifactorial: it 
may arise from a wide variety of events, ranging from physical and psychological, 
to social, moral and spiritual issues. Finally, distress has a negative connotation: 
it refers to upset and disequilibrium, to experiences in someone’s life which 
cannot be given a positive twitch. Indeed, it contrasts with well-being, with life 
that flourishes. Thus, for now, a nominal definition of distress may be a subject’s 
incapability to constructively accommodate negatively charged experiences into 
his or her own life. 
 Nevertheless, it still remains unclear what these negatively charged experiences 
would be. According to the abovementioned studies, they appear to arise from a 
wide range of physical to psychological, social, moral and spiritual issues, but 
why? Indeed, the question remains what distress actually means. Moreover, 
neither the abovementioned question about God nor the confrontation with the 
boundary of death and the passage of time are acknowledged in the medical 
discourse about distress. In fact, elaboration of these themes most commonly 
takes place in the field of religious studies rather than the medical sciences. Thus, 
supposedly, our thinking about distress could benefit from an interdisciplinary 
approach, bringing together insights from religious studies as well as the medical 
sciences . Therefore, the general aim of this thesis is perform interdisciplinary 
research into the experience of distress from the perspective of religious studies 
and medical sciences. 
 Acknowledging the need for further elaboration on the meaning of the term 
distress, in this study we will take up our nominal definition of distress - a subject’s 
incapability to constructively accommodate negatively charged experiences into 
his or her own life – and further explore the meaning of distress using a capability 
approach. The exploration of distress using a capability approach is the first 
specific aim of the study. Of note, this exploration should be regarded as a first 
step towards a further understanding of distress. A full theoretical elaboration of 
this approach - which falls beyond the scope this work - will be necessary before 
it can be implemented into empirical research. 
 Nevertheless, it may be possible to expand our understanding of distress also 
empirically if we make use of both currently available notions of distress in the 
field of medicine and the abovementioned themes associated with experiences 
27   Lazarus RS, Folkman S. Stress, appraisal and coping. 1984; New York.
28   National Comprehensive Cancer Network, 2008.
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of fragility and vulnerability which are at home in  religious studies. Therefore, 
the expansion of our understanding of distress from an empirical point of view, 
based on currently available insights in religious studies and medical sciences, is 
the second aim of this study.
1.2. Descriptive model
In order to achieve the abovementioned second specific aim - the expansion of 
our understanding of distress from an empirical point of view, based on currently 
available insights in religious studies and medical sciences - I propose to use a 
model as depicted in figure 1.29 As can be seen from this figure, the model 
comprises several aspects in relation to distress - drawn from the religious studies 
as well as the medical sciences – which were alluded to in the background of the 
study. In the next paragraphs these will be clarified and their operationalization 
will be described.
Figure 1  Descriptive model
1.3. Distress
As we suggested in the background of the study, distress may tentatively be 
defined as a subject’s incapability to constructively accommodate negatively 
charged experiences into his or her own life. In the medical sciences, physical, 
psychological and social problems are most commonly mentioned as constituents 
of these negatively charged experiences. These problems may be described as 
symptoms or as a loss of functioning. For example, physical symptoms may be 
29  In this thesis I do not have a fixed rule in the use of ‘I’ and ‘we’. As suggested by Paul Ricoeur, I have 
a preference for ‘I’ when I assume an argument as my own and ‘we’ when I hope to draw the reader 
along with me. (Ricoeur P. Memory, history, forgetting. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. 2006; 
Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, p.xvii; in chapter 1 and 2  this work will be cited as MHF). 
In chapter 3-7 ‘we’ usually refers to the group of authors who contributed to the article.
Patient characteristics
Demographic characteristics
Treatment phase
Coping strategies
Religious characteristics
- Images of God
Experience of time
- Mortality
- Time perception
Distress
Physical symptoms and functioning
Psychological symptoms and functioning 
Social symptoms and functioning
Guilt and forgiveness
Quality of life/satisfaction with life
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pain or diarrhea, while the loss of physical functioning may regard the incapacity 
to walk for a certain distance. The selection of physical, psychological and 
sociological symptoms and loss of functioning which are specifically relevant for 
people in distress is context dependent. Within the oncological context the 
choice for physical, psychological and sociological symptoms and loss of 
functioning is most obviously made by the list of symptoms and functionings as 
selected by the European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer 
(EORTC) Quality of Life Group. They have developed a core instrument (EORTC 
QLQ-C30) to measure quality of life which covers a range of physical, psychological 
and social issues that are relevant to a broad spectrum of cancer patients.30 Also, 
it includes a general scale to assess global quality of life. According to EORTC’s 
modular approach the core questionnaire can be supplemented by other 
questionnaires. For example, it is estimated that between 20 and 30% of cancer 
patients will experience clinically significant depressive symptoms at any one 
time.31 As a patient’s self-report of a bad mood measured by quality of life 
instruments is qualitatively different from the clinical diagnosis of depression 
measured by a specific diagnostic instrument or structured interview, I believe it 
is relevant to supplement EORTC QLQ-C30 by a specific instrument measuring 
depression.32 Also, as depression and hopelessness have been found to be 
mutually reinforcing, but distinct constructs, the experience of hopelessness 
should be accounted for, too.33
 In the definition of distress by the NCCN, attention is paid to the role of 
spirituality.34 One of the elements that is specifically addressed in this context is 
the issue of guilt and forgiveness. Guilt and forgiveness are not covered by the 
EORTC core questionnaire at all. Previously, Scherer-Rath has operationalized 
attitudes towards guilt by distinguishing between personal, interpersonal and 
societal guilt.35 Personal guilt refers to the experience that one has failed to use 
one’s personal talents. Interpersonal guilt refers to the failure of one’s actions in 
relation to other people, and societal guilt refers to this failure in relation to 
society as a whole. 
30  Sprangers MA, Cull A, Bjordal K et al. The European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer. 
Approach to quality of life assessment: guidelines for developing questionnaire modules. EORTC Study 
Group on Quality of Life. Qual Life Res. 1993;2:287-295. Sprangers MA, Cull A, Groenvold M et al. The 
European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer approach to developing questionnaire 
modules: an update and overview. Quality of Life Research. 1998;7:291-300.
31  Zabora J, BrintzenhofeSzoc K, Curbow B et al. The prevalence of psychological distress by cancer site. 
Psychooncology. 2001;10:19-28.
32  Lloyd-Williams M, Dennis M, Taylor F et al. Is asking patients in palliative care, “are you depressed?” 
appropriate? Prospective study. BMJ. 2003;327:372-373.
33  Rodin G, Lo C, Mikulincer M et al. Pathways to distress: The multiple determinants of depression, 
hopelessness, and the desire for hastened death in metastatic cancer patients. Social Science & Medicine. 
2009;68:562-569.
34  National Comprehensive Cancer Network, 2008.
35  Scherer-Rath M. Lebenssacksen. Herausforderung für die pastorale Beratung und Begleitung von 
Menschen in Lebenskrisen. 2001; Münster/Hamburg/London: Lit Verlag, p.114-119.
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 These three components of guilt can be viewed from two dimensions, viz. a 
religious and a non-religious dimension. In a religious dimension, personal, 
interpersonal and societal guilt is related to one’s relation with God. The 
disturbance of the relation with oneself, with others and with society as a whole 
is placed under the sign of a disturbed relation with God. Finally, forgiveness can 
be operationalized by distinguishing between forgiveness of others and being 
forgiven.36 Although experiences with both forgiveness of others and being 
forgiven may be encountered in clinical oncological practice, in a previous study 
it has been shown that forgiving others was the most prominent issue for cancer 
patients.37
1.4. Patient characteristics 
In empirical research, patient characteristics generally include demographic 
items such as age, gender, and education level. In view of the subject of our 
investigation, I propose to add several more variables which may be relevant for 
distress: treatment phase, coping strategies, religious characteristics, and 
experience of time.
1.4.1. Treatment phase
The class of background variables designated with the term treatment phase 
refers to the distinction between oncological treatment with curative intent and 
treatment with palliative intent. In the curative situation the treatment is aimed 
at the eradication of cancer. In contrast, in the palliative phase interventions are 
aimed at palliation of symptoms. In this phase one’s life time may be extended by 
means of palliative treatment, but one cannot be cured. The duration of one’s life 
is limited by the disease. It may be hypothesized that these two situations - the 
first looking at the prospect of life despite a serious diagnosis, the second directly 
facing the reality of immanent death – is of direct importance for the experience 
of distress.  
 
1.4.2. Coping strategies
In difficult situations, such as situations of distress, people tend to draw back on 
similar patterns of action. These patterns of action were first described as 
so-called coping strategies by Lazarus and Folkman.38 They distinguished between 
problem-focused and emotion-focused coping. However, this approach has been 
proven to be too simple. On both theoretical and empirical grounds Carver and 
36  Mauger PA, Perry JE, Freeman T et al. Measurement of Forgiveness: Prelimenary Research. Journal of 
Psychology and Christianity. 1992;11:170-180.
37  Mickley JR, Soeken K, Belcher A. Spiritual well-being, religiousness and hope among women with breast 
cancer. Image J Nurs Sch. 1992;24:267-272.
38  Lazarus RS, 1984.
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colleagues further differentiated these coping strategies into three main 
categories: active problem focused coping, support seeking coping and avoidant 
coping.39 In addition to these three main categories other coping strategies may 
be distinguished: acceptance of the situation; religious coping;40 and creating 
positive events, for example through humour.41
1.4.3. Religious characteristics
As we saw in the background of the study, in the confrontation with the 
vulnerability and fragility of human beings the question about God may arise. 
This question does not only pertain to the query whether one believes in God or 
not, but rather refers to one’s representation of God, one’s image of God. Based 
on the years-long theological and empirical studies of Johannes van der Ven we 
can distinguish between anthropomorphic, non-anthropomorphic and apophatic 
images of God.42 Anthropomorphic representations view God as personal, while 
non-anthropomorphic images of God refer to God as ‘something Higher’. Anthro-
pomorphic representations include a theistic image of God – God as the unmoved 
mover; an intrapersonal panentheistic image of God – God as a transcendent and 
immanent source of personal trust; an interpersonal panentheistic image of God 
– God who is transcendently and immanently expressed in the friendship and love 
between people; and a cosmic panentheistic image of God - God who is 
transcendently and immanently present in the beauty of nature. Non-anthropo-
morphic representations include a deistic image of God – something Higher which 
has set the world into movement, and a pantheistic image of God – something 
Higher which provides unity and structure to the world from within the world. 
Finally, an apophatic image of God is the epistemic claim that God surpasses all 
our knowing and naming.
 Although, as Dirk Hutsebaut phrased it: “The only real important religious 
question is the question of God”,43 several other ‘religious demographic’ charac-
teristics can be identified, such as religious affiliation, church visits and the 
importance of religion in daily life. These will be incorporated in this study, too.
39 Carver CS. You want to measure coping but your protocol’s too long: consider the brief COPE. International 
Journal of Behavioral Medicine. 1997;4:92-100. Kleijn WC, van Heck GL, van Waning A. Ervaringen met 
een Nederlandse bewerking van de COPE copingvragenlijst. De COPE_Easy. Gedrag en Gezondheid. 
2000;28:213-226.
40  Pargament KI. The Psychology of Religion and Coping. 1997; New York/London: The Guilford Press.
41  Folkman S, Moskowitz JT. Stress, positive emotion and coping. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 
2001;9:115-118.
42  Van der Ven JA. God reinvented? A theological search in texts and tables. 1998; Leiden: Brill. Van der Ven 
JA, Dreyer J, Pieterse H. Is there a God of human rights? 2004; Leiden: Brill.
43  Hutsebaut D. Anthopomorphic and Non-anthopomorphic God Representations and religious Cognitive 
Styles. An Empirical Study on a Sample of Adults with High Church Involvement. In: Ziebertz H-G, 
Schweitzer F, Häring H et al., eds. The Human Image of God. 2001; Leiden: Brill, p.361-377; p.361.
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1.4.4. Time experience
As we saw above, the confrontation with vulnerability and fragility of human 
beings draws our attention to the transitoriness of human life: human life is finite. 
This finitude of human time is, first of all, recognized in the limits that are set by 
the mortality of human beings. However, also before death we are confronted 
with finitude when we perceive the passage of time and have to acknowledge the 
irreversible flow of events from future, to present to past.  
Mortality
Human life is mortal; it is intrinsically connected to death. At one moment or 
another every human being has to die; death is inevitable. This does not exclude 
that throughout life people can neglect and hide for the reality of death. However, 
at some point it becomes impossible to deny that human life in its present form 
is finite. Therefore, in the end, human beings have to take a stance towards death. 
This ‘stance towards death’ may be operationalized by way of attitudes towards 
death as well as affects about death.
Attitudes towards death
As death is inevitable, we need notions about death to accommodate its reality into 
our lives. Although death may be regarded as the end of human life, in our culture 
several ideas about life after death exist. Somehow, in those perspectives human 
time seems to continue, despite death. Indeed, as Michael Scherer-Rath has 
investigated in depth, based on philosophical and theological literature as well as 
empirical research among patients in the middle of a suicide crisis, several attitudes 
towards death can be distinguished.44 Most generally, attitudes towards death can 
be differentiated into non-religious and religious attitudes. Non- religious attitudes 
do not provide a perspective beyond death, while religious attitudes provide an 
openness to transcendence beyond death. Immanentism and skepticism may be 
regarded as two prototypes of no religious attitudes. In an immanent attitude, 
death is a biological fact and from that perspective it does not  make  sense  to 
postulate  the  continuation  of life  after death.45 In a skeptical attitude towards 
death the possibility of knowing anything beyond the boundaries of death is denied.
 Religious attitudes towards death refer to a transcendence of death as the 
natural ending of human life. However, they do not necessarily imply a reference 
to God. Following Scherer-Rath, I will label religious attitudes towards death that 
do not explicitly refer to God as ‘non-explicitly religious’.46 Two central notions 
can be identified in these non-explictly religious attitudes: ‘soul’ and ‘higher 
reality’. The notion of the soul has a long and complex philosophical and 
theological history, but in the western world the basic assumption about the soul 
44  Scherer-Rath M, 2001, p. 133-150.
45  Immanence is often referred to as the presence of the divine within this world. However, in an immanent 
attitude towards death, no reference to a deity is included at all. 
46  Scherer-Rath M, 2011, p.136-142.
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is its immortality. In a second conception of the soul not its immortality is of main 
importance, but its capacity for reincarnation.47 The second central notion in 
non-explictly religious attitudes is ‘higher reality’. It refers to those conceptions 
that do not include a very well-defined impression of life after death, like heaven, 
hell or purgatory, but do hold the hope that with death ‘it does not all come to an 
end’. This is exemplified by the hope that after death we will be reunited with the 
ones who have preceded us, or the hope that death is a transition to another 
mode of being, albeit unclear what this would imply. 
 In the wide variety of religious images, metaphors and figures of speech, 
Scherer-Rath distinguishes two central concepts: ‘account’ and ‘completion’.48 
The concept of account refers to the attitudes in which it is believed that after 
death people have to give an account for their lives. The concept of completion is 
an answer to the experience that life is finite and that when people die many of 
their projects, plans, hopes and wills have not been fulfilled. In this conception 
two further beliefs can be distinguished. First, life can be regarded as an 
interactive process which is guided by God. Secondly, completion also refers to 
the idea that behind life and death a plan of God is operating. 
Affects towards death
Whatever attitude towards death is held, death cannot be avoided. This 
confrontation with the reality of death will often be accompanied by emotions. In 
fact, by means of emotions or affects changes in attitudes may be possible. 
Human beings may experience a great variety of affects. They can be grouped 
into different classes based on the valuation theory of Hubertus Hermans. In this 
theory, the self is approached as an organized system of spatiotemporal 
orientations, i.e. valuations.49 “As the experiencing process moves from one 
point to another or from one phase to another, so does the spatiotemporal 
orientation shift, with the result that the valuation system changes to a larger or 
smaller extent. Some valuations, those that lose their relevance, are excluded; 
others, those that are elicited by the change in situation, are taken into the 
system.”50 According to Hermans, valuations have an affective connotation. This 
implies that specific things that are valued by persons have an affective meaning 
which can be assessed. Vice versa, the affective meaning that is attached to a 
specific thing, for example ‘death’, can tell us something about the value that is 
attached to that thing (in casu, death). These affects which are associated with 
valuations can be grouped into four domains.51 Affects such as strength and pride 
47  Reasoner P. Reincarnation and Karma. In: Taliaferro C, Draper P, Quinn PL, eds. A Companion to Philosphy 
of Religion. 2010; Singapore: Blackwell Publishing, p.639-648; p.640.
48  Scherer-Rath M, 2001, p.142-147. In the theoretical model retaliation and fulfillment of life were also 
distinguished as separate attitudes towards death. Based on Scherer-Rath’s empirical results and 
experiences with the instrument, these attitudes were not included in the present study. 
49  Hermans HJ. Self as an Organized System of Valuations. Journal of Counseling Psychology. 1987;34:10-19.
50  Hermans HJM, 1987, p.11.
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refer to the domain of self-enhancement; carefulness and love to the domain 
attachment to others; security and warmth to the domain of positive affects; and 
loneliness and powerlessness to the domain of negative affects.
Time perception
By time perception I refer to one’s stand towards time in terms of past, present and 
future and to time as clock time. Time perception can be defined as the orientation 
of an individual on the past, present and future, in view of a continuously changing 
present.52 Four different aspects can be distinguished: time coherence, time 
dominance, temporal extension and speed. Time coherence refers to the degree 
in which events in the past, present and future are experienced as a continuous 
whole. Time dominance refers to the prevailing orientation in one’s time perception. 
One can be predominantly focused on the present (present dominance) or on the 
past or future (past dominance or future dominance). Temporal extension 
describes the relative length of the past, present and future compared to one’s 
life time. Although time dominance is closely related to temporal extension it is 
conceptually distinct as in temporal extension a linear conception of time is 
assumed which is not necessarily the case for time dominance. Speed of time 
refers to the experience that time may have passed away faster or slower than 
the actual (clock) time that has passed away.53 When time is perceived as moving 
quickly (high speed), one has the idea that less time has passed than is actually 
indicated by the clock; time seems to run away. In contrast, when time is perceived 
as moving slowly, one has the experience that more time has elapsed than is the 
case according to clock time; time seems to drag.
1.5. Research questions
From the model sketched above, several research questions can be formulated.54 
We will adopt a research strategy exploring the patient characteristics from top 
to bottom and start. The following research questions will be answered:
1. Do coping strategies differ between patients who are treated curatively for 
cancer compared to cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting?55 
51  Oles PK, Hermans HJ. The dialogical self: Theory and research. 2005; Lublin: Wydawnictwo. Hermans HJM. 
The person as a motivated storyteller: Valuation theory and the Self-Confrontation Method. In: Neimeyer 
RA, Neimeyer GJ, eds. Advances in Personal Construct Psychology. 2002; New York: Praeger, p.3-38.
52  Sannen H. De levensloop als verhaal. Jongeren en hun tijdsperspectief 1955-1995. 1998; Tilburg: Tilburg 
University Press.
53  James W. The principles of psychology. 1983; Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
54  We are well aware that from the model more questions about relations between variables follow, of which 
some could, indeed, be answered by our dataset. However, just as any human project, also this study is 
constrained by the limits of time. 
55  In this thesis the expression ‘patients who are treated curatively for cancer’ and ‘disease-free cancer 
patients’ are used interchangeably. Similarly, no distinction is made between ‘cancer patients in the 
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2. What is the relation between coping strategies, quality of life, depression and 
hopelessness in patients who are treated curatively for cancer and cancer 
patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
3. Do relations between coping strategies on the one hand and quality of life, 
depression and hopelessness on the other hand differ between patients who 
are treated curatively for cancer compared to cancer patients in the palliative, 
end-of-life care setting?
4. What is the relation between adherence to a personal, non-personal and 
unknowable image of God and coping strategies in cancer patients in the 
palliative, end-of-life care setting?
In the next step, we will focus on the relation between time experience and 
distress. As we discussed above, time experience will be distinguished in attitudes 
towards human mortality and perception of time. The following research 
questions will be answered: 
5. Do attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife differ between cancer 
patients without evidence of disease compared to advanced cancer patients 
who are facing death?
6. What is the relation between these attitudes and emotions about death and 
afterlife and patients’ distress, operationalized as quality of life, depression 
and hopelessness? 
7. Do relations of attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife with distress 
differ between cancer patients without evidence of disease and advanced 
cancer patients?
8. What is the relation between time perception and distress in disease-free 
cancer patients and advanced cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life 
care setting? 
9. Do relations between time perception and distress differ between disease-free 
cancer patients without evidence of disease compared to advanced cancer 
patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting?
Finally, as the study of guilt and forgiveness is relatively new in the empirical 
research field of distress, we will single out this one specific aspect of distress. 
The following research questions will be answered:
10. Which sociodemographic and religious characteristics are associated with 
attitudes of guilt and forgiveness in patients without evidence of disease and 
advanced cancer patients?
palliative, end-of-life care setting’, ‘advanced cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting’, and 
‘advanced cancer patients’. 
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11. Do attitudes of guilt and forgiveness differ between patients without evidence 
of disease and advanced cancer patients?
12. Do relations between sociodemographic and religious characteristics on the 
one hand and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness on the other hand differ 
between patients without evidence of disease and patients with advanced 
cancer?
1.6. Design of the empirical study
This study is explorative and uses a descriptive research design. Using a 
quantitative survey we will be able to assess whether a relation between patient 
characteristics – as explicated above - and distress exists.56 
 For our research population we selected patients with cancer and distinguished 
between patients who were curatively treated for cancer and advanced cancer 
patients who received supportive care only. The inclusion of these groups of 
patients enables us to answer our research questions concerning experience of 
time and distress. Distress can be expected to vary between the curatively treated 
and advanced cancer patients and the experience of time becomes most relevant 
because of the life threatening character of the cancer diagnosis. However, 
although both groups of patients are confronted with a life threatening disease, 
the group of curatively treated patients is still looking at the prospect of 
continuation of life, while the advanced cancer patients directly face the reality 
of immanent death. 
 The inclusion criteria for curatively treated patients were: patients with a 
history of treatment for a solid tumor; end of treatment less than one year ago; 
no signs of acute treatment toxicities and no evidence of disease. Patients who 
were on adjuvant hormonal therapy could also be included in this group. The 
inclusion criteria for the palliative group were: patients with advanced solid tumors; 
not receiving anti-tumor therapies; recovered from acute treatment toxicities. 
Exclusion criteria for both groups were: inability to read Dutch or extreme morbidity 
precluding filling out a questionnaire.
 A questionnaire was sent to 236 eligible patients - 123 curatively treated 
patients and 113 palliative patients - from the departments of Surgery, Urology, 
Gynaecology, Internal Medicine, Medical Oncology and the Palliative Care unit of 
one university and two general hospitals, two hospices, and a regional consultation 
service for palliative care in the Netherlands. Twenty-three patients who were 
treated curatively for cancer and 40 patients in the palliative phase did not return 
the questionnaire. In both groups the most important reason (50% in the curative 
56  We acknowledge the advantages of a qualitative research design for an indepth exploration of the meaning 
of time in relation to distress in individual cancer patients. Preferably a qualitative and quantitative 
approach is combined. However, a qualitative approach falls beyond the scope of this thesis.
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group, 39% in the palliative group) for not participating was not specified. Eleven 
patients in the palliative phase deteriorated or died before they could return the 
questionnaire. 
 The study was approved by the institutional Medical Ethical Board of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre and all participating patients gave 
written informed consent. 
1.7. Overview of the chapters 57
To reach the first specific aim of this thesis, in chapter 2 we will explore a capability 
approach of distress. We will first introduce a capability approach of distress 
based on the philosophies of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.58 In principle, 
their capability approach is applicable to all situations of struggle for an adequate 
personal quality of life, dignity, justice and human flourising.59 As this approach 
acknowledges the struggle for quality of life and the failure to achieve human 
flourishing it may also be an attractive approach to understand the concept of 
distress. As we will see, this approach takes up the idea of distress as incapability. 
However, it cannot answer the question why specific incapabilities should be 
acknowledged in relation to distress. Moreover, it leaves aside the relevance of 
time experience in the confrontation with the vulnerability and fragility of human 
beings. Therefore, we will turn towards a hermeneutical approach, as exemplified 
by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. As we will see, by answering the question 
what it means ‘to identify a person’ we will, in fact, provide a foundation for the 
subjective, negatively charged experience of distress and provide an answer to 
the question what issues should be acknowledged which are related to distress.
 Our second aim concerns the empirical study of distress. Following our 
research strategy as detailed above, we will answer research questions 1-12 in the 
subsequent chapters. In chapter 3 we will describe the relation between coping 
strategies and distress, taking into account treatment phase and general 
demographic characteristics. Chapter 4 focuses on coping strategies of advanced 
cancer patients and assesses the relation between belief in God and/or a Higher 
being and coping strategies, accounting for other general and religious character-
istics. Chapter 5 and 6 describe the relation between experience of time and 
aspects of distress, taking into account treatment phase and general demographic 
characteristics. Chapter 7 investigates attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness, 
taking into account treatment phase, general and religious characteristics, and 
assesses the relation between images of God and guilt and forgiveness.
57 It should be noted that the chapters in this thesis do not provide a monography on distress, but aim 
to elucidate different aspects of distress, as detailed in the aims of the study and the specific research 
questions.
58  Nussbaum MC. Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach. 2011; Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
59  Nussbaum MC, 2011.
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 Finally, in chapter 8 we will summarize our research findings and further discuss 
their implications.
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2.1. Introduction
This chapter aims to explore the term distress, incorporating the idea of distress as 
a subject’s inability to constructively accommodate the confrontation with the 
vulnerability and fragility of human life into one’s own life. Therefore, in paragraph 
2.2, I will introduce a so-called capability approach, based on the philosophies of 
Sen and Nussbaum and describe distress in terms of incapabilities. To answer the 
question why specific incapabilities are related to distress and to acknowledge the 
aspect of time experience in the confrontation with the vulnerability and fragility of 
human beings, I will explore a hermeneutics of the self based on the philosophy of 
Ricoeur in paragraphs 2.3-2.7. In paragraph 2.8, I will summarize our findings and 
end with a conclusion.
2.2. A capability approach of distress
Generally speaking, capabilities refer to our abilities to perform actions. The 
economist Sen and the philosopher Nussbaum1 have attached a more specific 
meaning to capabilities which can be of interest for a capability approach of 
distress. Capabilities refer to “the alternative combinations of things a person is 
able to do or be – the various ‘functionings’ he or she can achieve.”2 Functionings 
are the active realization of one or more capabilities; to the things someone 
manages to do or to be in life; to his or her achievements. The difference between 
capabilities and functionings is illustrated by the example of a person who is 
starving and a person who is fasting. Both have the same type of functioning in 
relation to nutrition, but their capability is fundamentally different, as the fasting 
person may choose not to fast, while the starving person has no such choice. 
 Of note, capabilities are not just personal abilities, but result from a combination 
of personal abilities and the political, social and economic environment.3 In this 
respect, capability is a kind of freedom, viz. the freedom to choose and to achieve 
alternative functioning combinations, to lead different types of life. As Sen is well 
aware, the introduction of the concept of freedom is not unproblematic.4 What 
does it mean to have the freedom to choose a certain life? Clearly, it implies, for 
example, not being forced by the government to work in a factory if one rather 
works as a poet. However, if, in principle, someone could choose to live in a 
particular way, but does not have the courage to do so, should that be regarded as 
1  Although the capability approach of Sen and Nussbaum contain similar essential elements, they differ in 
certain aspects. Where relevant, I will indicate these differences. 
2  Sen A. Capability and Well-Being. Nussbaum MC, Sen A. The Quality of Life. 1993; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p.30-53; p.30.
3  Cf. Robeyns I. The Capability Approach: a theoretical survey. Journal of Human Development 2005;6:93-
114. Robeyns elegantly describes the interplay between a person’s capability set and the person’s social 
and personal context in relation to choice and achieved functionings. (p.98)
4  Sen A, 1993, p.33.
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a reduction in freedom and thus in capabilities? Also, it can be asked whether 
freedom only regards the range of choices a person has, or also the kind of choices 
one has. For example, if one has to choose between eating chicken or pasta or 
between eating dry bread or nothing, the number of choices is the same, but the 
value of the choices is not. 
 Originally, the capability approach was introduced by Sen in a rather economical 
context of evaluating inequality.5 Later, he has used the capability approach to 
analyze other social issues such as well-being and poverty, liberty and freedom, 
living standards and development, gender bias and sexual divisions, and justice and 
social ethics.6 This capability approach has been elaborated as a comparative 
measure in the context of international development policies and is, for example, 
used in the annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations. Nussbaum 
has broadened the applicability of their capability approach even further, 
encompassing all situations of struggle for an adequate personal quality of life, 
dignity and justice.7 Since this capability approach acknowledges the struggle for 
quality of life and the failure to achieve human flourishing, I propose to assess its 
usefulness to understand the concept of distress. If we understand human 
flourishing or quality of life8 in terms of the capability to achieve valuable 
functionings, we could describe distress by phrasing it the other way around: 
distress can be described in terms of the incapability to achieve valuable 
functionings. In the context of our search to understand the common denominator 
of signs, symptoms and side-effects related to distress in cancer patients, it may 
well be appreciated that distress is experienced in relation to incapabilities, i.e. in 
all those circumstances that capabilities are at stake. For example, the diagnosis of 
breast cancer, the subsequent amputation of a breast and the development of 
lymphedema of an arm will reduce one’s capabilities: it will not be possible to 
choose a job or hobbies which involve the heavy use of the lymphedema arm. If 
such a job or hobbies are regarded as valuable functionings, this reduction in one’s 
capabilities will lead to the experience of distress. 
 Please note that the ‘if’ in the last sentence of the previous paragraph is of 
crucial importance. If certain functionings are regarded valuable, a reduction in 
capabilities will be distressfull. How can the value of functionings be determined? 
The answer to this question is not provided by the capability approach itself. The 
capability approach does not provide a comprehensive theory of valuation. Indeed, 
5  Sen A. Equality of what? (1979 Tanner Lecture at Stanford). In: McMurrin SM, ed. Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values.1980; Salt Lake City/Cambridge: University of Utah Press/Cambridge University Press, 
p.195-220.
6  For an overview of works, see: Sen A, 1993, p.30.
7  Nussbaum MC. Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach. 2011; Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
8  Although several definitions are available for the concept ‘quality of life’ (cf. Aaronson NK, Meyerowitz 
BE, Bard M et al. Quality of life research in oncology. Past achievements and future priorities. Cancer. 
1991;67:839-843), in this context it is used as one of the alternative expressions for well-being, human 
flourishing, satisfaction with life etc.
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it may be argued that the cutting power of the capability approach lies in what it 
denies. As Sen writes: “It differs from the standard utility-based approaches in not 
insisting that we must value only happiness …, or only desire fulfillment … It differs 
also from other – non-utilitarian - approaches in not placing among value-objects 
primary goods as such ( …only to the extent that these goods promote capabilities), 
or resources as such (… only in terms of the impact of resources on functionings and 
capabilities).9 Nevertheless, Nussbaum holds a list of ten central capabilities that a 
life worthy of human dignity requires. According to Nussbaum, these ten central 
capabilities should be secured to enable people to pursue a dignified and minimally 
flourishing life.10 If we rethink these capabilities into incapabilities, they may also be 
applicable for our understanding of distress in individual cancer patients. Nussbaum 
identified the following list:
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to 
be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure 
against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
These three very first capabilities are clearly endangered by the diagnosis and 
treatment of cancer. Although everyone has to die once, dying of metastatic 
pancreatic cancer at the age of fifty seems way too early. Removal of your ovaries 
or testicles because of ovarian or testicular cancer precludes reproductive health 
and may impinge upon sexual satisfaction.
4. Senses, imagination, and thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, 
think, and reason—and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way 
informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means 
limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to 
use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing 
works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. 
Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of 
expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of 
religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid 
nonbeneficial pain.
Although the fourth capability mainly seems to refer to education and self-develop-
ment that is hampered by political and economic situations, frequent hospital visits 
and treatment side-effects may equally prevent school attention or work 
engagement. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside 
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in 
general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. 
9  Sen A, 1993, p.48.
10  Nussbaum MC, 2011, p.33-34.
Distress: a capability approach
40
Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. 
Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that 
can be shown to be crucial in their development.
Being blighted by fear and anxiety is an experience that, unfortunately, many 
cancer patients may recognize somewhere in the course of their disease. It may 
happen right at the moment of the diagnosis when the question strikes you if you 
can be treated at all, but also in the course of treatment when you doubt whether 
the therapy is effective. It may even occur when everything seems well and you 
have been discharged from follow-up, but now you are all alone on your own. 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. This entails protection for the 
liberty of conscience and religious observance.
The diagnosis of cancer and its subsequent treatment may, in fact, turn practical 
reason upside down. The planning of your life, your ideas about important goals 
and relevant achievements may suddenly tumble down as death suddenly becomes 
a realistic possibility. For some patients it will prove to be impossible to rearrange 
their life plans from this new perspective.
7. Affiliation. 
a) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for 
other humans, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to 
imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting 
institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also 
protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
b) Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be 
treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This 
entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin and species.
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and the world of nature.
The effects of cancer and its treatment throw patients back unto themselves. Not 
only can other people avoid them out of fear, but the patient may also retreat into 
his or her own small world. 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
The words ‘cancer’ and ‘play’ are almost a contradiction. The seriousness of the 
diagnosis is in sharp contrast with the lightness that is supposed in the word play. 
Moreover, physical and psychosocial consequences of the disease and its treatment 
may, indeed, cause an incapability to play. 
10. Control over one’s environment. 
a) Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern 
one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free 
speech and association.
b) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and 
having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek 
employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from 
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unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human, 
exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of 
mutual recognition with other workers.
The specific examples given in 10a and 10b do not seem directly applicable to the 
situation of cancer patients. However, the most general ‘having control over one’s 
environment’ is precisely what patients with cancer do not possess. Certainly, 
patients may speak up, express their wishes, take autonomous decisions and defer 
treatment. But still, they also have to comply to the rules of the hospital, the time 
schedule of the medical professionals, the prescribed regulations for taking 
medications. 
 In conclusion, although the original context of the capability approach of social 
and political inequity can be sensed in Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, with some 
effort the list can be understood as incapabilities which are applicable to 
understanding distress in individual cancer patients. However, the question remains 
why these specific capabilities are the ones that are related to valuable functionings 
and, therefore, human flourishing. Or, vice versa, why these ten incapabilities are 
the ones that are relevant for distress in cancer patients. Why specifically these ten 
capabilities and not ten other ones? And why ten and not twenty or five? As Sen 
holds: “Quite different specific theories of value may be consistent with the 
capability approach, and share the common feature of selecting value-objects from 
functionings and capabilities. Also, the capability approach can be used with 
different methods of determining relative weights and different mechanisms for 
actual evaluation.”11 Nussbaum has based her list of capabilities on Aristotelian 
virtues which are supposed to be crucial for truly (flourishing) human life and has 
refined the list based on years of cross-cultural discussion.12 Aristotle chose the 
virtues by singling out spheres of human experience that figure in (more or less) any 
human life and in which human beings will have to act and to make choices in one 
way or another. Thus, following this line of reasoning, human experience has to be 
related, in one way or another, to life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, 
imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, 
and control over one’s environment. Nevertheless, the question remains: why 
would this be so? 
 As we saw above, capabilities refer to the alternative combinations of things a 
person is able to do or be. Therefore, it may be hypothesized that to understand 
why certain incapabilities are related to distress, insight is required into the 
question what it means that ‘a person is able to do or be’. However, this insight 
cannot be gained from a capability approach of distress as sketched above. 
Moreover, from the capability approach sketched above the potentially relevant 
relation between time and distress which we alluded to in chapter 1, does not come 
11  Sen A, 1993, p.48.
12  Nussbaum MC. Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach. In: Nussbaum MC, Sen A. The Quality of 
Life. 1993; Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.242-269. Nussbaum MC. Women and Human Development. 
The Capabilities Approach. 2001; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.76.
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to the fore. Therefore, I propose to broaden our scope and move towards a 
hermeneutical approach of human capabilities and personal identity. A hermeneutical 
approach will provide a further theoretical framework for the understanding of 
distress from an analysis of identity, and substantiate the relevance of time 
experience in the confrontation with the vulnerability and fragility of human beings.
2.3.  Capabilities and distress: the problematic of 
selfhood and time
Essentially, hermeneutics is the study of the interpretation. In its oldest phase, 
hermeneutics referred to the interpretation of sacred, more specifically biblical, 
texts. Although these texts were given, they were still in need of some interpretation 
in order to recover and reveal meanings of the text which were non-obvious and 
hidden. This meaning was to be recovered within the context of a tradition, a 
religious history which surrounded the sacred texts. In the course of the nineteenth 
and twentieth century hermeneutics broadened its scope. It became a general 
philosophical method to understand any texts and historical materials. Furthermore, 
it became the specific mode of philosophical self-understanding, a method for 
understanding the ‘human’ as such; it became ‘existential’. In contemporary 
hermeneutic philosophy three features stand out:13  1) it is phenomenologically 
informed, attempting to study consciousness and the content of conscious 
experiences through systematic reflection; 2) it is ontological, in the sense that it 
aims to produce a hermeneutic of human existence; 3) it is deeply historical in its 
awareness.
 One of the primary contemporary hermeneutic philosophers is Paul Ricoeur. 
Interestingly, the notion of human capability (l’homme capable) may be regarded 
as the guiding thread running through his philosophical work.14 According to 
Ricoeur, to be a human being is to be capable to act; to be capable of initiating new 
actions which can be put in expressions such as ‘I can speak’, ‘I can do things’, ‘I can 
narrate’, ‘I can be imputed’. By the notion of human capability Ricoeur is able to link 
semantic and pragmatic approaches with a philosophy of narrative identity and 
morality. Also, human capability forms a link between human action and human 
suffering as our capabilities are intertwined with our vulnerabilities and various 
figures of otherness.15 For Ricoeur, human capability is the answer to the problematic 
of selfhood: “I identify myself by my capacities, by what I can do.”16 Questions 
13  Ihde D. Paul Ricoeur’s Place in the Hermeneutic Tradition. In: Hahn LE, ed. The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur.1995; Peru (Ill): Open Court Publishing Company, p.59-70.
14 Kaplan DM. Introduction: Reading Ricoeur. In: Kaplan DM, ed. Reading Ricoeur. 2008; Albany: State 
University of New York Press, p.1-12.
15 Kaplan DM, 2008.
16  Ricoeur P. Asserting Personal Capacities and Pleading for Mutual Recognition. In: B. Treanor, H.I. Venema 
(eds.), A Passion for the Possible. Thinking with Paul Ricoeur. 2010; New York: Fordham University Press, 
p.22-26; p.22. 
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about human capability lead to the ultimate question: ‘Who?’ In the same stroke, 
this question ‘Who?’ opens up a whole polysemy of other questions: “Who is speaking? 
Who is acting? Who is telling his or her own story? Who is the moral subject of 
imputation?”17 Ricoeurs hermeneutic philosophy is essentially a philosophy of 
detours.18 By following the detours in Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy of the self, 
I believe we will gain insight into the meaning of human capabilities, time, and 
ultimately the concept of distress. 
 According to Ricoeur in his pivotal work Oneself as Another, the problem of 
selfhood can be approached via different ways which may be summarized by a 
three-step rhythm: describing, narrating, and prescribing.19 Therefore, we will first 
elaborate on the role of describing in relation to the problematic of selfhood (2.4). 
However, as we will see, the problematic of selfhood implies the problematic of 
time. Given this relevance of a temporal dimension of the self, I will briefly introduce 
the concept of time, following Ricoeur’s line of argument in his trilogy Time and 
Narrative (2.5.1). This leads to the next section where we will study the intertwining 
of time and narrative to understand the self (2.5.2). In section 2.6 the role of 
prescribing in relation to the problematic of selfhood is sketched. Finally, in sections 
2.7 and 2.8, I will summarize the lessons learned from Ricoeur’s approach of the 
problematic of selfhood and time in relation to capabilities and distress and explain 
how the ontological feature in Ricoeur’s hermeneutical approach can further add 
to our understanding of distress in cancer patients. 
2.4. Description
As we said above, the problem of selfhood can be approached by the three-step 
rhythm describing, narrating, and prescribing.20 ‘Describing’ refers, first of all, to 
identification. The notion of identification may be regarded as the most modest 
sense underlying the understanding of selfhood. A “person is, to begin with, one of 
the things that we distinguish by means of identifying reference.”21 This identification 
may take place as definite descriptions, proper names, and indicators such as I, you, 
this, here, now.22 First, a definite description can be made by creating a class that 
contains just one single member. This is attained by having certain classes intersect. 
For example, the definite description ‘the first man to walk on the moon’ is created 
by the classes ‘man’, ‘walk’, and ‘moon’. Secondly, identification by proper names is 
achieved by assigning the same name, just a phonic chain, to the same individual 
17  Ricoeur P. Oneself as another. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. 1992; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, p.169. Throughout chapter 2 and 8, this work will be referred to as OA.
18  OA, p.17.
19  OA, p.20.
20  OA, p.20.
21 OA, p.27.
22  OA, p.28-30.
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every time that this person comes to the fore. Finally, identification may take place 
via indicators such as personal pronouns (‘I’, ‘you’), demonstratives (‘this’, ‘that’) 
and adverbs of place and time (‘here’, ‘there’, ‘yesterday’, ‘now’, ‘tomorrow’).
 Although for the notion of selfhood proper identification is relevant to 
distinguish one person from another, in the end it is not sufficient to designate a 
person as a self, rather than merely as a type of thing, albeit a unique type of thing. 
By identifying persons in terms of specific characteristics - definite descriptions, 
proper names, and indicators - we may be able to speak about persons as entities 
making up our world, but not about persons as selves. For example, specific charac-
teristics may be assigned to a body, including height, weight, skin colour, and 
genetic make-up which undoubtedly designate one particular, singular body. In 
fact, one’s genetic make-up is ´immutable from the birth to the death of an 
individual, the biological basis of his identity.’ In this way, identifying reference 
assures personal identity in terms of sameness (mêmeté). However, although these 
specific characteristics of a body may designate a body as one and the same, it 
cannot designate this body as mine. A strictly referential framework, in terms of 
identifying reference, is insufficient to answer the question of selfhood. Instead of 
trying to find the answer in terms of the power of designation, we have to switch 
gears to the power of self-designation to make a person a self. According to Ricoeur, 
“we may … wonder whether persons can be distinguished from bodies if self-desig-
nation is not included in the very determination of the meaning ascribed to the sort 
of things to which identifying reference is directed.”23  
 Moving from designation to self-designation implies that we move from 
statements to utterances, from the field of semantics, in the referential sense of the 
term, to the field of pragmatics.24 In an utterance, i.e. an act of speaking, the 
speaker is designated reflexively. In the field of identifying reference we are making 
statements about ‘others’ (‘him’, ‘her’), while in the act of speaking the ‘I’ and the 
‘you’ of the speech situation are directly put on the fore. Following the classical 
theory of speech acts, Ricoeur distinguishes between performatives and 
constatives.25 Performatives are characterized by ‘doing by saying’. To say ‘I promise 
you’ is, at the very moment of uttering the sentence, actually promising something 
to someone. In contrast, the sentence ‘he promises’ is constative and does not have 
this ‘saying by doing’ feature. Of note, the performative utterance ‘I promise’ 
supposes simultaneously an ‘I’ that is speaking and a ‘you’ to whom the utterance 
is directed; “utterance equals interlocution”.26   
 Although by moving from designation to self-designation the ‘I’ is introduced 
and, thereby, we are getting more closely to an answer to the problem of selfhood, 
the question remains: Who is this ‘I’ who designates him/herself? As is illustrated 
by the following quote: “By ‘I’ (in ‘I see’) I did not mean: Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
23  OA, p.32.
24  OA, p.40.
25  OA, p.42-44.
26  OA, p.44.
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although addressing someone else, I could say: ‘It is now L.W. who is actually 
seeing,’ except that this is not what I meant to say.”27 Approaching the question of 
selfhood on a descriptive level by a theory of language (semantics and pragmatics) 
only does not seem sufficient. Therefore, on this descriptive level Ricoeur also 
introduces a theory of action. What does action teach us about its agent?
 To answer this question, it is relevant to know what counts as an action. This 
latter question can be answered by asking two further questions, viz. ‘what’ and 
‘why’. The answer to the ‘what-question’ describes actions as human actions, by 
distinguishing them from events. Events simply happen, while actions are what 
make things happen.28 This may be illustrated by the distinction between 
‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’. Knowing-how refers to a kind of practical 
knowledge such as knowing the position of one’s body, the limbs, a gesture that 
one can make. In contrast to ‘knowing-that’, this practical knowledge is knowledge 
without observation, it just happens. The ‘what’ of action is further specified by its 
relation to the ‘why’ of action. In fact, “the relation of one question to the other is 
unavoidable: one can hardly inform anyone else about what one does without 
saying at the same time why one is doing it.”29 The motive for an action and the 
action itself are mutually implicated. Motive is the reason for action. Reason in this 
respect does not imply that motivation is always rational (it may also imply a desire 
or drive), but is ‘reason for’. Thus, actions may be designated as actions when they 
make things happen for a reason. 
 Interestingly, although this analysis does, at least somehow, answer the 
question ‘What counts as action?’ it seems to blur the answer to our primary 
question, viz. ‘What does action teach us about its agent?’30 The ‘who’ of the action 
seems to be assimilated by the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of action. How can we get back to 
the ‘who’ of action? As Ricoeur observes himself, one of the greatest lacuna in the 
abovementioned descriptive approach of human capability is the temporal 
dimension of action and of the self.31 The ‘who’, the person of whom we are 
speaking and the agent on whom the action depends “have a history, are their own 
history”.32 Action can only take place in time and, therefore, “personal identity … 
can be articulated only in the temporal dimension of human existence.”33 However, 
what then is time? This question will be taken up in the next section.
27  Granger GG. Langages et épistémologie, 1979; Paris: Klincksieck, p.174; cited in OA, p.51.
28  OA, p.61.
29  OA, p.63.
30  OA, p.59-61; p.72.
31  OA, p.113.
32  OA, p.113.
33  OA, p.114.
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2.5. Narration
In the first section of this paragraph, we will briefly follow Ricoeur’s reflection on 
time in Time and Narrative, opposing a psychological approach towards time as 
exemplified by the thinking of St Augustine and a cosmological approach for which 
the philosophy of Aristotle is the prime example (2.5.1). However, as we will see, to 
properly understand time as human time, both approaches need to be reconciled. 
This leads to the next section, in which we follow Ricoeur’s line of reasoning that 
time becomes human time to the extent that time is organized after the manner of 
a narrative (2.5.2). Finally, in section 2.5.3, we will see that the intertwining of time 
and narrative is essential to understand selfhood.
2.5.1. The experience of time
“What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone 
who asks me, I do not know.”34 Book 11 of Augustine’s confessions, where this sigh 
is uttered, is taken up by Ricoeur in the first volume of his trilogy Time and Narrative, 
to sketch the aporias of the experience of time.35 One of the fundamental aporias 
of time is the question about its being, or non-being. The latter is exemplified by the 
observation that the future is not yet, the past is no longer and the present does 
not remain. However, at the same time we speak of time as having being: in the 
future things will be, in the past things were so and so and current events are 
passing away. This aporia of (non-)being leads to the next aporia, viz. the aporia of 
the measurement of time. How could we measure something that does not exist? 
How can it be that we speak of duration (a long future, a long past) if past and 
future have no being? Nevertheless, in language, along with the experience and 
action articulated by language, the existence of time and its duration is held. How 
can the being and non-being of time be reconciled?
 Augustine solves the paradox by placing the past and the future within the 
present, understanding the past as memory and the future as expectation. Past and 
future do not exist as such, but past things and future things can be predicted and 
recounted. Thus, “‘it is inaccurate to say ‘There are three tenses, or times: past, 
present and future,’ though it might properly be said, ‘There are three tenses or 
times: the present of past things, the present of present things and the present of 
future things.’”36 For Augustine, the presence of past, presence and future is 
located in the soul, without any reference to a cosmological conception of time. 
This is nicely illustrated by Roseanne McNulty, a forgotten centenarian, long-time 
resident of the Roscommon regional mental hospital in the novel The Secret 
Scripture, by Sebastian Barry. She is attempting to organize her memories and 
34  Augustinus A. Boulding M, Rotelle JE. The works of Saint Augustine: a translation for the 21st century. The 
Confessions; Book 11. 1997;Chapter XIV, p.295.
35  Ricoeur P. Time and Narrative. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. 1984; (I) Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, p.7. In the following, this work will be referred to as TN-I.
36 Augustinus A, 1997, Chapter XX:300.
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writes: “I am old enough to know that time passing by is just a trick, a convenience. 
Everything is always there, still unfolding, still happening. The past, the present, 
and the future, in the noggin eternally, like brushes, combs, and ribbons in a 
handbag.”37 
 Despite the beauty of Augustine’s psychological conception of time, it does not 
do justice to the experience that “it is simply not true that a day would remain what 
we call a ‘day’ if it were not measured by the movement of the sun.”38 A cosmological 
conception of time needs to be considered, too.39 According to this cosmological 
tradition “time surrounds us, envelops us, and dominates us, without the soul 
having the power to produce it.”40 Prime representative of this approach is 
Aristotle. Aristotle holds that, without being movement itself, time is something 
that has to do with movement.41 Time consists of a series of instants, of ‘ now-points’, 
which succeed one after another. 
 In conclusion, to think about time in order to understand human being both 
these psychological and cosmological dimensions of time should be grasped. How 
to proceed? According to Ricoeur, narrative may be the place to understand human 
being and bring together this twofold meaning of time. 
2.5.2. Time and narrative
Interestingly, Ricoeur does not define time, nor shows us what time is,42 but offers 
us a mediation between time and narrative, arguing that “time becomes human time 
to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, 
is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal existence.”43
 In this statement two parts can be distinguished.44 The first part of the 
statement, ‘time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the 
manner of a narrative’, refers to the solution of the aporia between psychological 
time and cosmological time, since in a story both the nonchronological (subjective) 
aspects of time and chronological (objective) aspects of time are accommodated. 
This solution for the aporia of time is achieved by emplotment. The second part of 
the statement, ‘narrative is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of 
temporal existence’, tells us that narratives refer to the temporal character of 
human existence for the sake of refiguring it: recounting and reflecting on what 
37  Barry S. The Secret Scripture. 2008; London: Faber and Faber Limited, p.210.
38  Ricoeur P. Time and Narrative. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. 1988; (III), Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, p.13. In the following, this work will be referred to as TN-III.
39  TN-III, p.12-22.
40  TN-III, p.12.
41  TN-III, p.13.
42  Vandevelde P. The Challenge of the “such as it was”: Ricoeur’s Theory of Narratives. In: Kaplan DM (ed.). 
Reading Ricoeur. 2008; Albany: State University of New York Press, p.142.
43  TN-I, p.3.
44  Klemm DE. Philosophy and Kerygma: Ricoeur as Reader of the Bible. In: Kaplan DM (ed.). Reading Ricoeur. 
2008; Albany: State University of New York Press, p.47-69; p.58-59. 
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happens. Narratives are “the privileged means by which we re-configure our 
confused, unformed, and at the limit mute temporal experience.” 45 
 Let us look more closely into the relation between narrative and time. Ricoeur 
describes this relation through what he calls a threefold mimesis. Mimesis1, or 
prefiguration, is the preunderstanding of the world of action in which the 
composition of the plot is grounded. It refers to the level of life, action and events 
that is already prenarrative. The features of this level of life, action and events give 
them a prenarrative quality.46 These features include the semantics of action, the 
symbolic of action and the temporality of action. First, the semantics of action refer 
to the differentiation of action from merely physical movements (cf. 2.4). Actions 
imply goals (answering the question ‘what?’), refer to motives (answering the 
question ‘why?’), have agents (answering the question ‘who?’), take place under 
certain circumstances (answering the question ‘how?’) and take the form of 
cooperation, competition or struggle (answering the question ‘with/against 
whom?’) The questions ‘what’, ‘why’, ‘who’, ‘how’, ‘with/against whom’ which 
determine human action, also form the basic network for a narrative. The second 
feature, the symbolic of action, refers to “a meaning incorporated into action and 
decipherable from it by other actors in the social interplay.”47 Action is mediated by 
signs, rules and norms. The third feature refers to the temporality of action: action 
unfolds in time, it has a beginning and an end.
 Mimesis2, or configuration, is what Aristotle calls muthos: putting into a plot, or 
emplotment, making explicit what was already implicit in the action. Emplotment 
has a mediating function in three ways.48 First of all, it mediates between the 
individual events and the story taken as a whole. Furthermore, emplotment brings 
together heterogeneous, discordant elements such as goals, causes, circumstances 
into an intelligible whole. Emplotment may be regarded as concordant discordance. 
Thirdly, emplotment ‘grasps together’ the two temporal dimensions, chronological 
and non-chronological, that we discussed above. On the one hand, it presents 
episodes in accord with the irreversible order of cosmological time, answering the 
question ‘and then what’ by ‘then, and then, and then.’ At the same time, 
emplotment arranges the succession of events into one meaningful whole, by 
assembling events together. Emplotment “extracts a configuration from a 
succession.”49 However, narrative attains its full meaning only when “it is restored 
to the time of action and of suffering in mimesis3.”
50
 Mimesis3, or refiguration, is the return of mimesis2 to the world of action. In 
mimesis3 the world of the story, the text, intersects with the world of the listener 
or reader. It is only by reading a story, or hearing a story, that the story’s capacity 
45  TN-I, p.xi.
46  TN-I, p.54-64. 
47  TN-I, p.57.
48  TN-I, p.65-67.
49  TN-I, p.66.
50  TN-I, p.70.
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to be followed is actualized. In turn, by reading or hearing a story, the world is 
resignified in its temporal dimension following the narrative’s invitation.51 The 
world of action is enriched by the narratives and stories that have been read and 
heard. By mimesis3 we have, made a circular movement and are brought back to 
the level of mimesis1. As Ricoeur states: “That the analysis is circular is indisputable. 
But that the circle is a vicious one can be refuted. In this regard, I would rather 
speak of an endless spiral that would carry the mediation past the same point a 
number of times, but at different altitudes.”52
 Acknowledging this mediation between time and narrative via mimesis1, 
mimesis2, mimesis3 and back to mimesis1, the question is how this can help us to 
understand the problematic of selfhood from which we started. 
2.5.3. Time, narrative, and the problematic of selfhood
As stated above the problematic of selfhood cannot be approached without 
acknowledging the temporal dimension of personal identity. However, rather than 
directly solving the problematic of selfhood, the introduction of temporality seems 
to enhance the problem even further: how can we know that a self is the self we 
were referring to if time passes by? At first sight, this question on the permanence 
of self in time may lead us back to an answer on the descriptive level: a self remains 
the same in the course of time because of numerical identity, qualitative identity 
and/or uninterrupted continuity.53 Numerical identity corresponds to the notion of 
reidentification of the same thing: several, e.g. five occurrences of the same thing 
in the course of time do not imply five different things, but one and the same thing 
five times. Qualitative identity denotes extreme resemblance: the statement x and 
y are wearing the same jacket means that the jackets have no noticeable difference. 
Finally, uninterrupted continuity refers to identity in the course of time when 
growth of ageing may threaten resemblance, but where continuity can be 
demonstrated by the ordered series of small changes, for example when we see 
photos of someone at successive ages. At this descriptive level personal identity is 
understood as sameness (mêmeté, idem-identity) which is exemplified by the idea 
of ‘character’, the set of distinctive marks and lasting dispositions which permit re-
identification of a human individual as being the same.54 
 However, by equating identity with sameness, we cannot fully accommodate 
the diversity, variability, discontinuity and instability induced by the course of time. 
Another model for permanence in time is needed which may be exemplified by the 
model of ‘keeping one’s word’. Holding a promise stands up against the challenge 
of time. Promise is the antidote of forgetting.55 Keeping a promise implies 
self-constancy that can resist the diversity, variability, discontinuity and instability 
51  TN-I, p.76-82.
52  TN-I p.72.
53  OA, p.115-118.
54  OA, p.119, 121.
55  OA, p.345.
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induced by the course of time, but, clearly, cannot be understood as ‘sameness’. 
Both this aspect of permanence in time, or ipse-identity, as well idem-identity has 
to be accounted for in order to do justice to the question of selfhood. Ricoeur holds 
that “self-constancy over time rests on a complex interplay of sameness and 
ipsity.”56 Therefore, in the three-step rhythm to approach the problem of selfhood 
we have to move from describing to narrating and consequently, as we will see, also 
prescribing. 
 The complex interplay between sameness and ipsity can be illustrated by 
drawing back on the conception of character. As we saw above, character may be 
regarded as the prime example of permanence in time in terms of sameness. 
However, character can also be understood narratively. First of all, a character is 
the one who performs actions in a story. Those actions can be understood from a 
prefigurative understanding of the world (cf. above, mimesis1). Although characters 
are singular and can be distinguished from others (idem-identity), this concordance 
is threatened by the disruptive effect of unforeseeable events in the course of time, 
by discordance. In order to maintain character, a synthesis has to be brought about 
between several events (synthesis on a quantitative level), between qualitatively 
different events (synthesis on a qualitative level), and between a succession of 
events (synthesis on a temporal level).57 The identity of a character can only be 
maintained by the synthesis of this concordance and discordance, viz. by 
emplotment (mimesis2). Thus, a character is not only the one who performs action 
in a narrative, but “characters … are themselves plots.”58 In other words, the 
identity of a self can be elucidated by the mediation between time and narrative via 
mimesis1 and mimesis2.
 Thus, a narrative can create a temporal coherence whereby the plot links past, 
present and future to one another. A narrative also links the plot to the personal 
goals that people pursue. These personal goals are not necessarily a well developed, 
clearly described life project, but may be global, fuzzy and unclear. Nevertheless, 
on the level of a “narrative unity of life” they govern our actions, practices and life 
plans.59 Life plans may be understood as the intermediary between this overall 
story of life and our actions, organized in practices – professions, games, arts. “Life 
plans take shape – a shape that is mobile and, moreover, changeable – thanks to a 
back-and-forth movement between more or less distant ideals, which must now be 
specified, and the weighing of advantages and disadvantages of the choice of a 
particular life plan on the level of practices.”60 
 In a narrative seemingly separate, arbitrary events striking you in the course of 
time are configured into an intelligible whole. When one follows a story, one moves 
“forward in the midst of contingencies and peripeteia under the guidance of an 
56  MHF, p.81. 
57  Dupont J. Identiteit is kwaliteit. 2010; Budel: Uitgeverij Damon, p.102-103.
58  OA, p.143.
59  MacIntyre A. After virtue. A study in moral theory. 1984; University of Notre Dame Press.
60  OA, p.157-158.
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expectation that finds its fulfillment in the ‘conclusion’ of the story. This conclusion 
is not logically implied by some previous premises. It gives the story an ‘end point’, 
which, in turn, furnishes the point of view from which the story can be perceived as 
forming a whole. To understand the story is to understand how and why the 
successive episodes led to this conclusion, which, far from being foreseeable, must 
finally be acceptable, as congruent with the episodes brought together by the 
story.”61 The paradox of emplotment is that “it inverts the effect of contingency, in 
the sense of that which could have happened differently or which might not have 
happened at all, by incorporating it in some way into the effect of necessity or 
probability exerted by the configuring act.”62
2.6. Prescription 
In our approach of the problem of selfhood we follow the three-step rhythm of 
describing, narrating, and prescribing. As explained earlier, only by reading a story, 
or hearing a story, the story’s capacity to be followed is actualized. Mimesis2 asks 
for mimesis3 in order to bring the story back to the world of action. A story asks for 
action. This action is not a simple reiteration of the actions at the level of mimesis1, 
but is enriched by the emplotment of mimesis2. Interestingly, this brings us from 
the level of narrating to the level of prescribing, as an ethical perspective is brought 
into the world of action and, as a result, also into the question of selfhood. “There 
is in action not only something to be recounted, but also something asking to be 
justified.”63 In mimesis3 it becomes clear that a self is not only an agent - the origin 
of activities in the course of time -, nor only the one who recounts the actions into 
an intelligible whole - putting oneself in charge of time -, but also the judge of 
activity through its capacity to reflect critically.64 In mimesis2, discordant elements 
are brought together in concordance by means of emplotment, endowing the self 
with self-constancy. Self-constancy implies that one can ‘keep one’s word’, i.e. that 
others can count on that person. Narrative is the transition of “… the ascription of 
action to an agent who has the capacity to act and its imputation to an agent who 
has the obligation to act.”65 Because someone is counting on me, I am accountable 
for my actions before another. In this way, the other becomes an undeniable part 
of my identity. The other is confronted with my actions, undergoes them or suffers 
from them, but also judges my actions and holds me accountable. 
 Giving an account of my actions implies practical wisdom, to assess my actions 
from the viewpoint of moral norms, under the recourse of ethical aims.66 Practical 
61  TN-I, p.66-67.
62  OA, p.142. Cf. TN-I, p.40-41.
63  Vandevelde P, 2008, p.160.
64 Klemm DE, 2008, p.47. 
65  OA, p.152.
66  OA, p.169-296. Cf. J. Schilderman, Liturgy as a Spiritual Practice, Studies in Spirituality (in press).
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wisdom refers to a situational-philosophical approach that acknowledges the 
perspective of complex and problematic situations. The norms refer to a 
deontological perspective, judging from the perspective of obligation. The aims 
refer to a teleological perspective of foundational values. Ultimately, the account of 
my actions will be judged against the milestone of “aiming at the good life, with and 
for others, in just institutions.”67 In the situational philosophical approach this 
implies that one takes into account that the deontological and teleological approach 
may be conflicting. In the deontological approach ‘aiming at the good life, with and 
for others, in just institutions’ takes the form of respect for oneself (autonomy) and 
respect for the other (reciprocity) which is safeguarded by principles of justice. In 
the teleological approach this aiming for the good life is expressed as esteem of 
oneself, friendship with others, in the societal setting of justice. By passing ethical 
aims through the sieve of moral norms proper judgment can be achieved in concrete 
situations. However, when the deontological and teleological approach cannot be 
balanced, practical wisdom will bring us back to the realm of ethical aims.
2.7. Distress as the infringement of selfhood
In the preceding sections, we have seen that the identity of a self can be understood 
in a three-step rhythm of describing, narrating and prescribing, by the mediation 
between time and narrative via mimesis1, mimesis2, and mimesis3. In section 2.7.1, I 
will relate the results of paragraphs 2.3-2.6 back to our capability approach of 
distress as outlined in paragraph 2.2. Then, in section 2.7.2, I will take our findings 
of the understanding of distress one final step further, by introducing Ricoeur’s 
sketch of an ontology of the self. 
2.7.1. Capabilities, selfhood, and distress
In terms of human capabilities the identity of the self, understood in the three-step 
rhythm of describing, narrating and prescribing, implies that “the capacity to say, 
the capacity to act, and the capacity to recount, to which ... imputability and 
promising [are added], [are part of] the typological outline [of basic human 
capacities].”68 Thus, rather than via a theory of valuation, the route via the 
problematic of selfhood has provided us with a list of capabilities which may be 
relevant to understand distress in cancer patients. Indeed, the relation between 
Ricoeur’s notion of human capabilities and distress in cancer patients can be 
sketched in a similar way as we suggested when using the capability approach of 
distress, based on Sen and Nussbaum, as outlined in 2.2. The diagnosis and 
treatment of cancer, or even cancer itself may impinge on one’s capabilities to say, 
to act, to recount, to be imputable and to be able to promise. Surgery and 
subsequent radiation of a tumor in the head and neck region may hinder proper 
67  OA, p.172.
68  Ricoeur P, 2010, p.23.
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speech, widespread bone metastases of breast cancer leading to multiple bone 
fractures may diminish one’s capacity to act, a brain tumor may preclude one’s 
capability to recount and strong pain medication may interfere with one’s capability 
to be imputable and to promise. 
 It must be noted that the basic capabilities that are chosen by Ricoeur are not 
exactly the same in all his texts where he deals with human capabilities.69 Although 
‘speaking’, ‘acting’, ‘narrating’, and ‘being imputable’ are always selected, 
‘promising’ is not consistently included. In fact, thusfar the most important 
outcome from the introduction of the problematic of selfhood may not be a 
standard list of capabilities, but rather the recognition that when capabilities are at 
stake something essential is at stake. Capabilities are not accidental, peripheral 
characteristics of human beings. When dealing with capabilities we directly touch 
onto the self itself, i.e. on the constitution of the self. When the diagnosis and 
treatment of cancer impinge upon one’s capabilities, this does not only imply that 
one simply cannot choose to do this or that, but it also implies that the self is called 
into question. And by questioning the self the whole polysemy of questions related 
to the self is evoked: Who is the I who is speaking? Who is the I who is acting? Who 
is the I who is telling his or her own story? Who is the I who is the moral subject of 
imputation? Who is the I who is promising? Or, introducing a temporal aspect - 
which so fundamentally determines the self - into these questions: was it me and 
will it still be me who speaks, acts, tells my story, is imputed, and makes promises? 
The answers to these questions determine the self. And, vice versa, not being able 
to answer to these questions endangers one’s identity. A questionable identity: 
that is, I propose, the crux of the experience of distress. The incapability to answer 
‘it’s me who is speaking, acting, narrating and being imputed’ is the kernel of 
distress. In other words, distress is the infringement of capabilities which puts the 
self at stake and makes identity questionable.
 The relevance of (in)capabilities for the experience of distress was already 
suggested by the capability approach of distress, based on Sen and Nussbaum. 
However, by means of the description of distress as the incapability to answer ‘ it’s 
me’, ‘here I am’, ‘it is myself’ this capability approach becomes more focussed. 
When referring to distress we are not discussing a random set of incapabilities, but 
we are ultimately concerned with the incapability to be a self. Nevertheless, the 
question remains which capabilities should be regarded as indispensable for the 
constitution of the self. Or vice versa, which incapabilities essentially compromise 
the self. As we already observed, even the so-called ‘basic’ capabilities that are 
chosen by Ricoeur may change depending on which specific text of Ricoeur one 
reads. Therefore, I propose to take one final step further and introduce Ricoeur’s 
ontology of the self to assess which capabilities are essential for the self. 
69  Kaufmann S. The attestation of the self as a bridge between hermeneutics and ontology in the philosophy 
of Paul Ricoeur. 2010; Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University, p.23.
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2.7.2. An ontology of the self
As we stated in our introductory section on hermeneutics, contemporary 
hermeneutics is ontological, in the sense that it aims to produce a hermeneutics of 
human existence. And, as Tong holds, “… although for Ricoeur, ontology is in no way 
separable from interpretation and is the ‘promised land’ which the hermeneutic 
philosopher can ony glimpse but can never truly reach before he dies, existence is 
definitely not just a matter of meaning and language. For the truth is, what speaks 
through the mirror of meaning and representation is something that is prior and 
more fundamental than the meaningful representation: namely, the act of existence 
itself.”70 In the last study of Oneself as Another Ricoeur presents an ontology of the 
self, in relation to his previously expounded hermeneutical approach, which sheds 
further light onto incapabilities calling the self into question. 
 Thusfar, in the hermeneutics of the self we have focussed on human capabilities 
in the sense of ‘I can …’. However, in the notion of human capability not only power, 
but also vulnerability is included: humans cannot … In the words of Ricoeur: “Under 
this expression [capable man] I gather all the figures of power and impotence, as 
indicated by linguistic constructions using the auxiliary verb can. Power is the whole 
of what I can do; impotence the sum of what I cannot. In the broad sense of the 
word, it is about an approach to the human phenomenon in terms of acting and 
suffering, of praxis and pathos.”71 This pathos, or passivity which can be found 
within the self can, on an ontological plane, be regarded as otherness. Otherness is 
implied in selfhood, as is already suggested by the title of Oneself as Another. 
Ricoeur distinguishes a triad of passivity or otherness, viz. the passivity of one’s 
own body; the passivity of the relation of the self to the foreign, to the other and 
the passivity of the self to itself, which is conscience in the sense of Gewissen.72 
 The passivity, or otherness, of one’s own body denotes “resistance that gives 
way to effort.”73 This refers, first of all, to the body’s mass, its gravity. Moving our 
body, walking, running, cycling, dancing, is never simply as a matter of course. Each 
time we want to walk, run, cycle or dance an effort is required to move our body. 
On a next plane, we come across the passivity of our body by the coming and going 
of our humors; humors that are ‘there’ despite ourselves. Rather than to physicial 
resistance this passivity refers to psychological resistance which we have to 
overcome each time when we want to act. Finally, the passivity of the body is 
encountered by the resistance of external things. Each time when we go around in 
the external world we touch upon other things, stumble over other bodies. We find 
ourselves in the external world due to the resistance of our body. 
70 Tong LK. Act, sign and conscience: thinking along with Ricoeur. In: Hahn LE. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. 
1995; Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, p.511-527; p.514.
71 Ricoeur P, Religious Belief. The Difficult Path of the Religious. In: B. Treanor, H.I. Venema (eds.), A Passion 
for the Possible. Thinking with Paul Ricoeur. 2010; New York: Fordham University Press, p.27-40; p.27-28.
72 AO, p.318.
73 AO, p.321.
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 This brings us to the passivity of the relation of the self to the other, since 
according to Ricoeur, the otherness of other selves is not reducible to the alterity of 
other bodies. Based on an extended analysis of Husserl’s account of ‘appresentation’ 
of the giveness of the other Ricoeur establishes our awareness of the other as 
another self. However, it is only by Levinas’ account of the ‘face of the other’ that, 
according to Ricoeur, the other self presents itself on the ethical plane and calls us 
to moral responsibility. In each case when we are confronted with others, we have 
to apprehend them as other selves, but we are at the same time constituted as 
selves. 
 Finally, conscience, the German Gewissen, is the last place where the self and 
the other intertwine. Conscience introduces otherness into the self by means of 
“the sort of call (Ruf) or appeal (Anruf) that is indicated by the metaphor of the 
voice. In this intimate conversation, the self appears to be called upon and, in this 
sense, affected in a unique way.”74 This is illustrated by the issue of guilt. A subject 
must always bring about mediations between disproportionate elements and, 
therefore, is liable to make mistakes; faults are luring. Objectively spoken, a fault 
implies the transgression of a rule. However, a fault not only refers to a prohibited 
action and its eventually harmful consequences, but also refers back to the one 
who committed the action and can be hold accountable for the fault. This call for 
accountability is the voice of guilt. “Guilt ... is implied in every contingent situation 
and belongs to what we ourselves have designated by the phrase our “historical 
condition”.75 Moreover, our temporality implies that once the fault is committed it 
is irreversible. It is certainly possible to soften or even repair the consequences of a 
fault, but once committed, it remains committed. We can take responsibility for our 
actions and make ourselves accountable, but the actions taken are irreversible; the 
past cannot be wiped out or rewinded. In fact, “stripping guilt from our existence 
would, it seems, destroy that existence totally.”76 
 In the case of conscience, the source of the call for accountability remains 
unclear; it bears the presence of other people in the form of social values, the ideas 
of ancestors as sedimented in myths and cults, and even of God. As Ricoeur writes: 
“Perhaps the philosopher as philosopher has to admit that one does not know and 
cannot say whether this Other, the source of the injunction, is another person 
whom I can look in the face or who can stare at me, or my ancestors for whom there 
is no representation, … or God – living God, absent God – or an empty place.”77 
Nevertheless, in each case that this voice of conscience calls upon the self we are 
summoned to answer ‘Here I stand!’
 Similarly, this voice of conscience, wherever it may come from, may not only 
call upon the self to give an account, but also to forgive. At first sight, forgiveness 
74 AO, p.342.
75 MHF, p.460.
76 MHF, p.466. 
77 AO, p.355.
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seems impossible. “Fault in its essence is unforgivable.”78 Nevertheless, Ricoeur 
holds: “There is forgiveness.”79 He refers to forgiveness as if it is announced from 
an insurmountable height. And indeed, looking at the, in essence, impossibility of 
forgiveness, one could argue that it should come from an insurmountable height. 
Nevertheless, forgiveness draws on the human capacity to recreate oneself in a 
new future. When you are forgiven, you are told: “You are better than your 
actions.”80 Forgiveness involves the “unbinding of the agent from the act.”81 
However, it does not involve a forgetting of the events themselves, but is a different 
way of signifying a debt to the dead that paralyzes memory.82 “In each case when 
we forgive another person, this person is to be considered capable of something 
other than his offenses and his faults.”83 
 Please note the use of ‘in each case’ in the previous paragraphs when we 
discussed the ‘self called into question’ by the otherness of the body, by other 
people and by conscience. Indeed, “to say self is not to say myself …the passage 
from selfhood to mineness is marked by the clause ‘in each case’ …The self … is in 
each case mine.”84 Each person has to take one’s selfhood as one’s own; each must 
take oneself as who one is; one must attest to oneself to be oneself.85 Attestation is 
a kind of belief, but not in the sense of doxa, of ‘I believe that’, but rather believe as 
‘I believe in’. Attestation “can be defined as the assurance of being oneself acting 
and suffering.”86 Attestation shows us that to become a self we need to affirm 
ourself by appropriating otherness.87 Thus, it is by attestation that the self is most 
fundamentally constituted.  
 What does this imply for our concept of distress? We stated that the incapability 
to answer ‘it’s me who is speaking, acting, narrating and being imputed’ is the 
kernel of distress. Indeed, by infringement of one’s capabilities the self is at stake. 
On an ontological plane we saw that in the notion of human capability not only 
power, but also vulnerability, passivity, otherness was included: humans cannot. 
Otherness may even overshadow ownness, passivity may outweigh activity, and 
78 AO, p.355.
79 L.c.
80 MHF, p.493.
81 L.c.
82 Kearny R. On the Hermeneutics of Evil. Kaplan DM (ed.). Reading Ricoeur. 2008; Albany: State University 
of New York Press, p.71-88; p.81.
83 MHF, p.493. Although in this way the height of forgiveness may not be insurmountable anymore, still 
an asymmetry can be observed. Despite the experience in everyday life of the correlation between 
forgiveness requested and forgiveness granted, in principle forgiveness is unconditional. Moreover, it can 
be questioned whether we can forgive ourselves. Ricoeur cites Hannah Arendt: if we are unable to forgive 
ourselves, this is because ‘ we are dependent upon others, to whom we appear in a distinctness which we 
ourselves are unable to perceive.’ (MHF, p.489) 
84 AO, p.180.
85 Atkins K. http://www.iep.utm.edu/ricoeur/, last accessed 4-11-2011.
86 AO, p.22.
87 Kaufmann S, 2010.
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suffering may prevail over acting. However, selfhood is most fundamentally at stake 
when it becomes impossible to attest that it is me who is at stake. Assuring that this 
body is my body, that it is me who takes responsibility in the face of the other or in 
response to the voice of conscience, is an act of attestation. If it becomes impossible 
to attest that it is my body, that it is me in front of the other and it is my fault, this 
may be regarded as a dissolution of the self. Indeed, the incapability to answer ‘it’s 
me who is speaking, acting, narrating and being imputed’ is, in fact, the incapability 
to attest to oneself. On the most basic, ontological level, the incapabilities that 
constitute distress are the incapability to attest to the self in terms of my body, me 
in front of the other, and my conscience. 
2.8. Conclusion: understanding distress in cancer patients
In chapter 1, we gave a nominal definition of distress as a subject’s inability to 
constructively accommodate negatively charged experiences into one’s own life. 
However, we also showed that despite the frequent use of the term distress in 
medical literature, several questions about the meaning of the term remained and 
further understanding of distress was needed. From the current chapter, we can 
conclude that, as suggested by our nominal definition of distress, ‘inability’, viz. 
‘incapability’, may serve as a leading notion to understand distress. As we saw 
above, following a capability approach of distress, based on Sen and Nussbaum, ten 
different basic capabilities could be identified, while Ricoeur seemed to identify five 
different capabilities. Considering this discrepency and the apparent fortuity of the 
choice for specific (in)capabilities, the quest remained for a theoretical foundation 
of the incapabilities which need to be considered as elements of distress. Since 
capabilities refer to the alternative combinations of things a person is able to do or 
be, i.e. a person’s identity, we have supplemented the capability approach by a 
hermeneutics of identity. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, including its ontology of identity, 
adds two relevant features to the notion of incapabilities. 
 First, selfhood is most fundamentally called into question when it becomes 
impossible to attest to oneself in relation to the otherness of the body, other people 
and conscience. Distress can be defined as the incapability to attest to myself in 
terms of my body, me in front of the other, and my conscience. Attestation may be 
regarded as the elaboration of the ‘constructive accommodation of negatively 
charged experiences’ that we tentatively included in our definition of distress. 
When the otherness of the body, the other or conscience overshadows ownness, 
when passivity outweighs activity it may become impossible to affirm that this 
body is still my body, that the other is part of myself, that it is me who is summoned 
to assume responsibility. As we saw above, the otherness of the body is noted by 
“resistance that gives way to effort.”88 This resistance is most directly encountered 
when one suffers from physical symptoms or when the body does not function 
88 AO, p.321.
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properly. The otherness of the body is not only encountered on a physical plane, 
but also by the coming and going of our humors, by psychological resistance with 
symptoms such as depression or hopelessness and the inability to concentrate 
oneself or to remember things. Similarly, when I am confronted with other people 
who seem to take over my life, determine when I have to come and to go, to eat, to 
sleep and to take pills; when only those others are the ones I encounter, I may 
become incapable to appropriate this otherness as mine. Finally, the voice of 
conscience declaring me guilty, the calling to offer forgiveness may be so loud that 
I stay behind, overwhelmed and incapable to raise my voice and affirm myself.
 Secondly, by placing the emphasis on the question of selfhood in the conceptual 
foundation of distress, the relevance of time comes to the fore. The self can be 
understood in a three-step rhythm of describing, narrating and prescribing, by the 
mediation between time and narrative. As we have seen above, when talking about 
human time it is impossible to lay hands on the ‘bare thing’. Human time is always 
emplotted time, time becomes human time by the mode of narrative. Within such a 
narrative, time runs or drags, time is past, present or future, time feels like an 
instant or a continuous movement; and finally, in one way or another, human time 
is finite. Time may be regarded as the broad basis in which the self is founded; 
without time, there is no self. This also implies that time forms the basis for my 
capabilities and incapabilities to attest to myself in terms of my body, me in front of 
the other, and my conscience. Indeed, without time, there will be no distress.
 Therefore, we can conclude that distress is constituted by the incapabilities to 
attest to myself in terms of my body, me in front of the other, and my conscience 
which are founded in time by the mode of narrative.  
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and palliative, end-of-life care setting
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Abstract 
Background: Coping strategies may be important factors influencing quality of life 
(QOL), depression and hopelessness. However, the majority of studies on this issue 
were performed in patients still undergoing anti-cancer treatment. Unknown is 
which coping strategies are of importance for palliative cancer patients who no 
longer receive treatment. 
Objective: assess coping strategies in curatively-treated and palliative-cancer 
patients no longer receiving anti-cancer treatment; examine the relation of these 
coping strategies with QOL, depression and hopelessness. 
Methods: A descriptive research design was used. 92 curative and 59 palliative 
patients filled out the COPE-Easy abbreviated version, the European Organisation 
for Research-and-Treatment of Cancer QOL-Questionnaire version-2.0, Beck’s de-
pression-inventory for primary care and Beck’s Hopelessness-Scale. 
Results: In both curative and palliative patients active coping strategies and 
acceptance were beneficial in terms of QOL, depression and hopelessness, unlike 
avoidant coping strategies and venting of emotions. Palliative patients scored 
higher on the coping strategy seeking moral support. For the outcome-variable 
emotional functioning, significant interactions were observed between the variable 
curative/palliative care setting and the coping strategy seeking moral support. For 
the outcome-variable role functioning, significant interactions were observed 
between the variable curative/palliative care setting and the coping strategy 
waiting.
Conclusions: Coping strategies were significantly correlated to QOL, depression and 
hopelessness. However, this correlation differed in the curative and palliative, 
end-of-life care setting. 
Implications for practice: The observed relations between coping strategies, QOL, 
depression and hopelessness give room to cognitive-behavioral nursing interventions. 
Specific attention is needed for differences in coping strategies between curative 
and palliative patients. 
Keywords
coping; curative care; palliative care; end-of-life care; quality of life; depression; 
hopelessness
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3.1. Introduction
In the Netherlands 86,200 new cases of cancer were diagnosed in 2007 and the 
incidence of cancer is still increasing. (www.ikcnet.nl) Chances of survival largely 
depend on the type of cancer and the stage when it is diagnosed. Roughly, about 
half of the cancer patients can be cured. Even when a patient is cured, he or she has 
to deal with long-term side effects of the cancer treatment.1 In everyday language 
cancer is associated with terms like battle and war, struggle and suffering. This 
suggests that coping with cancer – the symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment - is a 
major challenge. Coping with the fact that cancer cannot be cured may be an even 
greater challenge. 
 From several studies in cancer patients it is known that the coping strategies 
which patients use may be important factors influencing quality of life (QOL), 
depression and hopelessness.2 However, the majority of studies on this issue have 
been performed in patients who were treated with a curative intent. Even studies 
performed in so-called palliative patients – i.e. patients who cannot be cured - 
included patients who were still undergoing anti-cancer treatment by means of 
palliative chemotherapy or radiation therapy. However, it cannot be assumed that 
the relationship between coping and quality of life, depression or hopelessness 
which is observed in patients undergoing anti-cancer therapy can be extrapolated 
to patients for whom all therapies have been terminated and who are facing death. 
 Therefore, in this study we will compare the coping strategies of cancer patients 
in the curative and the palliative, end-of-life care setting and examine the relation 
of these coping strategies with QOL, depression and hopelessness. 
3.2. Literature review
3.2.1. Coping
The theory of coping in this study is based on Lazarus and Folkman‘s conceptual 
analysis of stress and coping.3 In these studies coping was distinguished in prob-
lem-focused and emotion-focused coping. However, this approach has been proven 
to be too simple. On both theoretical and empirical grounds Carver and colleagues 
further differentiated these coping strategies into three main categories: active 
problem focused coping, support seeking coping and avoidant coping.4 In addition 
1 Ganz PA. Late effects of cancer and its treatment. Semin Oncol Nurs. 2001;17:241-248.
2 Danhauer SC, Crawford SL, Farmer DF et al. A longitudinal investigation of coping strategies and quality of 
life among younger women with breast cancer. J Behav Med. 2009;32:371-379. Vachon M. Psychosocial 
distress and coping after cancer treatment. Cancer Nurs. 2006;29:26-31. Rustoen T. Hope and quality of 
life, two central issues for cancer patients: a theoretical analysis. Cancer Nurs. 1995;18:355-361.
3 Lazarus RS, Folkman S. Stress, appraisal and coping. 1984; New York: Springer Publishing.
4 Carver CS. You want to measure coping but your protocol’s too long: consider the brief COPE. International 
Journal of Behavioral Medicine. 1997;4:92-100. Kleijn WC, Van Heck GL, Van Waning A. Ervaringen met 
een Nederlandse bewerking van de COPE copingvragenlijst. De COPE_Easy. Gedrag en Gezondheid. 
2000;28:213-226.
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to these three main categories other coping strategies may be distinguished: 
acceptance of the situation; religious coping;5 and creating positive events, for 
example through humour.6
3.2.2. Quality of life, depression, and hopelessness
It is generally accepted that quality of life is multidimensional (i.e. comprises not 
only physical but also for example psychological and social well-being), and is 
subjective (i.e. relies primarily on the patient’s own judgment).7 In the measurement 
of QOL a distinction is made between global measures of QOL and health-related 
measures QOL. Global measures of QOL refer to well-being and satisfaction with 
life as a whole, whereas health-related QOL includes various effects of disease and 
treatment on aspects of well-being.8 In this study we included measures for both 
global and health-related QOL. 
 The relationship between symptoms and QOL can be quite variable across 
patients and may vary considerably in time within an individual patient, as disease 
progresses or multiple symptoms occur. Patients with metastatic or recurrent 
disease have been shown to report worse QOL compared to non-metastatic cancer 
patients.9
 It is estimated that between 20 and 30% of cancer patients will experience 
clinically significant depressive symptoms at any one time.10 However, physicians 
and nursing staff often under-recognize depression in oncology patients. A common 
mistake is to assume that depression represents nothing more than a natural and 
understandable reaction to an incurable illness.11 Previously, it was shown that 
depression correlated to QOL in a mixed sample of hospitalized patients.12 However, 
we will study quality of life and depression as separate outcome variables, since a 
patient’s self-report of a bad mood, as is measured by quality of life instruments, is 
qualitatively different from the clinical diagnosis of depression, as is measured by a 
specific diagnostic instrument or structured interview.13
5 Pargament KI. The Psychology of Religion and Coping. 1997; New York/London: The Guilford Press.
6 Folkman S, Moskowitz JT. Stress, positive emotion and coping. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 
2001;9:115-118.
7  Aaronson NK, Meyerowitz BE, Bard M et al. Quality of life research in oncology. Past achievements and 
future priorities. Cancer. 1991;67:839-843.
8  Saevarsdottir T, Fridriksdottir N, Gunnarsdottir S. Quality of life and symptoms of anxiety and depression 
of patients receiving cancer chemotherapy: longitudinal study. Cancer Nurs. 2010;33:E1-E10.
9 Siddiqi A, Given CW, Given B et al. Quality of life among patients with primary, metastatic and recurrent 
cancer. Eur J Cancer Care (Engl ). 2009;18:84-96.
10  Zabora J, BrintzenhofeSzoc K, Curbow B et al. The prevalence of psychological distress by cancer site. 
Psychooncology. 2001;10:19-28.
11  Barraclough J. ABC of palliative care. Depression, anxiety, and confusion. BMJ. 1997;315:1365-1368.
12  Skarstein J, Aass N, Fossa SD et al. Anxiety and depression in cancer patients: relation between the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale and the European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer Core 
Quality of Life Questionnaire. J Psychosom Res. 2000;49:27-34.
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 Fostering hope is recognized as an important part of cancer care. In fact, hope 
is one of the essential elements in the lives of cancer patients in both the curative 
and palliative setting.14 Hopelessness can be subdivided into three dimensions: an 
affective dimension (lack of hope), a motivational dimension (giving up) and a 
cognitive dimension (lack of future expectations). A study in Italian cancer patients 
reported no differences in levels of hope in patients with metastatic or primary 
cancer.15 However, another study among palliative care patients revealed mild 
levels of hopelessness.16 Although depression and hopelessness are mutually 
reinforcing, they have been found to be distinct constructs.17
3.2.3.  Associations with coping strategies
Several studies have shown an association between coping strategies and QOL. In 
fact, coping strategies may play an even more important role than medical or 
treatment related factors for predicting QOL.18 The general picture emerging from 
studies in patients with primary cancer and cancer survivors is that patients who 
used an active coping strategy, such as reappraisal or acceptance reported a better 
QOL and lower levels of depression and hopelessness than those who used avoidant 
coping strategies, such as resignation.19 In a study of breast cancer patients treated 
with curative intent a support seeking coping strategy like emotional expression 
was also related to a better quality of life, but only for those patients who perceived 
their social context as highly receptive to hearing them talk about their cancer.20 
In a study of 151 breast cancer patients who were undergoing surgery with curative 
intent, emotion oriented coping was positively correlated with depression.21 
13 Lloyd-Williams M, Dennis M, Taylor F et al. Is asking patients in palliative care, “are you depressed?” 
appropriate? Prospective study. BMJ. 2003;327:372-373.
14  Chi GC. The role of hope in patients with cancer. Oncol Nurs Forum. 2007;34:415-424.
15 Vellone E, Rega ML, Galletti C et al. Hope and related variables in Italian cancer patients. Cancer Nurs. 
2006;29:356-366.
16  Mystakidou K, Tsilika E, Parpa E et al. The relationship between quality of life and levels of hopelessness 
and depression in palliative care. Depress Anxiety. 2008;25:730-736.
17 Rodin G, Lo C, Mikulincer M et al. Pathways to distress: The multiple determinants of depression, 
hopelessness, and the desire for hastened death in metastatic cancer patients. Social Science & Medicine. 
2009;68:562-569.
18 Lehto US, Ojanen M, Kellokumpu-Lehtinen P. Predictors of quality of life in newly diagnosed melanoma 
and breast cancer patients. Ann Oncol. 2005;16:805-816.
19 Danhauer SC, et al. A longitudinal investigation of coping strategies. Lehto US, et al. Predictors of quality 
of life. Schnoll R, Harlow LL, Brandt U et al. Using two factor structures of the Mental Adjustment to 
Cancer (MAC) scale for assessing adaptation to breast cancer. Psychooncology. 1998;7:424-435. McCaul 
KD, Sandgren AK, King B et al. Coping and adjustment to breast cancer. Psychooncology. 1999;8:230-236. 
Feifel H, Strack S, Nagy VT. Coping strategies and associated features of medically ill patients. Psychosom 
Med. 1987;49:616-625.
20  Stanton AL, Danoff-Burg S, Cameron CL et al. Emotionally expressive coping predicts psychological and 
physical adjustment to breast cancer. J Consult Clin Psychol. 2000;68:875-882.
21 Jadoulle V, Rokbani L, Ogez D et al. Coping and adapting to breast cancer: a six-month prospective study. 
Bull Cancer. 2006;93:E67-E72.
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 It has been suggested that as patients become sicker, their ability to perform 
cognitive tasks and process information may decline,22 thereby reducing one of the 
resources people rely on for coping.23 Therefore, it may be questionable whether 
coping strategies are potential targets for interventions in patients in a palliative, 
end-of-life care setting. Nevertheless, coping capacity has been shown to be a 
predictor for QOL in a sample of lung cancer patients who were not amenable to 
curative treatment.24 Of note, patients undergoing palliative chemo- or radiotherapy 
were also included in that study. To the best of our knowledge, no data are available 
on the use of specific coping strategies and the relation of these coping strategies 
with quality of life, depression and hopelessness in palliative cancer patients who 
do not receive anti-cancer treatment anymore and are facing death.
3.3. Research questions
In the present study the following three questions will be addressed. 
1) Do coping strategies differ between patients who are treated curatively for 
cancer compared to cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
2) What is the relation between coping strategies, quality of life, depression and 
hopelessness in patients who are treated curatively for cancer and cancer 
patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
3) Do relations between coping strategies on the one hand and quality of life, 
depression and hopelessness on the other hand differ between patients who 
are treated curatively for cancer compared to cancer patients in the palliative, 
end-of-life care setting? 
3.4. Methods
This study used a descriptive research design. The study was approved by the 
institutional Medical Ethical Board of our Institute and all participating patients 
gave written informed consent. 
3.4.1. Study sample
The inclusion criteria for curatively treated patients were: patients with a history of 
treatment for a solid tumor; end of treatment less than one year ago; no signs of 
acute treatment toxicities and no evidence of disease. Patients who were on 
22 Cassell EJ, Leon AC, Kaufman SG. Preliminary evidence of impaired thinking in sick patients. Ann Intern 
Med. 2001;134:1120-1123.
23 Block SD. Psychological issues in end-of-life care. J Palliat Med. 2006;9:751-772.
24 Henoch I, Bergman B, Gustafsson M et al. The Impact of Symptoms, Coping Capacity, and Social Support on 
Quality of Life Experience Over Time in Patients with Lung Cancer. J Pain Symptom Manage. 2007;34:370-
379.
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adjuvant hormonal therapy could also be included in this group. The inclusion 
criteria for the palliative group were: patients with advanced solid tumors; not 
receiving anti-tumor therapies; recovered from acute treatment toxicities. Exclusion 
criteria for both groups were: inability to read Dutch or extreme morbidity 
precluding filling out a questionnaire.
 A questionnaire was sent to 236 eligible patients, 123 curatively treated patients 
and 113 palliative patients. Twenty-three patients who were treated curatively for 
cancer and 40 patients in the palliative phase did not return the questionnaire. In 
both groups the most important reason (50% in the curative group, 39% in the 
palliative group) for not participating was not specified. Eleven patients in the 
palliative phase deteriorated or died before they could return the questionnaire. 
Eight curatively treated patients and 14 palliative patients did not fully complete the 
coping scales and were excluded from the analysis. Thus, data of 92 curatively 
treated patients and 59 palliative patients were available for analysis. Participants 
and nonparticipants did not significantly differ by age or sex.
3.4.2. Measurement instruments
Basic sociodemographic data including age, marital status and educational level 
were collected from all participants in a self-administered questionnaire. To 
measure coping, quality of life, depression and hopelessness the following 
measurement instruments were included in the questionnaire.
 Coping was measured by the COPE-Easy abbreviated version, which is a validated 
Dutch instrument for measuring coping strategies.25 COPE-Easy distinguishes 
between 14 different coping strategies. Five are active coping strategies, three are 
support seeking strategies and three are avoidant coping strategies. Active coping 
involves active handling (actively trying to change the stressful circumstances), 
giving priority to dealing with the problem, positive reappraisal of the difficult 
situation, restraint coping (waiting until an appropriate opportunity to act presents 
itself) and planning (thinking about how to deal with the problem). Support seeking 
coping strategies are seeking advice or information, seeking moral support and 
venting of emotions. Avoidant coping strategies involve denial (refusal to believe 
that the stressor exists or trying to act as though the stressor is not real), giving up 
of one’s goals, seeking distraction. Finally, COPE-Easy distinguishes the coping 
strategies acceptance (of the situation), turning to a belief system/religion and 
humor. Coping strategies were scored on a four-point Likert scale from 1, not 
applicable, to 4, very much applicable.26 Internal consistency reliability has been 
reported for all coping strategies in a sample of 65 breast cancer patients and 
ranged from .62-.98, except for restraint coping where reliability was .35. Internal 
consistency reliability scores in our study ranged from .67-.95 for all subscales, 
except for venting of emotions for which the reliability score was .54.
25 Kleijn WC, 2000. Carver CS, Scheier MF, Weintraub JK. Assessing coping strategies: A theoretically based 
aproach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1989;56:267-283.
26  Kleijn WC, 2000.
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 Global QOL was measured with the Satisfaction with Life (SWL) scale27 and 
health related QOL with the European Organisation for Research and Treatment of 
Cancer QOL Questionnaire version 2.0 (EORTC QLQ-C30v2).28 The SWL has the 
specificity of asking about satisfaction with life as a whole, as opposed to an 
impression of the quality of life in the past few days as is measured by EORTC 
QLQ-C30v2. For the SWL a sum score is constructed, 5-9 indicating extremely 
dissatisfied, 10-14 dissatisfied, 15-19 slightly below average, 20-24 average, 25-29 
high satisfaction and 30-35 very high satisfaction. Internal consistency reliability 
has been reported as .87 in 176 undergraduates who were enrolled in introductory 
psychological classes.29 The internal consistency reliability score in our study was .84.
 The EORTC QLQ-C30v2 contains one scale to measure general health status. 
Furthermore, it distinguishes between functional scales, like physical functioning 
and role functioning, and symptom scales, like fatigue, pain and appetite loss. The 
scores on the functional scales and the global health status of the EORTC QLQ-C30v2 
ranged from 0, very bad, to 100, excellent, whereas the symptom scales ranged 
from 0, not at all, to 100, very much (cf. reference value manual for the EORTC 
QLQ-C30v2 at http://www.eortc.be/home/qol). In multiple studies it has proven to 
be a reliable measure of QOL with overall a reliability of .70 for its subscales.30 The 
internal consistency reliability scores in our study ranged from .83 to .93, except for 
the reliability of the cognitive functioning scale, which was .66.
 Depression was measured by Beck’s depression inventory for primary care.31 
The assessment of depression in cancer patients can be confounded by physical 
symptoms caused by the cancer or its treatment. The use of the Beck Depression 
Inventory for primary care (BDI-PC) can circumvent this problem, since it does not 
include somatic items. The BDI-PC contains 7 items, scored on a 0-3 scale. A 
sumscore of ³ 4 indicates a clinically relevant depression.32 In a study by Steer et al. 
of 120 patients who were scheduled for a consecutive routine outpatient visit with 
a physician specializing in internal medicine BDI PC had a sensitivity of 97% and a 
specificity of 99% for diagnosing depression compared to the diagnostic standard, 
an interview using the Mood Module from the Primary Care Evaluation of Mental 
Disorders.33 The internal consistency of the BDI-PC in the study by Steer et al. was 
0.85. The internal consistency reliability score in our study was .78.
27 Diener E, Emmons R, Larsen R et al. The Satisfaction with Life Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment. 
1985;49:71-75.
28 Aaronson NK, Ahmedzai S, Bergman B et al. The European Organization for Research and Treatment 
of Cancer QLQ-C30: a quality-of-life instrument for use in international clinical trials in oncology. J Natl 
Cancer Inst. 1993;85:365-376.
29  Diener E, 1985.
30  Diener E, 1985.
31 Beck AT, Guth D, Steer RA et al. Screening for major depression disorders in medical inpatients with the 
Beck Depression Inventory for Primary Care. Behav Res Ther. 1997;35:785-791.
32  Beck AT, 1997.
33  Steer RA, Cavalieri TA, Leonard DM et al. Use of the Beck Depression Inventory for Primary Care to screen 
for major depression disorders. Gen Hosp Psychiatry. 1999;21:106-111.
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 Hopelessness was measured with Beck’s Hopelessness Scale (BHS).34 BHS 
contains 20 items with a two-point scale (I agree, I don’t agree), comprising the 
three dimension of hopelessness (affective, motivational and cognitive). A sumscore 
over al 7 items is calculated, 0 indicating no hopelessness, 20 indicating maximum 
hopelessness.  Based on the sumscores patients can be classified into four groups: 
no hopelessness (0-3), mild (4-8), moderate (9-14) and severe (15-20).35 Internal 
consistency reliability of BHS was .93 in a sample of 294 hospitalized patients who 
had made recent suicide attempts.36 The internal consistency reliability score in our 
study was .90.
3.4.3. Statistical analysis
To answer the first research question - do coping strategies differ between patients 
who are treated curatively for cancer compared to cancer patients in the palliative 
phase? – we first identified relevant sociodemographic variables for coping 
strategies by looking at associations between coping strategies (low versus high) 
and patient characteristics using χ2 and t tests when appropriate. Agreement with 
a coping strategy was computed ‘low’ if a patient scored < 2.5 and ‘high’ if a patient 
scored ≥ 2.5 (on a scale from 1-4). The sociodemographic characteristics age, sex, 
living with a partner, education and employment were all identified as relevant so-
ciodemographic variables. Then, differences in means between the curative and 
palliative groups were assessed using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the 
relevant sociodemographic variables as covariates.
 To answer the second research question - What is the relation between coping 
strategies, quality of life, depression and hopelessness in patients who are treated 
curatively for cancer and cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
– we first assessed the scores on quality of life, depression and hopelessness for the 
curative and palliative group and then performed correlation and regression 
analyses. Associations between attitudes and emotions towards coping strategies 
on the one hand and measures of quality of life, depression and hopelessness on 
the other hand were analyzed by partial correlation analysis including the sociode-
mographic characteristics age, sex, living with a partner, education and employment. 
Coping strategies which showed significant associations with a partial correlation 
coefficient ≥ .300 were taken up in a stepwise regression model, including the so-
ciodemographic factors as independent variables and measures of quality of life, 
depression and hopelessness as dependent variables. In stepwise regression in 
SPSS each variable is entered in sequence and its value assessed. If adding the 
variable contributes to the model then it is retained, but all other variables in the 
model are then re-tested to see if they are still contributing to the success of the 
model. If they no longer contribute significantly they are removed. This method 
34 Beck AT, Weissman A. The measurement of pessimism: the hopelessness scale. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology. 1974;42:861-865.
35  Mystakidou K, Tsilika E, Parpa E et al. The relationship between quality of life and levels of hopelessness.
36  Beck AT, 1974.
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ensures we will end up with the simplest equation with the best predictive power. 
In case more than one coping strategy correlated with the same outcome variable 
all these coping strategies were taken up in the regression model. 
 To answer the third research question - do relations between coping strategies 
on the one hand and quality of life, depression and hopelessness on the other hand 
differ between curative and palliative patients – we assessed whether a significant 
partial correlation coefficient identified in one patient group was significantly 
different from the partial correlation coefficient in the other patient group using 
Fisher’s r-to-Z formula.37 
 All statistical analyses were performed with SPSS (version 16.0.1). Statistical 
inferences were based on 2-sided tests with p < .05 considered to be statistically 
significant.
3.5. Results
3.5.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 151 patients, 71 males and 80 females. The mean age (±SD) 
was 58 years (± 13 years). Baseline characteristics of the sample designated by 
curative or palliative setting are presented in Table 1. 
3.5.2.  Research question 1 
We first identified relevant sociodemographic variables for coping strategies by 
looking at associations between coping strategies (low versus high) and patient 
characteristics. The sociodemographic characteristics age, sex, living with a partner, 
education and employment were all significantly associated with one or more of 
the coping strategies. (Table 2) Then, between group differences (curative versus 
palliative) were assessed using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the relevant 
sociodemographic variables as covariates. Curative patients scored significantly 
lower on the coping strategy seeking moral support than patients in the palliative 
group (mean 2.60 (SE .09) versus 2.92 (SE .12) on a scale from 1-4). No other 
significant differences in coping strategies were observed between the curative and 
palliative patients. In both groups, the coping strategy with the highest average 
score was ‘active handling of the circumstances’ (mean 3.35 (SE .08) for curative 
patients and 3.21 (SE .10) for palliative patients), whereas the coping strategy ‘giving 
up of one’s goals’ scored lowest (mean 1.43 (SE .07) for curative patients and 1.51 (SE 
.09) for palliative patients). Overall, active coping strategies as well as the coping 
strategy acceptance and seeking moral support scored higher than 2.5, indicating 
that these coping strategies were relevant for patients. In contrast, all avoidant 
coping strategies (denial, giving up one’s goals and seeking distraction), as well as 
the coping strategies venting of emotions, humor and belief, scored below 2.5. 
37 Cohen J, Cohen P, West SG et al. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral 
Sciences. 2003; Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
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3.5.3.  Research question 2 
To answer this second research question we first assessed the scores on quality of 
life, depression and hopelessness for the curative and palliative group and then 
performed correlation and regression analyses. Both curative and palliative patients 
scored ‘average satisfaction’ on the satisfaction with life scale compared to norm 
scores (mean 22.7 (SE .67) for palliative and 20.8 (SE .85) for curative patients). 
However, as measured by the EORTC QLQ palliative patients were severely limited 
in their daily functioning compared to curative patients (mean scores for functional 
scales between 26.9-66.2 for palliative patients and 69.1-81.7 for curative patients) 
and reported significantly higher scores on the symptom scales (mean scores 
22.9-68.8 for palliative patients and 5.3-33.8 for curative patients). An exception is 
formed by the ‘symptom’ financial problems: both patient groups score low on this 
item (mean 16.3 (SE 3.66) for palliative patients and 13.8 (SE 2.7) for curative 
patients). Also, scores on depression and hopelessness were high in the palliative 
patients compared to the curative patients. 48% of the palliative patients had a 
score on BDI ≥ 4, which indicates a clinically relevant depression. In the curative 
group this was 10%.
 Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the partial correlation and regression analyses 
of coping strategies on the one hand and measures of quality of life, depression and 
hopelessness on the other hand for both curative and palliative patients. Of the 
active coping strategies the coping strategy giving priority was most frequently 
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Table 1   Population characteristics. Where appropriate frequencies are presented 
with valid percentages in brackets. 
Curative 
(n = 92)
Palliative
 (n = 59)
Total
 ( n = 151)
Male
Female  
41 (45)
51 (55)
30 (51)
29 (49)
71 (47)
80 (53)
Age Mean
St dev
55
13
62
10
58
13
Relationship Living with a partner
Living alone
78 (87)
12 (13)
39 (67)
19 (33)
117 (79)
31 (21)
Education Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
22 (24)
45 (50)
24 (26)
12 (21)
34 (58)
12 (21)
34 (23)
79 (53)
36 (24)
Employment Paid job
No paid job
40 (44)
51 (56)
17 (29)
42 (71)
57 (38)
93 (62)
Tumor type Breast
Prostate
Testis
Lung
Colon/rectum
Melanoma
Other 
34 (37)
16 (17)
11 (12)
9 (10)
4 (4)
6 (7)
12 (13)
9 (15)
2 (3)
0 (0)
6 (10)
13 (22)
5 (9)
24 (41)
43 (29)
18 (12)
11 (7)
15 (10)
17 (11)
11 (7)
36 (24)
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Table 2   Patient characteristics by level of agreement with coping strategies. 
Agreement with a coping strategy was computed ‘low’ if a patient scored 
< 2.5 and ‘high’ if a patient scored ≥ 2.5 (on a scale from 1-4). Only those 
coping strategies are displayed for which significant differences between 
low and high scores were observed.
 
Coping 
strategy
Patient 
group
Score Age
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with 
a partner
(%, n)
Education 
less than 
vocational 
(%, n)
Employed
(%, n)
Seeking 
advice and 
information
Curative Low 54.8
(15.1, 32)
16
(50.0, 32)
24
(77.4, 31)
17*
(54.8, 31)
15
(46.9, 32)
High 54.3
(11.9, 62)
25
(41.7, 60)
54
(91.5, 59)
20
(33.3, 60)
25
(42.4, 59)
Palliative Low 64.9*
(9.4, 30)
17
(56.7, 30)
18
(62.1, 29)
13
(44.8, 29)
6
(20.0, 30)
High 59.7
(01.2, 29)
13
(44.8, 29)
21
(72.4, 29)
15
(51.7, 29)
11
(37.9, 29)
Seeking 
moral 
support
Curative Low 57.6
(14.2, 33)
16
(48.5, 33)
30
(90.9, 33)
14
(43.8, 32)
11
(33.3, 33)
High 52.8
(12.1, 59)
25
(42.4, 59) 
48
(84.2, 57)
23
(39.0, 59)
29
(50.0, 58)
Palliative Low 64.7
(8.3, 14)
10
(71.4, 14)
11
(78.6, 14)
7
(50.0, 14)
1*
(7.1, 14)
High 61.6
(10.5, 45)
20
(44.4, 45)
28
(63.6, 44)
21
(47.7, 44)
16
(35.6, 45)
Venting of 
emotions
Curative Low 55.1
(14.2, 50)
28*
(56.0, 50)
43
(87.8, 49)
19
(38.8, 49)
21
(42.0, 50)
High 53.8
(11.7, 42)
13
(31.0, 42)
35
(85.4, 41)
18
(42.9, 42)
19
(46.3, 41)
Palliative Low 64.3
(9.7, 31)
17
(54.8, 31)
21
(67.7, 31)
15
(48.4, 31)
7
(22.6, 31)
High 60.1
(10.2, 28)
13
(46.4, 28)
18
(66.7, 27)
13
(48.1, 27)
10
(35.7, 28)
Denial Curative Low 52.2**
(13.2, 67)
30
(44.8, 67)
58
(89.2, 65)
25
(37.9, 66)
33
(50.0, 66)
High 60.8
(10.5, 25)
11
(44.0, 25)
20
(80.0, 25)
12
(48.0, 25)
7
(28.0, 25)
Palliative Low 63.0
(10.5, 45)
24
(53.3, 45)
30
(68.2, 44)
19
(43.2, 44)
11
(24.4, 44)
High 60.4
(8.4, 14)
6
(42.9, 14)
9
(64.3, 14)
9
(64.3, 14)
6
(42.9, 14)
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Table 2   Continued. 
 
Coping 
strategy
Patient 
group
Score Age
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with 
a partner
(%, n)
Education 
less than 
vocational 
(%, n)
Employed
(%, n)
Seeking 
distraction
Curative Low 55.1
(14.4, 44)
18
(40.9, 44)
33*
(78.6, 42)
16
(37.2, 43)
20
(45.5, 44)
High 54.0
(11.7, 48)
23
(47.9, 48)
45
(93.8, 48)
21
(43.8, 48)
20
(42.6, 47)
Palliative Low 63.2
(10.6, 31)
17
(54.8, 31)
23
(76.7, 30)
13
(43.3, 30)
9
(29.0, 31)
High 61.4
(9.5, 31)
13
(46.4, 28)
16
(57.1, 28)
15
(53.6, 28)
8
(28.6, 28)
Acceptance Curative Low 55.7
(14.0, 17)
9
(52.9, 17)
15
(88.2, 17)
9
(52.9, 17)
4
(25.0, 16)
High 54.2
(12.9, 75)
32
(42.7, 75)
63
(86.3, 73)
28
(37.8, 74) 
36
(48.0, 75)
Palliative Low 61.4
(10.2, 20)
14*
(70.0, 20)
15
(78.9, 19)
10
(50.0, 20)
5
(25.0, 20)
High 62.8
(10.1, 39)
16
(41.0, 39)
24
(61.5, 39)
18
(47.4, 38)
12
(30.8, 39)
Belief Curative Low 52.0**
(13.5, 67)
31
(46.3, 67)
58
(59.2, 65)
25
(37.3, 67)
33
(50.0, 66)
High 61.2
(9.0, 25)
10
(40.0, 25)
20
(80.0, 25)
12
(50.0, 24)
7
(28.0, 25)
Palliative Low 60.7
(9.2, 35)
22*
(62.9, 35)
25
(71.4, 35)
16
(45.7, 35)
10
(28.6, 35)
High 64.8
(11.0, 24)
8
(33.3, 24)
14
(60.9, 23)
12
(52.2, 23)
7
(29.2, 24)
Humour Curative Low 55.5
(12.0, 60)
26
(43.3, 60)
52
(88.1, 59)
21
(35.6, 59)
26
(44.1, 59)
High 52.7
(14.7, 32)
15
(46.9, 32)
26
(83.9, 31)
16
(50.0, 32)
14
(43.8, 32)
Palliative Low 62.3
(10.2, 44)
24
(54.5, 44)
32*
(74.4, 43)
20
(46.5, 43)
14
(31.8, 44)
High 62.4
(9.9, 15)
6
(40.0, 15)
7
(46.7, 15)
8
(53.3, 15)
3
(20.0, 15)
*  Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .05. 
** Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .01. 
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Table 3   Partial correlations between coping strategies and measures of quality of 
life, depression and hopelessness. Only significant partial correlation 
coefficients r are given for both the curative and palliative patient group if 
r > .300 in at least one of both groups. Control variables were age, sex, 
living with a partner, education and employment.
 
Active 
handling
Planning Giving 
priority
Waiting Reappraisal Seeking 
advice 
and  
information
Seeking 
moral 
support
Venting of 
emotions
Denial Giving up 
one’s 
goals
Accep
tance
Humour
cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal
Satisfaction with 
life
r .173 .352 .094 .457 .012 -.407
sig .133 .035 .417 .005 .920 .014
Global health 
status
r .308 .260
sig .006 .125
Role functioning r .322 -.282 -.007 -.336 .059 -.406
sig .004 .096 .949 .045 .610 .014
Social 
functioning
r .328 .270
sig .004 .111
Emotional 
functioning
r .178 -.361 -.145 -.465 .253 .387
sig .122 .030 .208 .004 .026 .020
Cognitive 
functioning
r .300 .151
sig .008 .380
Fatigue r -.312 .021
sig .006 .905
Dyspnea r -.360 -.034 -.340 -.040 -.215 -.359
sig .001 .844 .002 .819 .061 .032
Appetite loss r -.303 -.256 -.349 -.134 -.302 -.013
sig .007 .133 .002 .436 .008 .940
Financial 
problems
r -.073 -.506
sig .526 .002
Depression r .071 .357 .141 .412 -.357 -.475
sig .537 .033 .220 .012 .001 .003
Hopelessness r -.126 -.388 -.337 -.269 .053 .384 .345 .564 -.134 -.464
sig .273 .019 .003 .113 .648 .021 .002 .012 .246 .004
Abbreviations: cur, curative group; pal, palliative group.
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Table 3   Partial correlations between coping strategies and measures of quality of 
life, depression and hopelessness. Only significant partial correlation 
coefficients r are given for both the curative and palliative patient group if 
r > .300 in at least one of both groups. Control variables were age, sex, 
living with a partner, education and employment.
 
Active 
handling
Planning Giving 
priority
Waiting Reappraisal Seeking 
advice 
and  
information
Seeking 
moral 
support
Venting of 
emotions
Denial Giving up 
one’s 
goals
Accep
tance
Humour
cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal
Satisfaction with 
life
r .173 .352 .094 .457 .012 -.407
sig .133 .035 .417 .005 .920 .014
Global health 
status
r .308 .260
sig .006 .125
Role functioning r .322 -.282 -.007 -.336 .059 -.406
sig .004 .096 .949 .045 .610 .014
Social 
functioning
r .328 .270
sig .004 .111
Emotional 
functioning
r .178 -.361 -.145 -.465 .253 .387
sig .122 .030 .208 .004 .026 .020
Cognitive 
functioning
r .300 .151
sig .008 .380
Fatigue r -.312 .021
sig .006 .905
Dyspnea r -.360 -.034 -.340 -.040 -.215 -.359
sig .001 .844 .002 .819 .061 .032
Appetite loss r -.303 -.256 -.349 -.134 -.302 -.013
sig .007 .133 .002 .436 .008 .940
Financial 
problems
r -.073 -.506
sig .526 .002
Depression r .071 .357 .141 .412 -.357 -.475
sig .537 .033 .220 .012 .001 .003
Hopelessness r -.126 -.388 -.337 -.269 .053 .384 .345 .564 -.134 -.464
sig .273 .019 .003 .113 .648 .021 .002 .012 .246 .004
Abbreviations: cur, curative group; pal, palliative group.
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Table 4   Stepwise regression analysis of coping strategies and  measures of quality 
of life, depression and hopelessness. Per outcome variable, all significant 
models are shown with the independent variables which were entered 
successively.  
 
Dependent variable Group Model Independent variables Standardized Coefficients
Beta
Sig. R2
Change
R2 Adjusted R2 
Satisfaction with life Curative 1 Living with a partner -.245 .022 .060* .060* .043
Global health status Curative 1 Giving priority .343 .001 .118** .118** .107
2 Giving priority 
Education
.373
.259
.000
.011
.066* .184*** .165
Role  
functioning
Curative 1 Waiting .257 .016 .066* .066* .055
2 Waiting
Education
.303
.257
.004
.015
.064* .130** .109
Palliative 1 Sex -.375 .007 .141** .141** .123
Social  
functioning
Curative 1 Age .245 .021 .060* .060* .049
2 Age
Education
.276
.260
.008
.013
.067* .127** .106
3 Age 
Education
Acceptance
.290
.250
.241
.005
.014
.017
.058* .185** .156
Palliative 1 Living with a partner .402 .004 .161** .161** .144
Emotional functioning Curative 1 Acceptance .235 .029 .055* .055* .044
Palliative 1 Venting of emotions -.311 .027 .096* .096* .078
Cognitive functioning Curative 1 Planning .278 .009 .078** .078** .067
2 Planning
Education
.296
.242
.005
.020
.058* .136** .115
3 Planning
Education
Living with a partner
.322
.227
-.208
.002
.026
.042
.042* .178** .148
Fatigue Curative 1 Giving priority -.304 .004 .092** .092** .082
2 Giving priority
Education
-.343
-.293
.001
.004
.084** .177*** .157
Palliative 1 Sex .280 .046 .079* .079* .060
Dyspnea Curative 1 Education -.337 .001 .113** .113** .103
2 Education
Giving priority
-.380
-.323
.000
.001
.102** .216** .197
3 Education
Giving priority
Reappraisal
-.407
-.276
-.251
.000
.005
.010
.060* .275*** .249
Appetite loss Curative 1 Reappraisal -.283 .008 .080** .080** .070
2 Reappraisal
Education
-.311
-.208
.003
.047
.042* .123** .102
Financial  
problems
Curative 1 Living with a partner .336 .001 .113** .113** .102
Palliative 1 Giving priority -.439 .002 .193** .193** .175
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Table 4   Stepwise regression analysis of coping strategies and  measures of quality 
of life, depression and hopelessness. Per outcome variable, all significant 
models are shown with the independent variables which were entered 
successively.  
 
Dependent variable Group Model Independent variables Standardized Coefficients
Beta
Sig. R2
Change
R2 Adjusted R2 
Satisfaction with life Curative 1 Living with a partner -.245 .022 .060* .060* .043
Global health status Curative 1 Giving priority .343 .001 .118** .118** .107
2 Giving priority 
Education
.373
.259
.000
.011
.066* .184*** .165
Role  
functioning
Curative 1 Waiting .257 .016 .066* .066* .055
2 Waiting
Education
.303
.257
.004
.015
.064* .130** .109
Palliative 1 Sex -.375 .007 .141** .141** .123
Social  
functioning
Curative 1 Age .245 .021 .060* .060* .049
2 Age
Education
.276
.260
.008
.013
.067* .127** .106
3 Age 
Education
Acceptance
.290
.250
.241
.005
.014
.017
.058* .185** .156
Palliative 1 Living with a partner .402 .004 .161** .161** .144
Emotional functioning Curative 1 Acceptance .235 .029 .055* .055* .044
Palliative 1 Venting of emotions -.311 .027 .096* .096* .078
Cognitive functioning Curative 1 Planning .278 .009 .078** .078** .067
2 Planning
Education
.296
.242
.005
.020
.058* .136** .115
3 Planning
Education
Living with a partner
.322
.227
-.208
.002
.026
.042
.042* .178** .148
Fatigue Curative 1 Giving priority -.304 .004 .092** .092** .082
2 Giving priority
Education
-.343
-.293
.001
.004
.084** .177*** .157
Palliative 1 Sex .280 .046 .079* .079* .060
Dyspnea Curative 1 Education -.337 .001 .113** .113** .103
2 Education
Giving priority
-.380
-.323
.000
.001
.102** .216** .197
3 Education
Giving priority
Reappraisal
-.407
-.276
-.251
.000
.005
.010
.060* .275*** .249
Appetite loss Curative 1 Reappraisal -.283 .008 .080** .080** .070
2 Reappraisal
Education
-.311
-.208
.003
.047
.042* .123** .102
Financial  
problems
Curative 1 Living with a partner .336 .001 .113** .113** .102
Palliative 1 Giving priority -.439 .002 .193** .193** .175
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associated with outcome variables, viz. with global health status, fatigue, dyspnea 
and loss of appetite in the curative group and financial problems in the palliative 
group. Except for loss of appetite the coping strategy giving priority remained a 
significant predictor for these outcome variables in the regression analyses. The 
active coping strategy planning was a significant predictor for cognitive functioning, 
while the active coping strategy reappraisal was predictive for dyspnea and loss of 
appetite. The associations of these active coping strategies with the outcome 
variables all indicated a beneficial influence on patient’s distress: the active coping 
strategies were positively associated with satisfaction with life, global health status 
and functional scales of quality of life and negatively associated with symptom 
scales and hopelessness.
 In contrast, the support seeking coping strategies seeking advice and information, 
seeking moral support en venting of emotions were negatively associated with role 
functioning and emotional functioning, although a positive association was 
observed between seeking advice and information and satisfaction with life. None 
of the support seeking coping strategies remained significant in the regression 
analyses, except for the coping strategy venting of emotions which had a negative 
predictive value for emotional functioning in the palliative group. No associations 
were observed between the support seeking coping strategies and symptom scales, 
depression and hopelessness. An exception is formed by the coping strategy 
seeking moral support which was associated with appetite loss, but it did not 
remain a significant predictor in the regression analysis. 
 Avoidant coping strategies did not seem beneficial for patients either. For palliative 
patients a negative association was observed between giving up one’s goals and 
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Table 4   Continued.  
 
Dependent variable Group Model Independent variables Standardized Coefficients
Beta
Sig. R2
Change
R2 Adjusted R2 
Depression Curative 1 Acceptance -.336 .002 .113** .113* .102
2 Acceptance
Age
-.344
-.208
.001
.044
.043* .156** .136
Palliative 1 Acceptance -.393 .006 .154** .154** .136
2 Acceptance
Giving up
-.364
.273
.008
.044
.074* .228** .194
Hopelessness Curative 1 Giving up .350 .001 .122** .122** .112
2 Giving up
Reappraisal
.302
-.219
.004
.034
.045* .168*** .148
Palliative 1 Giving up .459 .001 .211** .211** .194
2 Giving up
Age
.574
-.445
.000
.001
.185** .395*** .368
3 Giving up
Age
Acceptance
.533
-.428
-.336
.000
.000
.003
.111** .506*** .473
* indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; *** indicates p < .001.
81
satisfaction with life, which, however, did not remain significant in the regression 
analysis. Also, denial and giving up one’s goals were positively associated with 
depression and hopelessness. In the regression analysis the coping strategy giving 
up was predictive for depression in the palliative group and for hopelessness in 
both the curative and palliative group. No associations were observed between the 
avoidant coping strategies and the functional and symptom scales of quality of life.
 In both the curative and palliative group the coping strategy acceptance was 
positively associated with emotional functioning and, in the curative group, also 
with social functioning. For the curative patients the relation between acceptance 
and emotional functioning and acceptance and social functioning remained 
significant in the regression analysis. A negative association was observed between 
acceptance and depression (curative and palliative patients) and acceptance and 
hopelessness (palliative patients). Also in the regression analysis acceptance was a 
negative predictor for depression and hopelessness. The coping strategy acceptance 
was not associated with any of the symptoms scales.
 No associations were observed between the coping strategy belief and any of 
the outcome measures. In palliative patients the coping strategy humor was 
negatively associated with dyspnea, but it was not a significant predictor in the 
regression analysis. 
3.5.4.  Research question 3
To assess whether a significant partial correlation coefficient identified in one 
patient group was significantly different from the partial correlation coefficient in 
the other patient group we used Fisher’s r-to-Z formula. In the curative group, the 
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association between the coping strategy waiting and the outcome variable role 
functioning was significantly different from the palliative group (Table 5). In the 
curative group a significant, positive correlation was observed while in the palliative 
group the correlation was non-significant and negative. In the palliative group five 
associations were identified which were significantly different from the curative 
group, viz. the associations giving priority – financial problems; seeking advice and 
information – satisfaction with life; seeking moral support – role functioning; 
seeking moral support – emotional functioning; giving up one’s goals – satisfaction 
with life. Although the correlation between giving priority and financial problems 
was negative in both the curative and the palliative group, the correlation coefficient 
was significant in the palliative group only. For the other four associations (seeking 
advice and information – satisfaction with life; seeking moral support – role 
functioning; seeking moral support – emotional functioning; giving up one’s goals 
– satisfaction with life) a significant, negative correlation was observed in the 
palliative group, while the correlation in the curative group was non-significant and 
positive.
3.6. Discussion
To the best of our knowledge this is the first comparative study of coping strategies, 
quality of life, depression and hopelessness in a group of curatively treated cancer 
patients and palliative cancer patients who did not receive anti-cancer treatment 
anymore and were facing death. 
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Table 5   Fisher’s r-to-Z analysis of correlation coefficients. Only those partial correlation 
coefficients are given which were significantly different between the 
curative and palliative patient group according to Fisher's r-to-Z formula.
 
Giving 
priority
Waiting Seeking 
advice 
and 
information
Seeking 
moral 
support
Giving up 
one’s goals
cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal
Satisfaction  
with life
r .094 .457 .012 -.407
Role functioning r .322 -.282 .059 -.406
Emotional 
functioning
r .178 -.361
Financial 
problems
r -.073 -.506
Abbreviations: cur, curative group; pal, palliative group.
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3.6.1.  Do curative and palliative patients differ?
In our study both in curative and palliative patients positive associations were 
observed between active coping strategies and acceptance on the one hand and 
general and functional measures of QOL on the other hand and negative associations 
with symptom scales, depression and hopelessness. In contrast, avoidant coping 
strategies and the coping strategy venting of emotions were negatively associated 
with general and functional measures of QOL and positively associated with 
depression and hopelessness. Our patients may have gained this knowledge by 
experience, since relatively high scores were observed for the active coping 
strategies and the coping strategy acceptance, whereas patients scored low on 
avoidant coping strategies and the coping strategies venting of emotions. 
 Despite this general picture of resemblance between curative and palliative 
patients, when looking in more detail into the results, interesting differences 
appear. First of all, palliative patients scored significantly higher on the coping 
strategy seeking moral support than curatively treated patients. The higher scores 
on the moral support seeking coping strategy in the palliative setting may be due to 
the fact that seeking moral support is operationalized as ‘seeking support with 
family of friends’.38 Possibly, in the palliative, end-of-life setting family and friends 
are more at hand for support than in the curative setting. However, in the palliative 
group seeking moral support was negatively associated with role and emotional 
functioning - although in the regression analysis this did not remain significant - and 
the correlation coefficient between the coping strategy seeking moral support and 
role and emotional functioning was significantly different for palliative and curative 
patients. Therefore, in contrast with curatively treated patients, it is questionable 
whether the coping strategy seeking moral support is beneficial for patients in the 
palliative, end-of-life care setting.
 A further comparison of the correlations between coping strategies and quality 
of life, depression and hopelessness revealed a significant difference between the 
curative and palliative group for the coping strategy waiting and the outcome 
variable role functioning. Moreover, the coping strategy waiting had a positive 
predictive value for role functioning in the curative group. This implies that in the 
curative setting patients may well be advised to adopt a waiting attitude, whereas 
this may not be useful in the palliative, end-of-life setting. Looking at the limited 
life-span of palliative patients this can well be understood. From this perspective 
the significant difference in correlation between the coping strategy giving priority 
and the outcome variable financial problems in the curative and palliative group 
and the predictive value of this coping strategy in the palliative group may also be 
understood. 
 
3.6.2.  Beneficial coping in cancer care 
In our study the active coping strategies planning, giving priority, reappraisal, 
waiting and the coping strategy acceptance were predictive for a better QOL and 
38  Carver CS, 1997. Kleijn WC, 2000.
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lower levels of depression and hopelessness, in contrast to the coping strategy 
venting of emotions and the avoidant coping strategy giving up. These results are in 
line with previous results in patients with primary cancer and cancer survivors.39
The observation that venting of emotions was predictive for reduced emotional 
functioning is important for daily practice, as patients are often encouraged to 
express their emotions and not to keep their feelings or tears for themselves. 
However, based on these and other results,40 it is questionable whether venting of 
emotions as a coping strategy is really helpful. It has been suggested that avoidant 
coping strategies may be beneficial in some circumstances, especially in the 
palliative care setting, allowing patients to live in the present, enjoy times when 
they feel well and appreciate the time they have.41 However, our data do not 
support this hypothesis.
 In the literature the results on the relation between acceptance and depression 
are conflicting. In a study among breast cancer patients it was shown that 
acceptance following diagnosis was associated with depression and anxiety three 
years later.42 In contrast, in a group of patients with early stage or regionally 
advanced gynecologic cancers patients acceptance and positive reframing at their 
initial visits predicted better one year QOL.43 Those with continued higher levels of 
these coping strategies at one year reported better concurrent functional and 
emotional well-being. Apparently, as is also shown by our data, acceptance and 
more active coping strategies may exist together in patients and may be beneficial 
for patients’ well-being. This is relevant since family and friends may find it hard to 
understand that a patient accepts his or her situation and may advise a more 
fighting spirit. 
 The observed relations between coping strategies, quality of life, depression 
and hopelessness give room to cognitive-behavioral nursing interventions. This is 
of special importance in palliative patients, as the low levels of quality of life and 
the high number of depressed and hopeless patients in our study indicate that 
treatment of and care for these patients is still insufficient. It has been shown 
previously that the treatment of depression in terminally ill cancer patients with 
conventional pharmacological treatment is difficult44 and the combined approach 
of pharmacological and psychosocial intervention may be most appropriate.45 Also, 
39 Danhauer SC, 2009. Lehto US, 2005. Schnoll R, 1998. McCaul KD, 1999. Feifel H, 1987.
40 Stanton AL, 2000. Jadoulle V, 2006.
41  Block SD, 2006.
42  Hack TF, Degner LF. Coping responses following breast cancer diagnosis predict psychological adjustment 
three years later. Psychooncology. 2004;13:235-247.
43  Lutgendorf SK, Anderson B, Ullrich P et al. Quality of life and mood in women with gynecologic cancer: a 
one year prospective study. Cancer. 2002;94:131-140.
44 Shimizu K, Akechi T, Shimamoto M et al. Can psychiatric intervention improve major depression in very 
near end-of-life cancer patients? Palliat Support Care. 2007;5:3-9.
45  Rodin G, Lloyd N, Katz M et al. The treatment of depression in cancer patients: a systematic review. 
Support Care Cancer. 2007;15:123-136.
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in a randomized study of 134 patients with recurrent breast cancer an intervention 
addressed at, among others, coping effectiveness (more active, less avoidant 
coping), resulted in less hopelessness in the intervention group, suggesting that 
specific intervention strategies can mitigate hopelessness when facing advanced 
disease.46 Nevertheless, a medical approach of the problems of cancer patients 
often prevails, even when patients are at the end of their lives. In fact, dying 
patients may receive invasive and inappropriate medical treatments in the days and 
hours before death, in spite of evidence of their poor prognosis.47 Further research 
needs to be performed to show that cognitive behavioral interventions may be 
(more) appropriate, also in the last phase of life.
3.6.3. Limitations of the study
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution. A mixed convenience 
sample was used, including a variety of cancer diagnosis. In the palliative group 52% 
of the patients returned the questionnaire. Although this percentage is quite good 
considering the phase of life we were asking patients to fill out questionnaires, we 
have to acknowledge that a selection bias may be present. Therefore, generalization 
of the results beyond the sample of this study is restricted. Also, our patient groups 
were relatively small, precluding the detection of subtle differences between the 
groups or small, but significant associations between coping strategies, quality of 
life, depression and hopelessness. 
3.6.4. Implications for practice and research
Given the results of our study, together with others,48 demonstrating that active 
coping strategies and the coping strategy acceptance were predictive for a better 
QOL and lower levels of depression and hopelessness - in contrast to the coping 
strategy venting of emotions and the avoidant coping strategy giving up - health 
care practitioners should treat cancer patients in a manner consistent with this 
evidence. 
 Oncology nurses are in a key position to incorporate psychosocial care in their 
daily practice, thereby influencing patients’ QOL.49 Although the patient’s perspective 
is essential in quality of life assessment not all patients take the initiative of sharing 
their currently perceived quality of life with the health care provider.50 In turn, 
46  Northouse L, Kershaw T, Mood D et al. Effects of a family intervention on the quality of life of women with 
recurrent breast cancer and their family caregivers. Psychooncology. 2005;14:478-491.
47 Ahronheim JC, Morrison RS, Baskin SA et al. Treatment of the dying in the acute care hospital. Advanced 
dementia and metastatic cancer. Arch Intern Med. 1996;156:2094-2100. Lynn J, Teno JM, Phillips RS et 
al. Perceptions by family members of the dying experience of older and seriously ill patients. SUPPORT 
Investigators. Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments. Ann 
Intern Med. 1997;126:97-106.
48 Danhauer SC, 2009. Lehto US, 2005. Schnoll R, 1998. McCaul KD, 1999. Feifel H, 1987.
49  King CR. Advances in how clinical nurses can evaluate and improve quality of life for individuals with 
cancer. Oncol Nurs Forum. 2006;33:5-12.
50  Leydon GM, Boulton M, Moynihan C et al. Cancer patients’ information needs and information seeking 
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professionals do not gather information proactively from the different domains, 
but often wait for patients to report their problems and fail to address all relevant 
issues.51 Previous research shows that nurses can involve individuals with cancer in 
assessing their QOL to assist in providing high-quality care that is directed at 
positively affecting QOL.52 
 Specific attention to differences in coping strategies between cancer patients in 
the curative and the palliative, end-of-life care setting is warranted. Especially in 
the palliative care setting patients may rely on seeking moral support from family 
and friends as a coping strategy, while for example active coping strategies may be 
more beneficial. This is not only of importance for nurses as professional caregivers 
of palliative patients, but also because nurses have an important role to play in 
communication with and education of family and friends.53 Also, in the curative 
setting a waiting attitude may well be advised to patients, whereas this may not be 
useful in the palliative, end-of-life setting.
 Nevertheless, challenges exist in achieving the translation of research into 
clinical practice.54 First of all, further research needs to be performed to show that 
cognitive behavioral interventions are efficacious for improvement of QOL and a 
decrease in depression and hopelessness in cancer patients in the curative and the 
palliative, end-of-life care setting. Furthermore, health care providers need to be 
made aware of the available evidence and be persuaded to change their current 
practice. Evidence based psychosocial assessment and intervention strategies need 
to be developed and incorporated in clinical practice guidelines. 
behaviour: in depth interview study. BMJ. 2000;320:909-913.
51  Detmar SB, Aaronson NK, Wever LD et al. How are you feeling? Who wants to know? Patients’ and 
oncologists’ preferences for discussing health-related quality-of-life issues. J Clin Oncol. 2000;18:3295-3301.
52  King CR, 2006.
53 Tamayo GJ, Broxson A, Munsell M et al. Caring for the caregiver. Oncol Nurs Forum. 2010;37:E50-E57.
54  Jacobsen PB. Promoting evidence-based psychosocial care for cancer patients. Psychooncology. 2009;18:6-13.
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Images of God in relation to coping strategies  
of advanced cancer patients  
This chapter is based on: 
Van Laarhoven HW, Schilderman J, Vissers KC, Verhagen CA, Prins JB. Images of God 
in relation to coping strategies of palliative cancer patients. J Pain Symptom Manage. 
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Abstract 
Context: religious coping is important for end-of-life treatment preferences, 
advance care planning, adjustment to stress and quality of life. The currently 
available religious coping instruments draw on a religious and spiritual background 
which presupposes a very specific image of God, namely God as someone who 
personally interacts with people. However, according to empirical research  people 
may have various images of God that may or may not exist simultaneously. It is 
unknown whether one’s belief in a specific image of God is related to the way one 
copes with a life-threatening disease.
Objectives: to examine the relation between adherence to a personal, a non-personal 
and/or an unknowable image of God and coping strategies in a group of Dutch 
advanced cancer patients who did not receive anti-tumor treatments anymore.  
Methods: In total, 68 advanced patients completed and returned the questionnaires 
on Images of God and the COPE-Easy. 
Results: In the regression analysis a non-personal image of God was a significant 
positive predictor for the coping strategies seeking advice and information (β .339), 
seeking moral support (β .262), and denial (β .261), and a negative predictor for the 
coping strategy humor (β -.483). A personal image of God was a significant positive 
predictor for the coping strategy turning to religion (β .608). Age was the most 
important socio-demographic predictor for coping and had negative predictive 
value for seeking advice and information (β -.268) and seeking moral support (β 
-.247).
Conclusion: A non-personal image of God is a more relevant predictor for different 
coping strategies in Dutch advanced cancer patients than a personal or unknowable 
image of God.
Keywords
religion; images of God; coping; palliative care
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4.1. Introduction
Religion and spirituality are increasingly recognized as important domains to 
include in the care for patients with a life threatening illness.1 According to reports 
in the United States and Canada 50%-90% of cancer patients view religion or 
spirituality as personally important.2 Religion and spirituality can offer a source of 
comfort, meaning, control and personal growth to patients who are confronted 
with a life-threatening disease.3  In a recent multicenter study 78.8% of the patients 
with advanced cancer (n=272) reported that religion helped them to cope to at 
least a moderate extent.4 Being asked about sources of support religiousness is 
spontaneously mentioned by 26.1% of cancer patients.5
 The way patients draw on their religion or spirituality to understand and to 
adapt to a specific situation of crisis is referred to as religious coping.6 Several 
specific religious coping scales have been developed to overcome the limitations of 
general coping scales which include only a few items on religious coping  and fail to 
capture the broad range of cognitions and practices related to religious coping.7 For 
example, the Ways of Religious Coping Scale measures the degree and kind of 
cognitions and behaviours people use to cope with stress.8 The Brief RCOPE 
examines specific clusters and patterns of items that are divided into positive 
(adaptive) or negative (maladaptive) coping strategies.9 The Religious Coping 
Activities measures the specific content of various potentially positive or negative 
1 McCue JD. The naturalness of dying. JAMA. 1995;273:1039-1043. World Health Organisation.  http://www.
who.int/cancer/palliative/definition/en/, last accessed 9-4-2012. 
2 True G, Phipps EJ, Braitman LE et al. Treatment preferences and advance care planning at end of life: 
the role of ethnicity and spiritual coping in cancer patients. Ann Behav Med. 2005;30:174-179. Gall TL. 
Relationship with God and the quality of life of prostate cancer survivors. Qual Life Res. 2004;13:1357-
1368. Balboni TA, Vanderwerker LC, Block SD et al. Religiousness and spiritual support among advanced 
cancer patients and associations with end-of-life treatment preferences and quality of life. J Clin Oncol. 
2007;25:555-560.
3 Pargament KI, Koenig HG, Perez LM. The many methods of religious coping: development and initial 
validation of the RCOPE. J Clin Psychol. 2000;56:519-543.
4 Phelps AC, Maciejewski PK, Nilsson M et al. Religious coping and use of intensive life-prolonging care near 
death in patients with advanced cancer. JAMA. 2009;301:1140-1147.
5 Cigrang JA, Hryshko-Mullen A, Peterson AL. Spontaneous reports of religious coping by patients with 
chronic physical illness. Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings. 2003;10:133-137.
6 Pargament KI. The Psychology of Religion and Coping. 1997; New York/London: The Guilford Press.
7 Carver CS, Scheier MF, Weintraub JK. Assessing coping strategies: A theoretically based aproach. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology. 1989;56:267-283. Carver CS. You want to measure coping but your 
protocol’s too long: consider the brief COPE. International Journal of Behavioral Medicine. 1997;4:92-100. 
Folkman S, Lazarus RS. Manual for the Ways of Coping Questionnaire. 1988; Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychology Press. Thune-Boyle IC, Stygall JA, Keshtgar MR et al. Do religious/spiritual coping strategies 
affect illness adjustment in patients with cancer? A systematic review of the literature. Social Science & 
Medicine. 2006;63:151-164.
8  Boudreaux E, Catz S, Ryan L et al. The Ways of Religious Coping Scale: Reliability, Validity, and Scale 
Development. Assessment. 1995;2:233-244.
9 Pargament KI, 2000.
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coping strategies, such as good deeds, religious support and religious avoidance.10 
In the Religious Problem Solving Scale three religious ways of maintaining a sense 
of agency and control in coping are distinguished:  firstly, collaborative religious 
coping, in which God is a partner who shares responsibility with the individual for 
problem solving; secondly, deferring coping in which the individual delegates 
responsibility to God while passively waiting for the outcome; lastly, self-directed 
coping in which the individual assumes that God has given him the skills and 
resources to solve the problem himself.11 The attempt to influence the will of God 
by praying for positive outcomes or pleading for a miracle may be added to this 
scale as a fourth way of coping.12 
 Using these instruments, it has been shown that religious coping is important 
for end-of-life treatment preferences, advance care planning, adjustment to stress 
and quality of life.13 It should be noted that the currently available religious coping 
instruments draw on a religious and spiritual background which presupposes a very 
specific image of God, namely God as someone who personally interacts with 
people.14 However, according to empirical research  people may have various 
images of God that may or may not exist simultaneously. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, many people have a non-personal image of God, regarding God as 
‘something higher’, or an unknowable image of God, which implies that God 
surpasses all our powers of imagination.15 It is unknown whether one’s belief in a 
specific image of God is related to the way one understands and adapts to a 
situation of crisis. 
4.2. Research question
The question underlying this study is: what is the relation between adherence to a 
personal, non-personal and unknowable image of God and coping strategies in 
advanced cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting?
10  Pargament KI, Ensing DS, Falgout K et al. God help me: (I) Religious coping efforts as predictors of outcome 
to significant negative life events. American Journal of Community Psychology. 1990;18:793-824.
11  Pargament KI, Kennell J, Hathaway W et al. Religion and the Problem-Solving Process - 3 Styles of Coping. 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1988;27:90-104.
12  Pargament KI, 1990.
13 True G, 2005. Balboni TA, 2007. Phelps AC, 2009. Tarakeshwar N, Vanderwerker LC, Paulk E et al. Religious 
coping is associated with the quality of life of patients with advanced cancer. J Palliat Med. 2006;9:646-
657. Ano GG, Vasconcelles EB. Religious coping and psychological adjustment to stress: a meta-analysis. J 
Clin Psychol. 2005;61:461-480.
14 Van Laarhoven HW, Schilderman J, Prins J. Religious Coping and Life-Prolonging Care. JAMA. 2009;302:257.
15 Van der Ven JA. God reinvented? A theological search in texts and tables. 1998; Leiden: Brill. Van der Ven 
JA, Dreyer J, Pieterse H. Is there a God of human rights? 2004; Leiden: Brill.
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4.3. Methods
4.3.1. Study sample
As part of a larger project on religion and palliative care a self-administered 
questionnaire was given out to advanced cancer patients from the departments of 
Internal Medicine, Medical Oncology and the Palliative Care unit of one university 
and two general hospitals, two hospices, and a regional consultation service for 
palliative care in the Netherlands. The study was approved by the institutional 
Medical Ethical Board and all participating patients gave written informed consent.
The inclusion criteria were as follows: patients with advanced solid tumors; not 
receiving anti-tumor therapies anymore and recovered from acute treatment 
toxicities. Exclusion criteria were: inability to read Dutch or extreme morbidity 
precluding filling out a questionnaire. 
4.3.2. Measurement instruments
Sociodemographic data were collected from all participants. Disease information 
was provided by the treating physician. Patients completed the Images of God 
Scale,  a Dutch 14-item instrument which has been used, among others, in a large 
survey (n=1008) on Socio-Cultural Developments in the Netherlands.16 It assesses 
adherence to a personal image of God (e.g. ‘God knows and understands me’), a 
non-personal image of God (e.g. ‘There is Something that unifies man and world in 
their very roots’) and an unknowable image of God (e.g. ‘God (Someone or 
Something) surpasses our powers of imagination’). The internal consistency 
(Crohnbach’s α) of the scales of images of God was .98 for a personal image of God, 
.93 for a non-personal image of God and .81 for an unknowable image of God. 
Images of God were scored from 1, totally disagree, to 5, fully agree. Coping was 
measured by the COPE-Easy abbreviated version, which is a validated instrument in 
Dutch measuring 14 different coping strategies.17 The internal consistency of the 
subscales of the COPE-Easy ranged from .63 to .98. Coping strategies were scored 
from 1, not applicable, to 4, very much applicable.
4.3.3. Statistical analysis
Associations between adherence to a personal, non-personal or unknowable image 
of God (low versus high) and patient characteristics were analyzed using χ2 and t 
tests when appropriate. Agreement with an image of God was computed ‘low’ if a 
patient scored < 3.5 and ‘high’ if a patient scored ≥ 3.5 (on a scale from 1-5), ensuring 
that in the ‘high’ category only patients were included that were really convinced of 
a particular image of God.
16 Van der Ven JA, 1998. Van der Ven JA, 2004. 
17 Carver CS, 1989. Kleijn WC, et al. Ervaringen met een Nederlandse bewerking van de COPE copingvragenlijst. 
De COPE_Easy. Gedrag en Gezondheid. 2000;28:213-226.
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Associations between images of God and coping strategies were first analyzed by 
Pearson’s correlation analysis. Significant associations were taken up in a stepwise 
regression model including relevant sociodemographic factors. In stepwise 
regression in SPSS each variable is entered in sequence and its value assessed. If 
adding the variable contributes to the model then it is retained, but all other 
variables in the model are then re-tested to see if they are still contributing to the 
success of the model. If they no longer contribute significantly they are removed. 
This method ensures we will end up with the simplest equation with the best 
predictive power. Relevant factors were considered to be sociodemographic 
patient characteristics significantly associated with both an image of God and any 
of the coping strategies. Patient age and sex, religious affiliation, church attendance 
and religious salience (importance of religion for daily life) were identified as such 
factors. In case more than one image of God correlated with the same coping 
strategy all images of God were taken up in that regression model. All statistical 
analyses were performed with SPSS (version 16.0.1). Statistical inferences were 
based on 2-sided tests with p < .05 considered to be statistically significant.
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Participants
Between July 2003 and December 2005 questionnaires were administered to 113 
consecutive eligible patients. Forty patients did not return the questionnaire. The 
most common reason for non-participation was non-specific (‘I just don’t feel 
like filling out the papers anymore’). 20% died before they could return the 
questionnaires. Five patients did not fully complete the Images of God Scale and 
were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, data from 68 patients were available 
for analysis. Participants and nonparticipants did not significantly differ by age of 
sex.  
 Colorectal cancer (22%), lung cancer (13%) and breast cancer (13%) were the 
most common tumor types. 53% of the patients was catholic, 13% protestant, 6% 
had another religious affiliation and 28% of the patients reported no religious 
affiliation.  Baseline characteristics of the sample by level of agreement with a 
personal, non-personal or unknowable image of God are presented in Table 1. Older 
patients and female patients scored higher on a personal image of God than 
younger and male patients. Although there was a significant association between 
agreement with the images of God and religious affiliation, church attendance and 
religious salience, they could not be equated: between 43-50% of the patients who 
scored low on the images of God still reported a religious affiliation. Of the patients 
who scored high on the images of God only up to 30% visited church regularly 
(monthly or more) and 35-51% of these patients explicitly stated that religion was 
relevant in their daily lives.
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4.4.2.  Research question: images of God and coping strategies
Table 2 and 3 show correlation and regression analyses of the relationship between 
images of God and coping strategies. A non-personal image of God was significantly 
correlated to five coping strategies, whereas a personal image of God was correlated 
to one coping strategy and an unknowable image of God to none of the coping 
strategies. In the regression analysis a non-personal image of God remained a 
significant positive predictor for the coping strategies seeking advice and 
information, seeking moral support, and denial, and a negative predictor for the 
coping strategy humor. A personal image of God was a significant positive predictor 
for the coping strategy turning to religion. Age was the most important socio-de-
mographic predictor for coping and had negative predictive value for seeking 
advice and information and seeking moral support.
4.5. Discussion
4.5.1. Images of God
This study shows for the first time that - compared to a personal or an unknowable 
image of God - a non-personal image of God is the most relevant predictor for coping 
in a group of Dutch advanced cancer patients. In contrast, adherence to an apophatic 
image of God was unrelated to any of the coping strategies. This suggests that the 
belief that God surpasses all our powers of imagination implies that God is more 
distant from daily life and patients who adhere an apophatic image of God may be 
more reliant on other resources. This hypothesis is supported by a previous study in 
prostate cancer survivors which showed that men who had a more distant image of 
God reported a greater sense of internal control and mastery over their illness.18 
 Clearly, it matters which image of God patients adhere to: a non-personal image 
of God cannot simply be equated with a personal or unknowable image of God. This 
is especially important since religious coping questionnaires often presuppose a 
personal image of God and, therefore, may fail to identify coping strategies which 
are related to a non-personal image of God. Therefore, new religious coping 
questionnaires which take into account different images of God, as measured by 
the Images of God Scale, are urgently needed. Of note, most studies on religious 
coping of cancer patients have been conducted in the USA.19  However, religious 
beliefs and practices can largely differ between countries and the relevance of a 
personal, non-personal or unknowable image of God for coping strategies may 
differ accordingly. At present it is unclear how prevalent religious coping is in 
various countries throughout the world. 
 In studies using the currently available religious coping scales, it has been 
shown that religious coping is associated with patient preferences for extensive 
measures to prolong life and receipt of intensive life-prolonging medical care near 
18  Gall TL, 2004.
19  Thune-Boyle IC, 2006.
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death.20 In our study the association between a non-personal image of God and the 
coping strategy denial could be an indication of patient preference for life 
prolonging medical care. However, the association between a non-personal image 
of God and the coping strategies seeking advice, information and moral support 
suggests that patients adhering to a non-personal image of God may be open to 
advice of their treating physicians to turn into a more palliative course of care.21   
20  Balboni TA, 2007. Phelps AC, 2009.
21  Schofield P, Carey M, Love A et al. ‘Would you like to talk about your future treatment options?’ - discussing 
the transition from curative cancer treatment to palliative care. Palliative Medicine. 2006;20:397-406.
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Table 1   Population characteristics by level of agreement with a personal, non- 
personal or unknowable image of God. Agreement with an image of God 
was computed ‘low’ if a patient scored < 3.5 and ‘high’ if a patient scored 
≥ 3.5 (on a scale from 1-5).
 
Characteristic Agreement with a personal image of God Agreement with a non-personal image of God Agreement with an unknowable image of God
LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH
Total 
no. of 
patients
Mean 
(sd)
Total 
no. of 
patients
Mean 
(sd)
P Total 
no. of 
patients
Mean 
(sd)
Total 
no. of 
patients
Mean 
(sd)
P Total 
no. of 
patients
Mean 
(sd)
Total 
no. of 
patients
Mean 
(sd)
P
Age 31 58
(8)
37 66
(10)
.000 21 61
(9)
47 63
(11)
.415 26 61
(10)
42 64
(10)
.222
 No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Male sex 31 20
(65)
37 14
(38)
.028 21 12
(57)
47 22
(47)
.431 26 14
(54)
42 20
(48)
.618
Living with a partner 30 22
(73)
37 22
(60)
.234 20 12
(60)
47 32
(68)
.524 25 14
(56)
42 30
(71)
.198
Education: ≥ vocational training 31 16
(50)
36 16
(50)
.558 21 11
(34)
46 21
(66)
.609 26 10
(39)
41 22
(54)
.225
Employment 31 11
(36)
37 8
(22)
.205 21 7
(33)
47 12
(26)
.508 26 7
(27)
42 12
(29)
.883
Religious affiliation 31 14
(45)
37 32
(87)
.000 21 9
(43)
47 37
(79)
.003 26 13
(50)
42 33
(79)
.014
Regular church attendance 31 0
(0)
37 11
(30)
.001 21 1
(5)
47 10
(21)
.088 26 1
(4)
42 10
(24)
.030
Religious salience 31 1
(3)
35 18
(51)
.000 21 3
(14)
45 16
(36)
.075 26 5
(19)
40 14
(35.0)
.167
99
4.5.2. Limitations of the study
It should be noted that the results of our study cannot be generalized beyond our 
study population, as we are limited both by the national context of the study (viz. 
the Netherlands), but also by the fact that religious minorities from the Netherlands 
were not included in the study (all but two participants were catholic or protestant). 
Also, our patient group was relatively small and we have tested multiple hypotheses 
with the possibility of reporting spurious associations. Ideally, because of our relatively 
small study sample, our results should be validated in a second independent set of 
data to allow for definite conclusions. Finally, from this study a causal relationship 
between images of God and coping strategies cannot be established, since, for 
example, there may have been an unknown third variable influencing both of these 
variables. Nevertheless, this study does offer an explorative insight into the relation 
between images of God and coping.
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.003 26 13
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Regular church attendance 31 0
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37 11
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 In conclusion, a non-personal image of God is the most relevant predictor for 
coping in a group of Dutch advanced cancer patients. When discussing prognosis 
and treatment options clinicians should be attentive to the different coping methods 
that patients may use and carefully examine the role of their religious beliefs and 
values. To facilitate clinicians in discussing these issues with patients at the end of 
life, practical training programmes should become widely available.22
22 Lo B, Ruston D, Kates LW et al. Discussing religious and spiritual issues at the end of life: a practical 
guide for physicians. JAMA. 2002;287:749-754. Marr L, Billings JA, Weissman DE. Spirituality training for 
palliative care fellows. J Palliat Med. 2007;10:169-177.
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Table 2   Correlations between images of God and coping strategies. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient r is given. 
 
Personal  
God
Non-personal  
God
Unknowable  
God
Active handling of the circumstances r -,046 ,239 -,078
sig. ,715 ,053 ,531
Planning how to deal with the 
situation
r -,181 ,007 -,137
sig. ,142 ,954 ,270
Giving priority to the situation r -,027 -,050 -,046
sig. ,832 ,691 ,714
Waiting until an appropriate moment 
to act presents itself
r ,154 ,235 ,152
sig. ,216 ,057 ,222
Reappreciate the situation r ,142 ,153 ,109
sig. ,256 ,221 ,385
Seeking advice and information r ,231 ,327** ,085
sig. ,060 ,007 ,493
Seeking moral support r ,088 ,247* -,029
sig. ,481 ,046 ,816
Venting of emotions r ,022 ,120 -,117
sig. ,862 ,339 ,348
Denial r ,022 ,264* -,007
sig. ,857 ,031 ,955
Giving up of one’s goals r -,097 -,051 -,166
sig. ,439 ,681 ,184
Seeking distraction r ,006 -,153 -,229
sig. ,964 ,220 ,064
Acceptance r ,162 -,103 -,087
sig. ,194 ,411 ,487
Turning to religion r ,709** ,435** ,147
sig. ,000 ,000 ,235
Humor r -,011 -,375** -,227
sig. ,932 ,002 ,069
* indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. 
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Table 3   Stepwise regression analysis of images of God on coping strategies. Stepwise 
regression analysis was performed of images of God on relevant coping 
strategies as determined from the correlation analysis (see Methods). Per 
coping strategy, all significant models are shown with the independent 
variables which were entered successively. 
 
Dependent 
variable
Model Independent 
variables
Standardized 
Coefficients
Beta
Sig. R2
change
R2 Adjusted R2 
Seeking  
advice and 
information
1 Non-personal God .330 .007 .109** .109** .095
2 Non-personal God
Age
.339
-.268
.004
.023
.071* .180** .154
Seeking  
moral support
1 Non-personal God .255 .042 .065* .065* .050
2 Non-personal God
Age
.262
-.247
.032
.044
.061* .126* .097
Denial 1 Non-personal God .261 .036 .068* .068* .053
Turning to 
religion
1 Personal God .701 .000 .491** .491** .483
2 Personal God
Church attendance
.608
.251
.000
.008
.054** .545** .545
Humor 1 Non-personal God -.373 .000 .139** .139** .125
2 Non-personal God
Religious salience
-.483
.267
.000
.039
.059* .199** .172
* indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. 
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Chapter 5
Patients’ perspectives on death and afterlife  
in relation to quality of life, depression and  
hopelessness in cancer patients without evidence 
of disease and advanced cancer patients
  
This chapter is based on: 
Van Laarhoven HW, Schilderman J, Verhagen CA, Vissers KC, Prins J. Perspectives on 
death and afterlife in relation to quality of life, depression, and hopelessness in cancer 
patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients. J Pain Symptom 
Manage. 2011;41(6):1048-59.
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Abstract 
Purpose: assess the relation of patients’ attitudes and emotions towards death and 
afterlife with quality-of-life, depression and hopelessness in cancer patients 
without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients facing death. 
Methods: 91 cancer patients without evidence of disease and 57 advanced cancer 
patients completed the Dutch Attitudes towards Death and Afterlife Scale. Emotions 
towards death were measured using the Self-Confrontation Method. Quality-of-life 
was measured with the Satisfaction with Life Scale and EORTC Quality-of-Life 
Questionnaire. Depression and hopelessness were measured with Beck’s Depression 
Inventory for Primary Care and Beck’s Hopelessness Scale.
Results: average scores on attitudes and emotions towards death and afterlife 
were not significantly different between the two groups. However, in the ‘no 
evidence of disease’ group a negative association between negative emotions and 
social functioning was observed which was not present in the ‘advanced’ group. In 
the ‘advanced’ group associations were observed which were not present in the ‘no 
evidence of disease’ group: positive associations between the explicitly religious 
attitude and global health status, and between reincarnation belief and role and 
cognitive functioning;  a negative association between other-directed emotions 
and social functioning. 
Conclusion: patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients do 
not differ in attitudes or emotions towards death, but the relation of these attitudes 
and emotions with aspects of quality-of-life varies. When there is no evidence of 
disease negative emotions play the most important role, whereas in the advanced 
cancer situation attitudes towards death and afterlife  which may provide meaning 
and value become more prominent.
Keywords
death; afterlife; quality of life; depression; hopelessness; palliative care
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5.1. Introduction
Cancer is one of the most frequent causes of death in the western world. Therefore, 
despite the fact that many people can be cured, the diagnosis cancer is still 
associated with imminent death. As a consequence, at least temporarily, the 
comfortable sense of both invulnerability and immortality is shattered, making the 
patient thoroughly aware that life is finite and limited.1 To cope with cancer implies, 
among others, to cope with the inescapable finitude of life. For patients with 
advanced, incurable cancer this process is even more complicated. The clinical 
course of a patient with advanced cancer has been characterized as a ‘living-dying 
experience’ in which the individual and his or her family attempts to maintain 
control and continue everyday life despite the confrontation with the incompatibil-
ity of life and death.2 Patients with advanced cancer have to perform the hard work 
of living in the face of death.3 This may be a period of life review and give the 
opportunity to close old conflicts, to say goodbye, seek forgiveness, and fulfil life 
goals, but it can also be a period of overwhelming distress.4 Patients are confronted 
with problems such as fear of death, unresolved issues, parting with family, and 
pain.5 Knowledge of end-of-life issues is vital for distress management and to 
provide comprehensive cancer care.6 
 However, direct comparative studies in cancer patients with different life 
expectancies which explore the perspectives on and feelings towards death and 
afterlife in relation to distress are limited and report conflicting results. For 
example, McClain-Jacobson showed that among 276 terminally ill cancer patients 
belief in an afterlife was associated with lower levels of end-of-life despair 
(hopelessness, desire for a hastened death and suicidal ideation), but not with 
levels of depression or anxiety.7 However, when multivariate analysis included a 
measure of spiritual well-being, the beneficial effect of afterlife beliefs disappeared. 
No comparison with cancer patients in a less advanced stage was made. Of note, in 
this study belief in an afterlife was measured with just one single question ‘Do you 
believe in an afterlife?’, without distinguishing between different afterlife beliefs. It 
may well be that a more differentiated approach towards afterlife beliefs would 
have lead to different results. 
1 Efficace F, Marrone R. Spiritual issues and quality of life assessment in cancer care. Death Studies. 
2002;26:743-756.
2 Muzzin LJ, Anderson NJ, Figueredo AT et al. The experience of cancer. Soc Sci Med. 1994;38:1201-208.
3 Coyle N. The hard work of living in the face of death. J Pain Symptom Manage. 2006;32:266-274.
4 Penson RT, Partridge RA, Shah MA et al. Fear of death. Oncologist. 2005;10:160-169.
5 Grumann MM, Spiegel D. Living in the face of death: interviews with 12 terminally ill women on home 
hospice care. Palliat Support Care. 2003;1:23-32.
6 National Comprehensive Cancer Network.  Distress Management. NCCN Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Oncology. v.1, 2008. Taylor EJ. Spiritual needs of patients with cancer and family caregivers. Cancer Nurs. 
2003;26:260-266.
7 McClain-Jacobson C, Rosenfeld B, Kosinski A et al. Belief in an afterlife, spiritual well-being and end-of-life 
despair in patients with advanced cancer. General Hospital Psychiatry. 2004;26:484-486.
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Previously, it has been observed in a group of 35 cancer patients with a life 
expectancy of less than two years that patients were significantly more afraid of 
death than healthy control subjects on a non-conscious level, although the majority 
of patients disclaimed fear of death on a verbal level.8 Similarly, in a study of 102 
inpatients with haematologic malignancies treated with curative intent, these 
patients had significantly more preoccupation with death than a control group of 
33 patients with benign dysfunction.9 In this study, preoccupation with death was 
related to a depressive coping style as well as symptoms of depression and anxiety. 
Shermon et al. reported higher death anxiety in 38 patients with advanced cancer 
compared to 36 cancer patients’ caregivers. Greater death anxiety was associated 
with lower quality of life.10  In contrast, in a study of 90 young adult male cancer 
survivors and a normative comparison group, death anxiety was  related to somatic 
and psychological distress, but  the cancer survivors did not have higher death 
anxiety than the comparison group.11 Also, in a recent study of 254 patients with 
stage I-IV ovarian cancer 55% reported fear of dying. However, stage of disease and 
number of prior treatments were not associated with worry about dying.12 
 Thus, the question remains whether cancer patients with different life expectancies 
have different attitudes and emotions towards death and afterlife. Also, it is unclear 
whether these attitudes and emotions towards death and afterlife influence 
patients’ distress. 
5.2. Research questions
In the present study the following three questions were addressed. First, do 
attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife differ between cancer patients 
without evidence of disease compared to advanced cancer patients who are facing 
death? Second, are these attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife related 
to patients’ distress, operationalized as quality of life, depression and hopelessness?13 
Third, do relations of attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife with distress 
differ between cancer patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer 
patients? We approached patients’ attitudes towards death and afterlife in a 
differentiated way and distinguished between an agnostic attitude, three non-explicitly 
8 Feifel H, Freilich J, Hermann LJ. Death fear in dying heart and cancer patients. J Psychosom Res. 1973;17:161-
166.
9 Vollmer TC, Wittmann M, Schweiger C et al. Preoccupation with death as predictor of psychological 
distress in patients with haematologic malignancies. Eur J Cancer Care (Engl ). 2010.
10 Sherman DW, Norman R, McSherry CB. A comparison of death anxiety and quality of life of patients with 
advanced cancer or AIDS and their family caregivers. J Assoc Nurses AIDS Care. 2010;21:99-112.
11 Cella DF, Tross S. Death anxiety in cancer survival: a preliminary cross-validation study. J Pers Assess. 
1987;51:451-461.
12 Shinn EH, Taylor CL, Kilgore K et al. Associations with worry about dying and hopelessness in ambulatory 
ovarian cancer patients. Palliat Support Care. 2009;7:299-306.
13 National Comprehensive Cancer Network, 2008.
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religious attitudes and an explicitly religious attitude.14 Moreover, we did not only 
examine negative emotions towards death, but also positive, self-directed and 
other-directed emotions.15 
5.3. Methods
5.3.1. Study sample
As part of a larger project on quality of life a self-administered questionnaire was 
given out to patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients 
from the departments of Surgery, Urology, Gynaecology, Internal Medicine, Medical 
Oncology and the Palliative Care unit of one university and two general hospitals, 
two hospices, and a regional consultation service for palliative care in the 
Netherlands. The study was approved by the institutional Medical Ethical Board 
and all participating patients gave written informed consent. The inclusion criteria 
for patients without evidence of disease  were: patients with a history of treatment 
for a solid tumor; end of treatment less than one year ago; no signs of acute 
treatment toxicities and no evidence of disease at the moment of inclusion. Patients 
who were on adjuvant hormonal therapy could also be included in this group.  The 
inclusion criteria for the advanced cancer patients were: patients with advanced 
solid tumours; not receiving anti-tumour therapies anymore; recovered from acute 
treatment toxicities at the moment of inclusion. Exclusion criteria for both groups 
were: inability to read Dutch or extreme morbidity precluding filling out a 
questionnaire. 
5.3.2. Measurement instruments
Sociodemographic data were collected from all participants. Disease information 
was provided by the treating physician. Participants were also asked to indicate 
whether they believed in God or a higher being on a scale from 1 (absolutely not 
convinced) to 5 (absolutely convinced). 
 To measure attitudes towards death and afterlife we used the Dutch 
measurement instrument developed by Scherer-Rath for patients who were in the 
middle of a suicide crisis.16 Although the situation of patients in a suicide crisis may 
be quite different from patients confronted with cancer, the common denominator 
in these two patient populations is that they are both confronted with a radical, 
existential life event. To accommodate potential differences between the two 
groups we have performed a new factor analysis on the original items of the 
14 Scherer-Rath M. Lebenssackgassen. Herausforderung für die pastorale Beratung und Begleitung von 
Menschen in Lebenskrisen. 2001; Münster/Hamburg/London: Lit Verlag; Scherer-Rath M, Van der Ven JA, 
Felling A. Images of death as perspectives in a life crisis. Journal of Empirical Theology. 2001;14:5-26.
15 Hermans HJ, Hermans-Jansen E. Self-narratives: The construction of meaning in psychotherapy. 1995; New 
York: The Guilford Press.
16 Scherer-Rath M, 2001. Scherer-Rath M, et al, 2001.
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instrument (factor analysis fixed to 5 factors, oblimin rotation, communality ≥ .2, 
factor loading ≥ .4) Five different attitudes towards death and afterlife were 
distinguished: an  agnostic  attitude, three non-explicitly religious attitudes and an 
explicitly religious attitude (total explained variance 68%). The distinction between 
agnostic  and religious attitudes reflected the fact that both religious and  agnostic 
people try to come to terms with death. The  agnostic  attitude referred to death as 
a natural ending of life or doubt about the possibility of any meaning of death 
(Crohnbach’s a = .73). The distinction between non-explicitly religious and explicitly 
religious attitudes reflected that God or transcendency is not always brought up 
explicitly. In the non-explicitly religious attitudes the concepts ‘soul’ and ‘higher 
reality’ symbolized the transcendental, while in the explicitly religious attitudes 
reference was made to the ‘one God’. For the explicitly religious attitude 
Crohnbach’s a  was .96. Non-explicitly religious attitudes were further differentiated 
into the belief in the continuation of the soul despite death (‘continuation’, 
Crohnbach’s a = .92), belief in reincarnation (‘reincarnation’, Crohnbach’s a = .83) 
and belief in the reencounter with and community of all deceased after death 
(‘community’, Crohnbach’s a = .95). In the data-set of Scherer-Rath both the 
religious attitude and  agnostic attitudes could be further differentiated. However, 
these further differentiations were not found in our patient population and were, 
therefore, not used in the present study. Each attitude  was scored on a scale from 
1 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree). 
 Emotions towards death were measured using the Self-Confrontation Method 
of Hermans.17 This is an idiographic method which may be used to identify specific 
domains of value in someone’s life and assess which emotions are attached to 
these domains.18 In our study respondents were asked to think of their own death 
and then rate the relevance of eight emotions which reflect four domains of self 
valuation: (1) self-enhancement (strength, pride: self-directed emotions; 
Crohnbach’s a = .69), (2) attachment to others (carefulness, love: other-directed 
emotions; Crohnbach’s a = .85), (3) positive affect (security, warmth: positive 
emotions; Crohnbach’s a = .74), and (4) negative affect (loneliness, powerlessness: 
negative emotions; Crohnbach’s a = .68). For each domain a sum score was 
calculated, 0 indicating that the emotion was not present at all and 10 indicating 
that the emotion was very much present.
 Overall quality of life was measured with the Satisfaction with Life (SWL) scale19 
and the score for global health status from the European Organisation for Research 
and Treatment of Cancer Quality of Life Questionnaire version 2 (EORTC QLQ-C30v2).20 
17 Hermans HJ, 1995.
18 Oles PK, Hermans HJ. The dialogical self: Theory and research. 2005; Lublin: Wydawnictwo; Hermans HJM. 
The person as a motivated storyteller: Valuation theory and the Self-Confrontation Method. In: Neimeyer 
RA, Neimeyer GJ, eds. Advances in Personal Construct Psychology. 2002; New York: Praeger.
19 Diener E, Emmons R, Larsen R et al. The Satisfaction with Life Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment. 
1985;49:71-75.
20 Aaronson NK, Ahmedzai S, Bergman B et al. The European Organization for Research and Treatment 
of Cancer QLQ-C30: a quality-of-life instrument for use in international clinical trials in oncology. J Natl 
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For the SWL a sum score was constructed, 5-9 indicating extremely dissatisfied, 
10-14 dissatisfied, 15-19 slightly below average, 20-24 average, 25-29 high 
satisfaction and 30-35 very high satisfaction. The scale for global health status of 
the EORTC Quality of Life Questionnaire ranged from 0, very bad, to 100, excellent 
(cf. reference values for the EORTC-QLQ C30 at http://groups.eortc.be/ qol/
downloads/ reference_values_manual2008.pdf). The subscales physical 
functioning, role functioning, social functioning, emotional and cognitive 
functioning of the EORTC QLQ-C30v2 were used to measure quality of life in 
functional terms. The scales ranged from 0, very bad, to 100, excellent  The QLQ-C30 
has proven to be a reliable and valid measure of the quality of life, also in palliative 
care cancer patients.21 
 Depression was measured by Beck’s Depression Inventory for Primary Care 
(BDI-PC).22 The assessment of depression in cancer patients can be confounded by 
physical symptoms caused by the cancer or its treatment. The use of the BDI-PC can 
circumvent this problem, since it does not include somatic items. The BDI-PC 
contains 7 items, scored on a 0-3 scale. A sumscore of ≥ 4 indicates clinically 
relevant depression. As depression and hopelessness are mutually reinforcing, but 
distinct constructs,23 hopelessness was measured separately with Beck’s Hopelessness 
Scale, 0 indicated no hopelessness, 20 indicated maximum hopelessness.24 
5.3.3. Statistical analysis
Associations between attitudes and emotions towards death (low versus high) and 
patient characteristics were analyzed using χ2 and t tests when appropriate. 
Agreement with an attitude towards death was computed ‘low’ if a patient scored 
< 3.5 and ‘high’ if a patient scored ≥ 3.5 (on a scale from 1-5). Agreement with an 
emotion towards death was computed ‘low’ if a patient scored < 6 and ‘high’ if a 
patient scored ≥ 6 (on a scale from 0-10). To answer the first research question - do 
attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife differ between patients without 
evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients? – differences in means between 
the two groups were assessed using covariance analysis with the significant 
associations between sociodemographic variables and attitudes and emotions 
towards death as covariates.
Cancer Inst. 1993;85:365-376.
21 Kyriaki M, Eleni T, Efi P et al. The EORTC core quality of life questionnaire (QLQ-C30, version 3.0) in 
terminally ill cancer patients under palliative care: validity and reliability in a Hellenic sample. Int J Cancer. 
2001;94:135-139.
22 Beck AT, Guth D, Steer RA et al. Screening for major depression disorders in medical inpatients with the 
Beck Depression Inventory for Primary Care. Behav Res Ther. 1997;35:785-791.
23 Rodin G, Lo C, Mikulincer M et al. Pathways to distress: The multiple determinants of depression, 
hopelessness, and the desire for hastened death in metastatic cancer patients. Social Science & Medicine. 
2009;68:562-569.
24 Beck AT, Weissman A. The measurement of pessimism: the hopelessness scale. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology. 1974;42:861-865.
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 To answer the second research question - are these attitudes and emotions 
about death and afterlife related to patients’ distress, operationalized as quality of 
life, depression and hopelessness? – we performed correlation and regression 
analyses. Associations of attitudes and emotions towards death and afterlife with 
measures of quality of life, depression and hopelessness were analyzed by partial 
correlation analysis including relevant sociodemographic factors. Relevant factors 
were considered to be those sociodemographic patient characteristics that were 
significantly associated with both an attitude or feeling towards death and any of 
the measures of quality of life, depression or hopelessness. Patient age, sex and 
belief in God or a higher being were identified as such factors. Significant 
associations with a correlation coefficient r ≥ .2 were taken up in a stepwise 
regression model including the relevant sociodemographic factors. In stepwise 
regression in SPSS each variable was entered in sequence and its value assessed. If 
adding the variable contributed to the model then it was retained, but all other 
variables in the model were then re-tested to see if they were still contributing to 
the success of the model. If they no longer contributed significantly they were 
removed. This method ensured we would end up with the simplest equation with 
the best predictive power. In case more than one attitude or emotion towards 
death and afterlife correlated with the same outcome variable they were all taken 
up in that regression model. 
 Finally, to answer the third research question - do relations of attitudes and 
emotions about death and afterlife with distress differ between patients without 
evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients – it was assessed whether a 
significant partial correlation coefficient identified in one patient group was 
significantly different from the partial correlation coefficient in the other patient 
group using Fisher’s r-to-Z formula.25 
 All statistical analyses were performed with SPSS (version 16.0.1). Statistical 
inferences were based on 2-sided tests with p<.05 considered to be statistically 
significant. 
5.4. Results
5.4.1. Participants
A questionnaire was administered to 236 eligible patients, 123  cancer patients 
without evidence of disease and 113 advanced cancer patients. Twenty-three 
patients without evidence of disease and 40 advanced cancer did not return the 
questionnaire. In both groups the most important reason (50% in the no evidence 
of disease group, 39% in the advanced cancer group) for not participating was not 
specified (‘I just don’t feel like filling out the papers anymore’). Eleven patients in 
the advanced cancer group deteriorated or died before they could return the 
25 Cohen J, Cohen P, West SG et al. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral 
Sciences. 2003; Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
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questionnaire. Nine patients without evidence of disease and 16 advanced cancer 
patients did not fully complete the scales on attitudes and emotions towards death 
and were excluded from the analysis. Thus, data  of 91 patients without evidence of 
disease and 57 advanced cancer patients were available for analysis. Participants 
and nonparticipants did not significantly differ by age or sex.
 Breast cancer (17%), prostate, colorectal and lung cancer (all 7%) were the most 
common tumour types. Baseline characteristics of the sample and baseline charac-
teristics of the sample by level of agreement with the attitudes and emotions 
towards death are presented in Table 1 and Table 2.   
5.4.2.  Research question 1
The average scores on attitudes towards death and afterlife were quite similar for 
patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients. (Table 3)  Both 
patient groups scored highest on an agnostic attitude towards death and afterlife, 
directly followed by belief in the continuation of the soul despite death. Also the 
scores on the emotions about death were not statistically significant between the 
without evidence of disease group and the advanced cancer group, although on 
average patients without evidence of disease scored lower on all emotions towards 
death compared to advanced cancer patients. Negative emotions and other-directed 
emotions scored highest in both patient groups. 
5.4.3.  Research question 2
Table 4 and Table 5 show partial correlation and regression analyses of attitudes 
and emotions towards death and afterlife with satisfaction with life, measures of 
quality of life, depression and hopelessness, respectively. In the advanced cancer 
Death and afterlife
Table 1   Patient characteristics. Valid percentages are presented in brackets.
 
Patient group No evidence of disease Advanced cancer
Age (mean ± st dev) 53 ±  14 62 ± 10
Karnofsky Performance Score (mean ± st dev) 95 ±    6 62 ± 17
Sex
    Female 
    Male
48 (53%)
43 (47%)
28 (49%)
29 (51%)
Living with a partner
   Yes 
   No 
75 (84%)
14 (16%)
38 (68%)
18 (32%)
Education level
   Less than vocational level 
   Vocational level or higher 
38 (42%)
52 (58%)
27 (47%)
30 (53%)
Employment
   Yes 
   No 
41 (46%)
49 (54%)
17 (30%)
40 (70%)
Belief in God or a higher being
   Yes
   No 
69 (76%)
22 (24%)
43 (77%)
13 (23%)
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Table 2   Patient characteristics by level of agreement with attitudes and feelings 
towards death and afterlife. 
 
Attitude or  
emotion  
about death
Patient group Score Age
(st dev, n)
Karnofsky 
Performance 
Score  
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with a partner
(%, n)
Education:  
< vocational training
(%, n)
Employment
(%, n)
Belief in God  
or a higher being
(%, n)
Explicitly religious No evidence of 
disease
Low 51.6*
(13.5, 73)
94.9
(6.1, 71)
35
(47.9, 73)
63*
(88.7,71)
29
(40.3, 72)
33
(45.8, 72)
26**
(35.6, 73)
High 58.6
(12.9,18)
94.4
(7.8, 18)
8
(44.4, 18)
12
(66.7,18)
9
(50.0, 18)
8
(44.4, 18)
18
(100.0, 18)
Advanced cancer Low 59.8*
(9.1, 36)
64.7
(17.0, 30)
22*
(61.1, 36)
25
(71.4, 35)
18
(50.0, 36)
12
(33.3, 36)
8**
(22.2, 36)
High 66.4
(10.4, 21)
58.9
(17.9, 19)
7
(33.3,21)
13
(61.9, 21)
9
(42.9, 21)
5
(23.8, 21)
20
(100.0, 20)
Agnostic No evidence  
of disease
Low 49.2*
(13.8, 39)
94.9
(6.4, 39)
20
(51.3, 39)
31
(83.8, 37)
16
(42.1, 38)
21
(53.8, 39)
21
(53.8, 39)
High 55.8
(12.8, 52)
94.8
(6.5, 50)
23
(44.2, 52)
44
(84.6, 52)
22
(42.3, 52)
20
(39.2, 51)
23
(44.2, 52)
Advanced cancer Low 63.3
(11.5, 27)
57.0
(14.3, 23)
12
(44.4, 27)
14*
(53.8, 26)
12
(44.4, 27)
10
(37.0, 27)
16
(59.3, 27)
High 61.3
(8.6, 30)
67.3
(18.7, 26)
17
(56.7, 30)
24
(80.0, 30)
15
(50.0, 30)
7
(23.3, 30)
12
(41.4, 29)
Reincarnation No evidence  
of disease
Low 52.8
(13.9, 83)
95.0
(6.5, 81)
40
(48.2, 83)
70
(86.4, 81)
36
(43,9, 82)
36
(43,9, 82)
38
(45.8, 83)
High 54.5
(10.0, 8)
92.5
(4.6, 8)
3
(37.5, 8)
5
(62.5, 8)
2
(25.0, 8)
5
(62.5, 8)
6
(75.0, 8)
Advanced cancer Low 62.2
(9.8, 52)
62.6
(17.9, 45)
28
(53.8, 52)
35
(68.6, 51)
25
(48.1, 52)
15
(28.8, 52)
24
(47.1, 51)
High 62.6
(13.2, 5)
60.0
(11.5, 4)
1
(20.0, 5)
3
(60.0, 5)
2
(40.0, 5)
2
(40.0, 5)
4
(80.0, 5)
Community No evidence  
of disease
Low 53.7
(12.8, 78)
95.0
(6.2, 76)
39
(50.0, 78)
68**
(88.3, 77)
31
(40.3, 77)
33
(42.9, 77)
35
(44.9, 78)
High 48.4
(17.4, 13)
93.8
(7.7, 13)
4
(30.8, 13)
7
(58.3, 12)
7
(53.8, 13)
8
(61.5, 13)
9
(69.2, 13)
Advanced cancer Low 62.7
(9.4, 45)
64.4
(17.8, 41)
27**
(60.0, 45)
31
(70.5, 44)
23
(51.1, 45)
11
(24.4, 45)
18**
(40.9, 44)
High 60.7
(12.4, 12)
52.5
(11.6, 8)
2
(16.7, 12)
7
(58.3, 12)
4
(33.3, 12)
6
(50.0, 12)
10
(83.3, 12)
Continuation No evidence  
of disease
Low 54.4
(12.7, 64)
95.0
(6.2, 62)
30
(46.9, 64)
58**
(90.6, 64)
29
(46.0, 63)
25
(39.7, 63)
25**
(39.1, 64)
High 49.6
(15.2, 27)
94.4
(7.0, 27)
13
(48.1, 27)
17
(68.0, 25)
9
(33.3, 27)
16
(59.3, 27)
19
(70.4, 27)
Advanced cancer Low 59.8*
(8.2, 33)
65.2
(18.2, 29)
21*
(63.6, 33)
24
(75.0, 32)
16
(48.5, 33)
9
(27.3, 33)
8**
(25.0, 32)
High 65.6
(11.5, 24)
58.5
(15.7, 20)
8
(33.3, 24)
14
(58.3, 24)
11
(45.8, 24)
8
(33.3, 24)
20
(83.3, 24)
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Table 2   Patient characteristics by level of agreement with attitudes and feelings 
towards death and afterlife. 
 
Attitude or  
emotion  
about death
Patient group Score Age
(st dev, n)
Karnofsky 
Performance 
Score  
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with a partner
(%, n)
Education:  
< vocational training
(%, n)
Employment
(%, n)
Belief in God  
or a higher being
(%, n)
Explicitly religious No evidence of 
disease
Low 51.6*
(13.5, 73)
94.9
(6.1, 71)
35
(47.9, 73)
63*
(88.7,71)
29
(40.3, 72)
33
(45.8, 72)
26**
(35.6, 73)
High 58.6
(12.9,18)
94.4
(7.8, 18)
8
(44.4, 18)
12
(66.7,18)
9
(50.0, 18)
8
(44.4, 18)
18
(100.0, 18)
Advanced cancer Low 59.8*
(9.1, 36)
64.7
(17.0, 30)
22*
(61.1, 36)
25
(71.4, 35)
18
(50.0, 36)
12
(33.3, 36)
8**
(22.2, 36)
High 66.4
(10.4, 21)
58.9
(17.9, 19)
7
(33.3,21)
13
(61.9, 21)
9
(42.9, 21)
5
(23.8, 21)
20
(100.0, 20)
Agnostic No evidence  
of disease
Low 49.2*
(13.8, 39)
94.9
(6.4, 39)
20
(51.3, 39)
31
(83.8, 37)
16
(42.1, 38)
21
(53.8, 39)
21
(53.8, 39)
High 55.8
(12.8, 52)
94.8
(6.5, 50)
23
(44.2, 52)
44
(84.6, 52)
22
(42.3, 52)
20
(39.2, 51)
23
(44.2, 52)
Advanced cancer Low 63.3
(11.5, 27)
57.0
(14.3, 23)
12
(44.4, 27)
14*
(53.8, 26)
12
(44.4, 27)
10
(37.0, 27)
16
(59.3, 27)
High 61.3
(8.6, 30)
67.3
(18.7, 26)
17
(56.7, 30)
24
(80.0, 30)
15
(50.0, 30)
7
(23.3, 30)
12
(41.4, 29)
Reincarnation No evidence  
of disease
Low 52.8
(13.9, 83)
95.0
(6.5, 81)
40
(48.2, 83)
70
(86.4, 81)
36
(43,9, 82)
36
(43,9, 82)
38
(45.8, 83)
High 54.5
(10.0, 8)
92.5
(4.6, 8)
3
(37.5, 8)
5
(62.5, 8)
2
(25.0, 8)
5
(62.5, 8)
6
(75.0, 8)
Advanced cancer Low 62.2
(9.8, 52)
62.6
(17.9, 45)
28
(53.8, 52)
35
(68.6, 51)
25
(48.1, 52)
15
(28.8, 52)
24
(47.1, 51)
High 62.6
(13.2, 5)
60.0
(11.5, 4)
1
(20.0, 5)
3
(60.0, 5)
2
(40.0, 5)
2
(40.0, 5)
4
(80.0, 5)
Community No evidence  
of disease
Low 53.7
(12.8, 78)
95.0
(6.2, 76)
39
(50.0, 78)
68**
(88.3, 77)
31
(40.3, 77)
33
(42.9, 77)
35
(44.9, 78)
High 48.4
(17.4, 13)
93.8
(7.7, 13)
4
(30.8, 13)
7
(58.3, 12)
7
(53.8, 13)
8
(61.5, 13)
9
(69.2, 13)
Advanced cancer Low 62.7
(9.4, 45)
64.4
(17.8, 41)
27**
(60.0, 45)
31
(70.5, 44)
23
(51.1, 45)
11
(24.4, 45)
18**
(40.9, 44)
High 60.7
(12.4, 12)
52.5
(11.6, 8)
2
(16.7, 12)
7
(58.3, 12)
4
(33.3, 12)
6
(50.0, 12)
10
(83.3, 12)
Continuation No evidence  
of disease
Low 54.4
(12.7, 64)
95.0
(6.2, 62)
30
(46.9, 64)
58**
(90.6, 64)
29
(46.0, 63)
25
(39.7, 63)
25**
(39.1, 64)
High 49.6
(15.2, 27)
94.4
(7.0, 27)
13
(48.1, 27)
17
(68.0, 25)
9
(33.3, 27)
16
(59.3, 27)
19
(70.4, 27)
Advanced cancer Low 59.8*
(8.2, 33)
65.2
(18.2, 29)
21*
(63.6, 33)
24
(75.0, 32)
16
(48.5, 33)
9
(27.3, 33)
8**
(25.0, 32)
High 65.6
(11.5, 24)
58.5
(15.7, 20)
8
(33.3, 24)
14
(58.3, 24)
11
(45.8, 24)
8
(33.3, 24)
20
(83.3, 24)
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Table 2   Continued. 
 
Attitude or  
emotion  
about death
Patient group Score Age
(st dev, n)
Karnofsky 
Performance 
Score  
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with a partner
(%, n)
Education:  
< vocational training
(%, n)
Employment
(%, n)
Belief in God  
or a higher being
(%, n)
Other-directed 
feelings
No evidence  
of disease
Low 51.3
(14.0, 65)
95.0
(6.4, 64)
34
(52.3, 65)
55
(87.3, 63)
25
(39.1, 64)
30
(46.2, 65)
31
(47.7, 65)
High 57.1
(11.5, 26)
94.4
(6.5, 25)
9
(34.6, 26)
20
(76.9, 26)
13
(50.0, 26)
11
(44.0, 25)
13
(50.0, 26)
Advanced cancer Low 59.1*
(8.3, 27)
67.1
(16.8, 24)
17
(63.0, 27)
20
(76.9, 26)
12
(44.4, 27)
11
(40.7, 27)
11
(40.7, 27)
High 65.1
(10.7, 30)
58.0
(17.1, 25)
12
(40.0, 30)
18
(60.0, 30)
15
(50.0, 30)
6
(20.0, 30)
17
(58.6, 29)
Self-directed 
feelings
No evidence  
of disease
Low 53.7
(12.6, 72)
95.2
(6.1, 71)
34
(47.2, 72)
61
(85.9, 71)
26*
(36.6, 71)
30
(42.3, 71)
35
(48.6, 72) 
High 50.1
(16.8, 19)
93.3
(17.7, 18)
9
(47.4, 19)
14
(77.8, 18)
12
(63.2, 19)
11
(57.9, 19)
9
(47.4, 19)
Advanced cancer Low 63.2
(9.7, 48)
63.1
(17.9, 41)
24
(50.0, 48)
30
(63.8, 47)
22
(45.8, 48)
12
(25.0, 48)
24
(50.0, 48)
High 57.2
(10.8, 9)
58.8 
(14.6, 8)
5
(55.6, 9)
8
(88.9, 9)
5
(55.6, 9)
5
(55.6, 9)
4
(50.0, 8)
Positive feelings No evidence  
of disease
Low 52.6
(12.8, 67)
95.0
(6.4, 66)
34
(50.7, 67)
59*
(89.4, 66) 
28
(42.4, 66)
32
(48.5, 66)
33
(49.3, 67)
High 54.0
(15.7, 24)
94.3
(6.6, 23)
9
(37.5, 24)
16
(69.6, 23)
10
(41.7, 24)
9
(37.5, 24)
11
(45.8, 24)
Advanced cancer Low 61.1
(8.5, 40)
64.7 
(17.6, 36)
23
(57.5, 40)
28
(71.8, 39)
19
(47.5, 40)
13
(32.5, 40)
16*
(40.0, 40)
High 64.9
(12.9, 17)
56.2
(15.6, 13)
6
(35.3, 17)
10
(58.8, 17)
8
(47.1, 17)
4
(23.5, 17)
12
(75.0, 16)
Negative feelings No evidence  
of disease
Low 52.1
(14.3, 64)
95.0
(6.4, 64)
30
(46.9, 64)
49*
(79.0, 62)
28
(43.8, 64)
29
(45.3, 64)
28
(43.8, 64)
High 55.1
(11.5, 27)
94.4
(6.5, 25)
13
(48.1, 27)
26
(96.3, 27)
10
(38.5, 26)
12
(46.2, 26)
16
(59.3, 27)
Advanced cancer Low 63.7
(9.8, 34)
61.3
(19.1, 30)
18
(52.9, 34)
23
(67.6, 34)
17
(50.0, 34)
12
(35.3, 34)
17
(50.0, 34)
High 60.1
(10.1, 23)
64.2
(14.6, 19)
11
(47.8, 23)
15
(68.2, 22)
10
(43.5, 23)
5
(21.7, 23)
11
(50.0, 22)
*  Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .05. 
** Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .01. 
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Table 2   Continued. 
 
Attitude or  
emotion  
about death
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(st dev, n)
Karnofsky 
Performance 
Score  
(st dev, n)
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(%, n)
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(%, n)
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(%, n)
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(%, n)
Belief in God  
or a higher being
(%, n)
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(9.8, 34)
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*  Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .05. 
** Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .01. 
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group the explicitly religious attitude was positively correlated with global health 
status, but in the regression analysis it did not show predictive value. In both the no 
evidence of disease group and the advanced cancer group the  agnostic  attitude 
was positively associated with hopelessness, which remained significant in the 
regression analysis. Also, in the advanced cancer group, the  agnostic  attitude was 
negatively associated with satisfaction with life, although in the regression analysis 
the variable negative emotions towards death was the only significant predictor for 
satisfaction with life. Of the not-explicitly religious attitudes the attitude reincarnation 
was associated with the outcome variables role function and cognitive function. 
This association also had predictive value in the regression analysis. 
 In the advanced cancer group other-directed feelings were negatively 
associated with and had negative predictive value for social function. Although 
positive emotions were negatively associated with social function, this was not 
significant in the regression analysis. Self-directed feelings were negatively 
associated with and had negative predictive value for physical function. In the no 
evidence of disease group negative emotions were negatively associated with 
social and emotional function and positively associated with depression. This 
remained significant in the regression analysis. 
5.4.4.  Research question 3
Overall, in the no evidence of disease group four significant partial correlations 
were observed of attitudes and emotions towards death and afterlife with the 
outcome variables satisfaction with life, measures of quality of life, depression and 
hopelessness. In the advanced cancer group nine significant correlations were 
observed. Directly comparing these partial coefficients between the two groups 
using the Fisher’s r-to-Z formula the association negative emotions – social 
functioning in the no evidence of disease group was significantly different from the 
advanced cancer group. The following associations in the advanced cancer group 
were significantly different from the  no evidence of disease group: explicitly 
religious attitude - global health status; reincarnation - role functioning;  reincarnation 
- cognitive functioning; other-directed emotions - social functioning. 
5.5. Discussion
5.5.1. Death and afterlife
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the relation between 
attitudes and emotions towards death and afterlife and patients’ distress in a group 
of patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients. On average, 
no significant differences were observed in the mean scores on attitudes and 
emotions towards death for both patient groups. This is in line with earlier findings 
that self-reported fear of death was not significantly different in a group of terminal 
ill patients compared to controls or across different disease stages26
26 Feifel H, 1973. Shinn EH, 2009. Smith DK, Nehemkis AM, Charter RA. Fear of Death, Death Attitudes, and 
Chapter 5
119
 Looking at the four associations of attitudes and emotions towards death and 
afterlife with aspects of quality of life observed in the palliative group which were 
absent in the curative group (viz. explicitly religious attitude - global health status; 
reincarnation - role functioning;  reincarnation - cognitive functioning; other-directed 
emotions - social functioning), this may suggest that the relation of attitudes and 
emotions with quality of life is stronger in the group of advanced cancer patients 
who were facing death than in the group of patients without evidence of disease. 
However, vice versa, in the group without evidence of disease an association was 
Religious Conviction in the Terminally Ill. International Journal of Psychiatry in Medicine. 1983;13:221-232.
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Table 3   Mean values of the attitudes and feelings towards death and afterlife. 
Mean scores and standard errors of attitudes and feelings about death 
and afterlife are given for the group of patients without evidence of 
disease and advanced cancer patients. Mean values are corrected for the 
sociodemographic variables sex, age, living with a partner, education and 
belief in God or a higher being which were significantly associated with 
attitudes or feelings about death and afterlife (cf. table 1). For scale ranges 
see Material and Methods. To assess differences in means covariance 
analysis was performed using sex, age, living with a partner, education 
and belief in God or a higher being as covariates. No significant differences 
between the two patient groups were observed. 
 
No evidence  
of disease
Advanced cancer
Explicitly religious Mean
St error
2.86
.09
2.80
.11
Agnostic Mean
St error
3.48
.08
3.42
.10
Reincarnation Mean
St error
2.47
.09
2.29
.11
Community Mean
St error
2.63
.09
2.74
.12
Continuation Mean
St error
3.04
.09
3.23
.11
Other-directed feelings Mean
St error
4.11
.35
5.27
.45
Self-directed feelings Mean
St error
2.75
.29
3.52
.38
Positive feelings Mean
St error
3.50
.32
4.10
.41
Negative feelings Mean
St error
4.34
.33
4.97
.42
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observed which was not present in the advanced cancer group (viz. negative 
emotions - social functioning). Therefore, in patients with advanced cancer the 
relation between attitudes and feelings towards death and quality of life, depression 
and hopelessness was not necessarily stronger compared to patients without 
evidence of disease, but rather in both groups different relations were observed. 
Let us look in more detail into the observed relations.
 In the group without evidence of disease only (negative) emotions towards 
death were related to aspects of quality of life and depression. Attitudes towards 
death and afterlife were not related to any of the outcome variables, except for the 
association of the  agnostic  attitude with hopelessness, which we will discuss 
below. In contrast, in the advanced cancer group several attitudes towards death 
and afterlife were related with measures of quality of life and hopelessness. This 
suggests that when one is faced with imminent death, finding meaning and value 
Chapter 5
Table 4   Partial correlations between attitudes and emotions towards death and 
afterlife and measures of quality of life, depression and hopelessness. 
Partial correlation coefficients r are given only when r ≥ .200. Control 
variables were age, sex and belief in God or a higher being. 
 
Explicitly 
religious
Agnostic Reincarnation Community Other directed Self directed Positive emotions Negative emotions
NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv
satisfaction 
with life
r -.308* .259 -.351*
sig .039 .086 .018
global health 
status
r .388** -.207 .278 -.228
sig .009 .059 .064 .132
physical 
function
r -.248 -.323* -.226 .260
sig .101 .031 .135 .084
role  
function
r .448** -.225
sig .002 .138
social 
function
r -.420** -.293 -.296* -.255*
sig .004 .051 .049 .019
emotional 
function
r -.258 -.330**
sig .087 .002
cognitive 
function
r .297* .208
sig .048 .171
depression r -.249 .295**
sig .099 .006
hopelessness r .263* .366*
sig .016 .013
*  Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .05. 
** Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .01. 
Abbreviations: NED, no evidence of disease; Adv, advanced cancer.
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becomes a more central focus of attention.27 In fact, in terminally ill patients, 
concerns about meaning and value may be more prominent than complaints about 
physical symptoms.28 All emotions towards death showed negative correlations 
with measures of quality of life and a positive correlation with depression. 
Apparently, any emotion towards death, even if its content is positive, has a 
negative connotation in terms of distress. However, this does not imply that the 
content of the emotion is of no importance at all, since, for example, other-directed 
feelings were specifically related to social function and self-directed feelings to 
physical function.
27 Sulmasy DP. Spiritual issues in the care of dying patients: “. . . it’s okay between me and god”. JAMA. 
2006;296:1385-1392.
28 Portenoy RK, Thaler HT, Kornblith AB et al. The Memorial Symptom Assessment Scale: an instrument for 
the evaluation of symptom prevalence, characteristics and distress. Eur J Cancer. 1994;30A:1326-1336.
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Table 4   Partial correlations between attitudes and emotions towards death and 
afterlife and measures of quality of life, depression and hopelessness. 
Partial correlation coefficients r are given only when r ≥ .200. Control 
variables were age, sex and belief in God or a higher being. 
 
Explicitly 
religious
Agnostic Reincarnation Community Other directed Self directed Positive emotions Negative emotions
NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv NED Adv
satisfaction 
with life
r -.308* .259 -.351*
sig .039 .086 .018
global health 
status
r .388** -.207 .278 -.228
sig .009 .059 .064 .132
physical 
function
r -.248 -.323* -.226 .260
sig .101 .031 .135 .084
role  
function
r .448** -.225
sig .002 .138
social 
function
r -.420** -.293 -.296* -.255*
sig .004 .051 .049 .019
emotional 
function
r -.258 -.330**
sig .087 .002
cognitive 
function
r .297* .208
sig .048 .171
depression r -.249 .295**
sig .099 .006
hopelessness r .263* .366*
sig .016 .013
*  Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .05. 
** Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .01. 
Abbreviations: NED, no evidence of disease; Adv, advanced cancer.
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 In both the group of patients without evidence of disease and the advanced 
cancer patients the agnostic  attitude was associated with hopelessness. Previously, 
it has been argued that not the content of a belief is important, but rather the 
certainty with which a belief is held.29 Patients appear to derive comfort from a 
firm belief, whatever the content of that belief may be. Based on our results this 
conclusion should be nuanced. Patients with a firm belief that life ends with death 
and there is no meaning to death score higher on hopelessness. The lack of meaning 
may be crucial in this respect. In dealing with the finitude of life the ability to 
ascribe meaning is essential and, indeed, may be more important than the specific 
content that reflects this meaning.30  However, if the only ‘meaning’ that can be 
given is ‘meaningless’ this may not provide the comfort and sense of hope that 
patients need when they are confronted with death. It should be noted that hope is 
29 Smith DK, 1983.
30 Marrone R. Dying, mourning, and spirituality: A psychological perspective. Death Studies. 1999;23:495-519.
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Table 5   Stepwise regression analysis of attitudes and emotions towards death and 
afterlife and measures of quality of life, depression and hopelessness. Per 
outcome variable, all significant models are shown with the independent 
variables which were entered successively. 
 
Dependent variable Group Model Independent variables Standardized  
Coefficients Beta
Sig. R2
change
R2 Adjusted R2 
Satisfaction with life Advanced cancer 1 Negative emotions -.298 .027 .089* .089* .072
Physical function No evidence of disease 1 Belief in God or a higher being -.223 .034 .050* .050* .039
2 Belief in God or a higher being
Sex
-.222
-.218
.031
.034
.047* .097* .077
Advanced cancer 1 Self-directed emotions -.317 .018 .101* .101 .084
Role function Advanced cancer 1 Sex -.278 .038 .077* .077* .060
2 Sex
Reincarnation
-.385
.344
.005
.011
.107* .184** .153
Social function No evidence of disease 1 Negative emotions -.223 .024
2 Negative emotions
Age
-.232
.217
.024
.035
.050*
.047*
.050*
.097*
.039
.076
Advanced cancer 1 Other-directed emotions -.302 .027 .091* .091* .074
Emotional function No evidence of disease 1 Negative emotions -.343 .001 .118** .118** .108
Advanced cancer 1 Age .275 .040 .076* .076* .058
Cognitive function Advanced cancer 1 Reincarnation .316 .018 .100* .100* .083
Depression No evidence of disease 1 Negative emotions .315 .003 .099** .099** .089
Hopelessness No evidence of disease 1 Agnostic attitude .241 .022 .058* .058* .047
Advanced cancer 1 Agnostic attitude .287 .037 .082* .082* .064
* indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. 
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essential for the well-being of patients, even in the last phase of life.31 Hope should 
not be equated with hope of cure, since it may also regard hope for valued and 
caring relationships or reconciliation with life and death.32
5.5.2. Limitations of the study
Clearly, from our study no definite conclusion can be drawn about the causal or 
influential relationship between the life phase of a patient  (no evidence of disease 
versus advanced cancer) and the relation of attitudes and emotions about death 
31 Herth K. Fostering hope in terminally-ill people. J Adv Nurs. 1990;15:1250-1259. Buckley J, Herth K. 
Fostering hope in terminally ill patients. Nurs Stand. 2004;19:33-41.
32 Herth K, 1990. Benzein E, Norberg A, Saveman BI. The meaning of the lived experience of hope in 
patients with cancer in palliative home care. Palliative Medicine. 2001;15:117-126. Duggleby W, Wright K. 
Transforming hope: how elderly palliative patients live with hope. Can J Nurs Res. 2009;41:204-217. Eliott 
JA, Olver IN. Hope, Life, and Death: A Qualitative Analysis of Dying Cancer Patients’ Talk About Hope. Death 
Studies. 2009;33:609-638. Daneault S, Dion D, Sicotte C et al. Hope and noncurative chemotherapies: 
which affects the other? J Clin Oncol. 2010;28:2310-2313.
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and afterlife with distress. A longitudinal follow-up study would be necessary to 
corroborate our suggestion that the relation between attitudes and emotions 
about death and afterlife and patients’ distress changes in the course of illness, 
when the prospects of a patient change from the curative to the palliative setting, 
or even vice versa.33  Also, our patient group was relatively small and we have 
tested multiple hypotheses with the possibility of reporting spurious associations. 
Ideally, because of our relatively small study sample, our results should be validated 
in a second independent set of data to allow for definite conclusions. Finally, the 
observed correlations were not very strong and it is still an open question whether 
direct counselling of patients, either in the curative or the palliative setting, on 
attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife will reduce distress, although a 
pilot study has suggested that preparation and life completion discussion may 
improve functioning and quality of life in seriously ill patients.34 Awaiting the 
results of further studies on this issue, we advocate that if physicians are confronted 
with patients who are overtly struggling with the finitude of their lives they should 
start up an appropriate counselling trajectory. Therefore, clinicians should be 
attentive to beliefs and feelings of patients regarding death and afterlife. As many 
clinicians feel uncertain about these issues, well-developed training programmes 
for clinicians are urgently needed.35
 In conclusion, patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer 
patients do not have different attitudes or emotions towards death, but the relation 
of these attitudes and emotions with quality of life, depression and hopelessness 
varies between the two groups. When there is no evidence of disease negative 
emotions play the most important role, whereas in case of advanced cancer 
attitudes towards death and afterlife which may provide meaning and value 
become more prominent. A careful exploration of these attitudes and emotions is 
essential to provide optimal cancer care.
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Abstract 
Background: Time perception may be an important factor influencing distress of 
cancer patients. However, no comparative studies have been performed for cancer 
patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients in the palliative, 
end-of-life care setting.  
Objective: To assess time perception in disease-free and advanced cancer patients; 
examine the relation of time perception with patients’ distress. 
Methods: A descriptive research design was used.  96 disease-free and 63 advanced 
cancer patients filled out Cottle’s Circle Test to assess time coherence and time 
dominance; Cottle’s Line Test to assess temporal extension and Bayes’ question on 
speed of time, the European Organisation for Research-and-Treatment of Cancer 
QOL-Questionnaire version-2.0, Beck’s Depression Inventory for Primary Care and 
Beck’s Hopelessness Scale. 
Results: In patients without evidence of disease future dominance was most often 
observed, whereas in advanced cancer patients the present was the dominant time 
segment. In both groups a focus on the past was associated with distress. In contrast 
with patients without evidence of disease, advanced cancer patients perceived 
time as moving slowly and this was correlated with distress. 
Conclusions: The time perception of cancer patients without evidence of disease 
and advanced cancer patients is significantly different and is related to distress. 
Implications for practice: The observed relation between a focus on the past and 
distress gives room for interventions of nurses and other health care professionals. 
Specific attention is needed for differences  between cancer patients without 
evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients.
Keywords
time perception; curative care; palliative care; end-of-life care; quality of life; 
depression; hopelessness
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6.1. Introduction 
What, then, is time?
If no one asks me, I know;
If I want to explain it to someone who asks me,
I do not know.1
The paradox of time is that, although it hardly needs any discussion that time is an 
essential aspect of human life, time cannot be grasped. It cannot be seen, felt, 
heard, tasted or smelled and even when we think about time it seems to escape our 
understanding. As St Augustine ponders in the eleventh book of his Confessions: 
‘Now, what about those two times, past and future, in what sense do they have real 
being, if the past no longer exists and the future does not exist yet? As for present 
time, if that were always present and never slipped away into the past, it would not 
be time at all; it would be eternity. If, therefore, the present’s only claim to be 
called ‘time’ is that it is slipping away into the past, how can we assert that this 
thing is, when its only title to being is that it will soon cease to be? In other words, 
we cannot really say that time exists, except because it tends to non-being.’2
 Nevertheless, in our western culture, time is often viewed as a measurable, 
external process that regulates our lives by ticking away the seconds, minutes and 
hours.3 It is the measure by which we know when to get to work, when to meet 
deadlines, when to eat, when to sleep, when to celebrate holidays. From this 
perspective, time can be measured with a stop watch; it is clock time. Time is that 
what we have to keep up with. However, time is also experienced as a more 
personal, internal process. This so-called embodied time does not necessarily keep 
up with clock time.4  One hour may fly away when we are caught up in something, 
whereas that same hour may seem to last forever when we are waiting.  Embodied 
time implies that time is subjective and that the perspective of time may change 
according to the situation one experiences. In the words of the American 
philosopher and psychologist William James: ‘The knowledge of some other part of 
the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always mixed in with our knowledge 
of the present thing.’5 As St Augustine already formulated: ‘It is inaccurate to say 
“There are three tenses, or times: past, present and future,” though it might 
1 Augustinus A, Boulding M, Rotelle JE. The works of Saint Augustine: a translation for the 21st century. The 
Confessions; Book 11. 1997; Chapter XIV:295.
2 Augustinus A, 1997, p.296.
3 McGrath JE, Kelly JR. Time and human interaction. Toward a social psychology of time. 1986; New York: 
The Guilford Press.
4 Lovgren M, Hamberg K, Tishelman C. Clock time and embodied time experienced by patients with 
inoperable lung cancer. Cancer Nurs. 2010;33:55-63. Wilde MH. Urine flowing: a phenomenological study 
of living with a urinary catheter. Res Nurs Health. 2002;25:14-24.
5 James W. The principles of psychology. 1983; Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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properly be said, “There are three tenses or times: the present of past things, the 
present of present things and the present of future things.”’ 6
 One of the situations that may fundamentally alter one’s time perception is the 
diagnosis of cancer. Although advances in treatment options have improved cancer 
outcome, still about half of the cancer patients cannot be cured and many of the 
patients that can be cured have to deal with the long-term side effects of cancer 
treatment.7 Moreover, even in early stages it can never be guaranteed that one is 
cured. It is well-known that the diagnosis of cancer is accompanied with distress in 
all stages.8 Also, previous studies have described aspects of an altered time 
perception in cancer patients and their primary caregivers.9 However, comparative 
studies between disease-free cancer patients and advanced cancer patients with 
respect to their time perception are lacking, nor are data available on how time 
perception in these patient groups is related to distress. Therefore, in this study we 
will compare time perception of cancer patients without evidence of disease and 
advanced cancer patients in a palliative, end-of-life care setting and examine the 
relation of time perception with patients’ distress.
6.1.1. Time perception
In this study we will use the concept of time as embodied time and refer to time 
perception as an orientation of the individual on the past, present and future, in 
view of a continuously changing present.10 We will distinguish four aspects of time 
perception: time coherence, time dominance, temporal extension and speed. 
 Time coherence refers to the degree in which events in the past, present and 
future are experienced as a continuous whole. Time dominance refers to the 
prevailing orientation in one’s time perception. One can be predominantly focussed 
on the present (present dominance) or on the past or future (past dominance or 
future dominance). Temporal extension describes the relative length of the past, 
present and future compared to one’s life time. Although time dominance is closely 
related to temporal extension it is conceptually distinct as in temporal extension a 
linear conception of time is assumed which is not necessarily the case for time 
dominance. In a previous study among terminally ill cancer patients a shorter future 
6 Augustinus A, 1997, p.300.
7 Harrington CB, Hansen JA, Moskowitz M et al. It’s not over when it’s over: long-term symptoms in cancer 
survivors--a systematic review. Int J Psychiatry Med. 2010;40:163-181.
8 Holland JC, Alici Y. Management of distress in cancer patients. J Support Oncol. 2010;8:4-12.
9 Lovgren M, 2010. Neuringer C, Harris RM. The perception of the passage of time among death-involved 
hospital patients. Life Threat Behav. 1974;4:240-254. Fitzpatrick JJ, Donovan MJ, Johnston RL. Experience 
of time during the crisis of cancer. Cancer Nurs. 1980;3:191-194. Breaden K. Cancer and beyond: the 
question of survivorship. J Adv Nurs. 1997;26:978-984. Hayout I, Krulik T. A test of parenthood: dilemmas 
of parents of terminally ill adolescents. Cancer Nurs. 1999;22:71-79. Rasmussen DM, Elverdam B. Cancer 
survivors’ experience of time: time disruption and time appropriation. J Adv Nurs. 2007;57:614-622. 
Thorne SE, Hislop TG, Stajduhar K et al. Time-related communication skills from the cancer patient 
perspective. Psychooncology. 2009;18:500-507.
10 Sannen H. De levensloop als verhaal. Jongeren en hun tijdsperspectief 1955-1995. 1998; Tilburg: Tilburg 
University Press.
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temporal perspective was reported compared to a healthy control group.11 In 
contrast, for cancer survivors a new orientation on the future may emerge when 
patients remain disease free.12
 The speed of time refers to the experience that time may have passed away 
faster or slower than the actual (clock) time that has passed away.13 When time is 
perceived as moving quickly (high speed), one has the idea that less time has passed 
than is actually indicated by the clock; time seems to run away. In contrast, when 
time is perceived as moving slowly, one has the experience that more time has 
elapsed than is the case according to clock time; time seems to drag. In previous 
studies of terminally ill patients no differences were observed in the speed of time 
passage compared to healthy subjects.14 However, no comparative studies have 
been performed with cancer survivors. 
6.1.2. Time perception and distress
Previous studies on time perception and distress have primarily focused on speed 
of time. From everyday experience it is well known that time may move fast when 
one feels well (‘time flies when having fun’), while time is ‘hanging heavy’ when one 
is not. Bayes et al. studied this phenomenon in 371 terminally ill patients (314 
oncological and 57 AIDS patients) by asking ‘How long did yesterday (or: this 
morning, afternoon, evening, night) seem to you.’15 Answers could be ‘long’ or ‘very 
long’ and ‘short’ of ‘very short’. Patients were also asked to rate their condition as 
‘very bad’, ‘passable bad’, ‘good’ or ‘very good’. A good correlation between speed 
of time and perceived condition was observed: when the day was perceived as long 
or very long (i.e. low speed), the condition was perceived as bad or very bad, while 
a high speed was reported when one’s self-reported condition was rated good or 
very good.
 The relation between speed of time and distress may be understood from a 
cognitive information processing point of view. Processing of information from the 
environment is achieved by ‘taking up’ information and ‘storage’ of the information. 
A given period of time is perceived as extended or lengthened if the number of 
events that need to be taken up is increased and stored in a disorganized fashion.16 
Conversely, a given time interval is perceived as reduced when the number of 
events is decreased, or when the person is better able to organize, chunk or code 
the information. When regarding perceived distress as a stimulus that needs to be 
processed it may be hypothesized that with distress, time intervals are perceived as 
11 Fitzpatrick JJ, 1980.
12 Breaden K, 1997.
13 James W. The principles of psychology.
14 Neuringer C, 1974. Fitzpatrick JJ, 1980. 
15 Bayes R, Limonero JT, Barreto P et al. Assessing suffering. Lancet. 1995;346:1492. Bayes R, Limonero JT, 
Barreto P et al. A way to screen for suffering in palliative care. J Palliat Care. 1997;13:22-26.
16 Ornstein RE. On the experience of time. 1975; New York, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Scott DW. Anxiety, 
critical thinking and information processing during and after breast biopsy. Nursing Research. 1983;32:24-28.
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lengthened (i.e. speed of time seems to slow down) compared to a situation without 
distress. This hypothesis was confirmed in a study of 70 cancer and 17 non-cancer 
patients with pain. Greater pain intensity was associated with an overestimation of 
given time intervals and the majority of pain patients reported a perceived slowing 
down of time while in pain.17
6.2. Research questions
In the present explorative study the following three questions will be addressed. 
1) Does time perception differ between disease-free cancer patients compared to 
advanced cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
2) What is the relation between time perception and distress in disease-free cancer 
patients and advanced cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
3) Do relations between time perception and distress differ between disease-free 
cancer patients without evidence of disease compared to advanced cancer 
patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
6.3. Methods
This study used a descriptive research design. The study was part of a larger 
research project on quality of life in curatively treated and palliative-cancer patients 
no longer receiving anticancer treatment. Previously, we have reported the use of 
coping strategies in this patient population and the relation of these coping 
strategies with quality of life, depression, and hopelessness.18 The study was 
approved by the institutional Medical Ethical Board of our Institute and all 
participating patients gave written informed consent. 
6.3.1. Study sample
The inclusion criteria for disease-free cancer patients were: patients with a history 
of treatment for a solid tumor; end of treatment less than one year ago; no signs of 
acute treatment toxicities and no evidence of disease. Patients who were on 
adjuvant hormonal therapy could also be included in this group.  The inclusion 
criteria for the advanced cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting 
were: patients with advanced solid tumors; not receiving anti-tumor therapies; 
recovered from acute treatment toxicities at the moment of inclusion. Exclusion 
criteria for both groups were: inability to read Dutch or extreme morbidity precluding 
filling out a questionnaire.
17 Somov PG. Time perception as a measure of pain intensity and pain type. J Back and Musculoskeletal 
Rehabilitation. 2000;14:111-121.
18 Van Laarhoven HW, Schilderman J, Bleijenberg G et al. Coping, quality of life, depression and hopelessness 
in cancer patients in a curative and palliative, end-of-life care setting. Cancer Nurs. 2011;34:302-314.
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 As described previously, a questionnaire was sent to 236 eligible patients, 123 
disease-free and 113 advanced cancer patients.19 Twenty-three patients without 
evidence of disease and 40 advanced cancer patients did not return the 
questionnaire. In both groups the most important reason (50% in the no evidence 
of disease group, 39% in the advanced cancer group) for not participating was not 
specified; eleven patients in the advanced cancer group (9%) deteriorated or died 
before they could return the questionnaire. Four curatively treated patients and 10 
palliative patients did not complete any of the time scales and were excluded from 
the analysis. Thus, data  of 96 disease-free patients and 63 palliative patients were 
available for analysis. Participants and nonparticipants did not significantly differ by 
age or sex.
6.3.2. Measurement instruments
Basic sociodemographic data including age, marital status and educational level 
were collected from all participants in a self-administered questionnaire. 
 To measure the four aspects of time perception several measurement instruments 
were used. First, to measure time coherence and time dominance Cottle’s Circle 
Test was used for which content validity has been shown previously.20 Patients 
were asked to think of the past, present and future as being in the shape of circles 
and draw these circles in the way they best represented the relationship of past, 
present and future. Then they were asked to label each circle to show which one 
indicated the past, which one the present and which one the future. Time coherence 
was scored as ‘temporal discretion’ when the circles were totally unrelated, 
‘temporal continuity’ when the circles touched each other or partially overlapped 
and ‘temporal integration’ when the circles fully overlapped (Fig. 1) From these 
circles also time dominance was determined. Past dominance was scored if the 
circle indicating the past was largest, present dominance if the circle indicating the 
present was largest and future dominance if the circle indicating the future was 
largest. Time dominance was scored as ‘other’ if there was no ‘dominant’ circle, for 
example if all three circles were drawn equally large.  Temporal extension was 
measured by an adapted  version of Cottle’s Lines Test.21  We asked patients to 
indicate the extension of their own past, present and future on a given line. (Fig. 2) 
Relative length of past, present and future were measured by taking the length of 
the line representing past, present or future and dividing it by the length of the 
whole life line. Finally, speed of time was measured by asking patients how long the 
past week had seemed to them.22 Answer categories were ‘very long’, ‘long’, 
‘normal’, ‘short’, ‘very short’.
19 Van Laarhoven HW, 2011.
20 Sannen H. De levensloop als verhaal. Cottle ThJ. Perceiving time: A psychological investigation with men 
and women. 1976; New York: John Wiley & Sons.
21 Cottle ThJ, 1976.
22 Bayes R, 1995. Bayes R, 1997.
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Figure 1   Time coherence as determined from the Circle Test.  
A) temporal discreteness, B) temporal continuity, C) temporal integration.
Figure 2   Time extension. Patients were instructed to draw the duration of their 
past, present and future on a line where ‘birth’ and ‘death’ were already 
given at the far ends of the line.
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 We operationalized distress as quality of life, depression and hopelessness.23 
The following measurement instruments were included in the questionnaire, as 
described previously.24 In brief, Global QOL was measured with the Satisfaction 
with Life (SWL) scale25 and health related QOL with the European Organisation for 
Research and Treatment of Cancer QOL Questionnaire version 2.0 (EORTC 
QLQ-C30v2).26 For the SWL a sum score was constructed, 5-9 indicating extremely 
dissatisfied, 10-14 dissatisfied, 15-19 slightly below average, 20-24 average, 25-29 
high satisfaction and 30-35 very high satisfaction. The EORTC QLQ-C30v2 contains 
one scale to measure general health status. Furthermore, it distinguishes between 
functional scales, like physical functioning and role functioning, and symptom 
scales, like fatigue, pain and appetite loss. The scores on the functional scales and 
the global health status of the EORTC QLQ-C30v2 ranged from 0, very bad, to 100, 
excellent, whereas the symptom scales ranged from 0, not at all, to 100, very 
much.27  
 Depression was measured by Beck’s Depression Inventory for Primary Care 
(BDI-PC).28 The BDI-PC contains 7 items, scored on a 0-3 scale. A sumscore of ≥ 4 
indicates a clinically relevant depression. Hopelessness was measured with Beck’s 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS).29 BHS contains 20 items with a two-point scale (I agree, I 
don’t agree). For the 20 items a sumscore is constructed, 0 indicating no 
hopelessness, 20 indicating maximum hopelessness. Based on the sumscores 
patients can be classified into four groups: no hopelessness (0-3), mild (4-8), 
moderate (9-14) and severe (15-20).30 
6.3.3. Statistical analysis
To answer the first research question - Does time perception differ between 
disease-free cancer patients compared to advanced cancer patients in the palliative, 
end-of-life care setting? – we first identified relevant sociodemographic variables 
for time perception by looking at associations between measures of time perception 
23 National Comprehensive Cancer Network.  Distress Management. NCCN Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Oncology. v.1, 2008.
24 Van Laarhoven HW, et al. Coping, quality of life, depression and hopelessness.
25 Diener E, Emmons R, Larsen R et al. The Satisfaction with Life Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment. 
1985;49:71-75.
26 Aaronson NK, Ahmedzai S, Bergman B et al. The European Organization for Research and Treatment 
of Cancer QLQ-C30: a quality-of-life instrument for use in international clinical trials in oncology. J Natl 
Cancer Inst. 1993;85:365-376.
27 Cf. the reference value manual for the EORTC QLQ-C30v2 at http://www.eortc.be/home/qol, last accessed 
6-2-2011.
28 Beck AT, Guth D, Steer RA et al. Screening for major depression disorders in medical inpatients with the 
Beck Depression Inventory for Primary Care. Behav Res Ther. 1997;35:785-791.
29 Beck AT, Weissman A. The measurement of pessimism: the hopelessness scale. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology. 1974;42:861-865.
30 Mystakidou K, Tsilika E, Parpa E et al. The relationship between quality of life and levels of hopelessness 
and depression in palliative care. Depress Anxiety. 2008;25:730-736.
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and patient characteristics using χ2 or t-tests where appropriate. The sociodemo-
graphic characteristics age, living with a partner, education and employment were 
all identified as relevant sociodemographic variables. Then, differences in means 
between the curative and palliative groups were assessed using analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) with the relevant sociodemographic variables as covariates.
 To answer the second research question - What is the relation between time 
perception and distress in disease-free cancer patients and advanced cancer 
patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting?  – we performed correlation and 
regression analyses. Associations between time perception, quality of life, 
depression and hopelessness were analyzed by partial correlation analysis including 
the sociodemographic characteristics age, sex, living with a partner, education and 
employment. Significant associations with a partial correlation coefficient ≥.30 
were taken up in a stepwise regression model, including the sociodemographic 
factors as independent variables and measures of quality of life, depression and 
hopelessness as dependent variables. In stepwise regression in SPSS each variable 
is entered in sequence and its value assessed. If adding the variable contributes to 
the model then it is retained, but all other variables in the model are then re-tested 
to see if they are still contributing to the success of the model. If they no longer 
contribute significantly they are removed. This method ensures we will end up with 
the simplest equation with the best predictive power. 
 To answer the third research question - Do relations between time perception 
and distress differ between disease-free cancer patients without evidence of 
disease compared to advanced cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care 
setting?  – we assessed whether a significant partial correlation coefficient identified 
in one patient group was significantly different from the partial correlation 
coefficient in the other patient group using Fisher’s r-to-Z formula.31 
 All statistical analyses were performed with SPSS (version 16.0.1). Statistical 
inferences were based on 2-sided tests with p < 0.05 considered to be statistically 
significant. In the partial correlation analyses a more stringent significance level of 
p < 0.01 was used to partly correct for multiple testing.
6.4. Results
6.4.1. Participants
Baseline characteristics of the sample designated by disease free (curative) or 
advanced cancer (palliative) setting are presented in Table 1. 
31 Cohen J, Cohen P, West SG et al. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral 
Sciences. 2003; Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
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6.4.2.  Research question 1 
We first identified relevant sociodemographic variables for time perception by 
looking at associations between measures of time perception and patient charac-
teristics. The sociodemographic characteristics age, living with a partner, education 
and employment were all significantly associated with one or more of the measures 
of time perception. (Table 2) Then, between group differences (disease free versus 
advanced) were assessed using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the relevant 
sociodemographic variables as covariates. 
 No differences were noted between cancer patients without evidence of 
disease and advanced cancer patients with respect to time coherence. In both 
groups more than 60% adhered to a discrete vision on past, present and future, 
while a minority (≤ 5%) adhered to an integrated vision. The remainder favored a 
perspective of continuity. However, in patients with advanced cancer  significantly 
more present dominance was noted compared to patients without evidence of 
disease. In contrast, future dominance was significantly more observed in patients 
without evidence of disease (p < .05). These results for time dominance reflected 
the data obtained for temporal extension: the observed relative length of the 
presence compared to the life line as a whole was 26.2% for patients without 
evidence of disease versus 35.2% for advanced cancer patients (p <.01) and the 
relative length of the future was 34.9% for patients without evidence of disease 
Time perception
Table 1   Population characteristics. Where appropriate frequencies are presented 
with valid percentages in brackets. 
 
Curative 
n = 96 (%)
Palliative 
n = 63 (%)
Total 
n = 159 (%)
Male
Female  
43 (45)
53 (55)
31 (49)
32 (51)
74 (47)
85 (53)
Age Mean
St dev
53
13
62
10
57
13
Relationship Living with a partner
Living alone
80 (85)
14 (15)
42 (68)
20 (32)
122 (78)
34 (22)
Education Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
20 (21)
50 (53)
25 (26)
12 (19)
38 (62)
12 (19)
32 (20)
88 (56)
37 (24)
Employment Paid job
No paid job
40 (42)
55 (58)
18 (29)
45 (71)
58 (37)
100 (63)
Tumor type Breast
Prostate
Testis
Lung
Colon/rectum
Melanoma
Other 
34 (35)
16 (17)
13 (14)
9   (9)
4   (4)
6   (6)
14 (15)
 9 (14)
2   (3)
0   (0)
9 (14)
13 (21)
5   (8)
25 (40)
43 (27)
18 (11)
13   (8)
18 (11)
17 (11)
11   (7)
39 (25)
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Table 2   Patient characteristics by level of agreement with time perspective. Length 
of past, present or future was computed ‘short’ if a patient scored the 
median (calculated for all patients) or below and ‘long’ if a patient scored 
above the median. Speed of time was computed ‘slow’ if a patient scored 
the median (calculated for all patients) or below and ‘fast’ if a patient 
scored above the median. 
 
Time 
category
Patient 
group
Score Age
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with 
a partner
(%, n)
Education  
< vocational 
training
(%, n)
Employed
(%, n)
Time  
coherence: 
discrete
Cur Yes 54.1
(14.0, 55)
28
(50.9, 55)
46
(85.2, 54)
22
(40.0, 55)
21
(38.9, 54)
No 49.7
(13.4, 25)
10
(40.0, 25)
19
(79.2, 24)
5
(20.8, 24)
13
(52.0, 25)
Pal Yes 63.0
(8.7, 35)
16
(45.7, 35)
27*
(79.4, 34)
21*
(60.0, 35)
10
(28.6, 35)
No 60.7
(12.1, 20)
10
(50.0, 20)
10
(50.0, 20)
5
(26.3, 19)
8
(40.0, 20)
Time  
coherence: 
continuity
Cur Yes 49.1
(13.4, 21)
8
(38.1, 21)
15
(75.0, 20)
3*
(14.3, 21)
12
(57.1, 21)
No 54.0
(14.0, 59)
30
(50.8, 59)
50
(86.2, 58)
24**
(41.4, 58)
22
(37.9, 58)
Pal Yes 60.5
(12.5, 18)
9
(50.0, 18)
10
(55.6, 18)
3
(17.6, 17)
7
(38.9, 18)
No 63.0
(8.6, 37)
17
(45.9, 37)
27
(75.0, 36)
23
(62.2, 37)
11
(29.7, 37)
Time  
coherence: 
integration
Cur Yes 52.5
(15.3, 4)
2
(50.0, 4)
4
(100.0, 4)
2
(66.7, 3)
1
(25.0, 4)
No 52.7
(14.0, 74)
36
(47.4, 76)
61
(82.4, 74)
25
(32.9, 76)
33
(44.0, 75)
Pal Yes 62.5
(10.6, 2)
1
(50.0, 2)
0*
(0.0, 2)
2
(100.0, 2)
1
(50.0, 2)
No 62.1
(10.1, 53)
25
(47.2, 53)
37
(71.2, 52)
24
(46.2, 52)
17
(32.1, 53)
Past  
dominance
Cur Yes 54.8
(12.7, 28)
13
(46.4, 28)
24
(85.7, 28)
10
(35.7, 28)
12
(44.4, 27)
No 51.4
(15.0, 48) 
24
(50.0, 48)
37
(80.4, 48)
15
(31.7, 47)
18
(37.5, 48)
Pal Yes 62.7
(10.9, 27)
12
(44.4, 27)
16
(61,5, 26)
14
(51.9, 27)
10
(37.0, 27)
No 61,5
(9.2, 25)
13
(52.0, 25)
18
(72.0, 25)
10
(41.7, 24)
8
(32.0, 25)
Present 
dominance
Cur Yes 50.0
(13.9, 15)
8
(53.3, 15)
13
(86.7, 15)
2
(13.3, 15)
7
(47.7, 15)
No 53.3
(14.3, 61)
29
(47.5, 61)
48
(81.4, 59)
23
(38.3, 60)
23
(38.3, 60)
Pal Yes 59.4
(8.7, 17)
8
(47.1, 17)
13
(76.5, 17)
5
(29.4, 17)
5
(29.4, 17)
No 63.5 
(10.5, 35)
17
(48.6, 35)
21
(61.8, 34)
19
(55.9, 34)
13
(37.1, 35)
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Table 2   Continued. 
 
Time 
category
Patient 
group
Score Age
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with 
a partner
(%, n)
Education  
< vocational 
training
(%, n)
Employed
(%, n)
Future 
dominance
Cur Yes 49.9
(17.3, 22)
12
(54.5, 22)
15
(75.0, 20)
9
(42.9, 21)
6
(27.3, 22)
No 53.8
(12.8, 54)
25
(46.3, 54)
46
(85.2, 54)
16
(29.6, 54)
24
(45.3, 53)
Pal Yes 65.3
(7.3, 4)
3
(75.0, 4)
3
(75.0, 4)
3
(100, 3)
1
(25.0, 4)
No 61.9
(10.3, 48)
22
(45.8, 48)
31
(66.0, 47)
21
(43.8, 48)
17
(35.4, 48)
No 
dominance
Cur Yes 56.4
(11.4, 11)
4
(36.4, 11)
9
(81.8, 11)
4
(36.4, 11)
5
(45.5, 11)
No 52.0
(14.6, 65)
33
(50.8, 65)
52
(82.5, 63)
21
(32.8, 64)
25
(39.1, 64)
Pal Yes 67.0
(11.9, 4)
2
(50.0, 4)
2
(50.0, 4)
2
(50.0, 4)
2
(50.0, 4)
No 61.8
(9.9, 48)
23
(47.9, 48)
32
(68.1, 47)
22
(46.8, 47)
16
(33.3, 48)
Relative 
length of 
the past
Cur Short 50.1
(14.4, 42)
18
(42.9, 42)
32
(78.0, 41)
19
(45.2, 42)
19
(46.3, 41)
Long 55.6
(11.8, 43)
21
(48.8, 43)
38
(90.5, 42)
12
(28.6, 42)
15
(34.9, 43)
Pal Short 64.1
(9.4, 26)
13
(50.0, 26)
17
(65.4, 26)
13
(52.0, 25)
5
(19.2, 26)
Long 60.4
(9.5, 25)
15
(60.0, 25)
18
(72.0, 25)
9
(36.0, 25)
11
(44.0, 25)
Relative 
length of 
the present
Cur Short 51.8
(13.5, 48) 
22
(45.8, 48)
42
(91.3, 46)
18
(38.3, 47)
23
(48.9, 47)
Long 54.2
(13.4, 37)
17
(45.9, 37)
28
(75.7, 37)
13
(35.1, 37)
11
(29.7, 37)
Pal Short 64.4
(10.1, 20)
13
(65.0, 20)
15
(75.0, 20)
10
(52.6, 19)
7
(35.0, 20)
Long 61.0
(9.1, 31)
15
(48.4, 31)
20
(64.5, 31)
12
(38.7, 31)
9
(29.0, 31)
Relative 
length of 
the future
Cur Short 58.6**
(12.1, 30)
17
(56.7, 30)
24
(82.8, 29)
7
(24.1, 29)
5**
(16.7, 30)
Long 49.7
(13.1, 55)
22
(40.0, 55)
46
(85.2, 54)
24
(43.6, 55)
29
(53.7, 54)
Pal Short 60.9
(9.8, 38)
21
(55.3, 38)
26
(68.4, 38)
12**
(31.6, 38)
13
(34.2, 38)
Long 66.3
(7.7, 13)
7
(53.8, 13)
9
(69.2, 13)
10
(83.3, 12)
3
(23.1, 13)
Speed of 
time
Cur Slow 51.7
(13.9, 42)
20
(47.6, 42)
34
(82.9, 41)
20
(47.6, 42)
17
(41.5, 41)
Fast 54.5 
(13.1, 53)
23
(43.4, 53)
45
(86.5, 52)
17
(32.7, 52)
23
(43.4, 53)
Pal Slow 63.5
(9.5, 42)
20
(47.6, 42)
28
(68.3, 41)
24
(58.5, 41)
10
(23.8, 42)
Fast 61.1
(10.4, 18)
10
(55.6, 18)
11
(61.1, 18)
7
(38.9, 18)
7
(38.9, 18)
*  Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .05. 
** Indicates a significant difference between low and high scores, p < .01. 
Abbreviations: cur, curative group; pal, palliative group.
142
versus 22.0% for advanced cancer patients (p<.001). Speed of time was experienced 
significantly different between the advanced cancer patients and patients without 
evidence of disease: for patients without evidence of disease their past week 
seemed significantly shorter than for patients with advanced cancer (p<.001).
6.4.3.  Research question 2
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the partial correlation and regression analyses of 
measures of time perception and measures of quality of life, depression and 
hopelessness for both cancer patients without evidence of disease and advanced 
cancer patients. 
 Of measures of time perception speed of time was most frequently associated 
with measures  of distress,  viz.  with global  health status, social functioning, emotional 
functioning, constipation and depression. These associations were all observed in 
the group of advanced cancer patients. Speed of time remained a significant 
predictor for these quality of life variables in the regression analyses. The 
associations of speed of time with these variables all indicated that when the week 
was experienced shorter (i.e. the speed of time higher) less distress was reported 
(better physical, social and emotional functioning, less symptoms of constipation 
and less depression). 
 Temporal extension, more specifically relative length of the future, was the 
second measure of time perception which was frequently associated with measures 
of distress, viz. with satisfaction with life, emotional functioning, depression and 
hopelessness. These associations were all observed in the group of cancer patients 
without evidence of disease. Except for emotional functioning, relative length of 
the future remained a significant predictor for these variables in the regression 
analyses. The associations of relative length of the future with these variables all 
indicated a beneficial relation with patients’ distress: the longer the relative length 
of the future was indicated, the better satisfaction with life and emotional 
functioning and the less depression and hopelessness were reported.
 In the group of patients with advanced cancer the relative length of the past 
was negatively associated with satisfaction with life and positively with hopelessness, 
which indicates that the longer the past was estimated to be, the less satisfaction 
with life and the more hopelessness was reported. Similarly, if the past was the 
dominant time segment for advanced cancer patients, higher levels of hopelessness 
were reported, whereas if the present was the dominant time segment less 
hopelessness was reported. For cancer patients without evidence of disease lower 
levels of physical functioning were reported if the past was the dominant time 
segment. Except for the relation of present dominance with hopelessness these 
associations all remained significant in the regression analyses.
6.4.4.  Research question 3
To assess whether a significant partial correlation coefficient identified in one 
patient group was significantly different from the partial correlation coefficient in 
the other patient group we used Fisher’s r-to-Z formula. (Table 5) In the group of 
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patients with advanced cancer all associations of speed of time with measures of 
quality of life (global health status, social functioning, emotional functioning, 
constipation and depression) were significantly different from the group of cancer 
patients without evidence of disease. Also, the relation between present dominance 
and hopelessness in the group of advanced cancer patients was significantly different 
from the group of cancer patients without evidence of disease. In the group of 
cancer patients without evidence of disease the observed correlations were not 
significantly different from the group of advanced cancer patients.  
Time perception
Table 3   Partial correlations between measures of time perspective and measures 
of quality of life, depression and hopelessness. Partial correlation 
coefficient r for both the cancer patients without evidence of disease and 
advanced cancer patients are only given if r > .300 and p < .01 in at least 
one of both groups. As only a minority of patients (< 5%) adhered to an 
integrated vision of past, present and future patient numbers were too 
small to be taken up in the correlation analysis. Control variables were 
age, living with a partner, education and employment. 
Past 
dominance
Present 
dominance
Relative 
length of  
the past
Relative 
length of  
the present
Relative 
length of  
the future
Speed of 
time
cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal cur pal
Satisfaction  
with life
r -.219 -.442 .304 .268
sig .064 .006 .009 .109
Global health 
status
r .213 .575
sig .055 .000
Physical 
functioning
r .325 .340
sig .009 .046
Social 
functioning
r .139 .508
sig .212 .001
Emotional 
functioning
r .332 .176 .078 .561
sig .004 .298 .485 .000
Constipation r -.043 -.414
sig .701 .008
Depression r -.358 -.412 -.037 -.555
sig .002 .011 .741 .000
Hopelessness r -.284 -.498 .057 .479 .158 .434 -.370 -.395
sig .023 .002 .655 .004 .184 .007 .001 .015
Abbreviations: cur, curative group; pal, palliative group.
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Table 4   Stepwise regression analysis of measures of time perspective and  measures 
of quality of life, depression and hopelessness. Stepwise regression analysis 
was performed of measures of time perspective on relevant measures 
of quality of life, depression and hopelessness as determined from the 
correlation analysis (see Methods). Patient age, living with a partner, 
education and employment were entered in each model as independent 
relevant sociodemographic variables. Per outcome variable, all significant 
models are shown with the independent variables which were entered 
successively. 
 
Dependent 
variable
Group Model Independent 
variables
Standardized 
Coefficients
Beta
Sig. R2
change
R2 Adjusted 
R2 
Satisfaction 
 with life
Curative 1 Relative length 
of the future
.331 .003 .109** .109 .098**
2 Relative length 
of the future
Living with a 
partner
.325
-.218
.002
.039
.048* .157 .135**
Palliative 1 Relative length 
of the past
-.338 .018 .114* .114 .095*
Global health 
status
Palliative 1 Speed of time .564 .000 .318*** .564 .305***
Physical  
functioning
Curative 1 Education .314 .008 .099** .099 .086**
2 Education
Past 
dominance
.310
.273
.006
.016
.074* .173 .149**
Social  
functioning
Palliative 1 Speed of time .335 .013 .112* .112 .095*
2 Speed of time
Living with a 
partner
.317
.287
.015
.027
.082 .194 .162**
Emotional 
functioning
Palliative 1 Speed of time .524 .000 .275*** .275 .261***
Constipation Palliative 1 Speed of time -.337 .011 .114* .114 .097*
Depression Curative 1 Relative length 
of the future
-.251 .025 .063* .063 .051*
2 Relative length 
of the future
Age
-.414
-.329
.000
.009
.082** .145 .122**
Palliative 1 Speed of time -.548 .000 .300*** .300 .286***
145
6.5. Discussion
To the best of our knowledge this is the first comparative study of time perception, 
quality of life, depression and hopelessness in a group of cancer patients without 
evidence of disease and a group of advanced cancer patients who did not receive 
anti-cancer treatment anymore and were facing death. 
6.5.1. Time perception in cancer patients
Both cancer patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients 
had a similar view on time coherence. Both groups merely adhered to a discrete 
vision on past, present and future, which reflects the experience that time consists 
of a succession of states, largely independent of each other. The traces of the past 
disappear very quickly and each instant of time brings something new. In contrast a 
vision of continuity or integration, which was adhered to by only a minority of 
patients, presupposes that events do not just occur one by one successively in the 
course of time, but that certain past events contribute to the development of 
others in the future and that new events may shed light on events of the past. It 
reflects the idea that the past and the future are contained in the present. The idea 
of continuity or integration may be compared with the ‘plot’ of a story. In the 
configuration of the plot multiple events are not just put in temporal succession, 
but are integrated into one comprehensible story.32 Although a direct comparison 
with healthy volunteers is lacking in our study, the discrete vision of past, present 
32 Sannen H, 1998.
Time perception
Table 4   Continued. 
Dependent 
variable
Group Model Independent 
variables
Standardized 
Coefficients
Beta
Sig. R2
change
R2 Adjusted 
R2 
Hopelessness Curative 1 Relative length 
of the future
-.298 .007 .089** .089 .078**
Palliative 1 Relative length 
of the past
.465 .002 .216** .216 .196**
2 Relative length 
of the past
Age
.406
-.405
.003
.003
.161** .377 .345***
3 Relative length 
of the past
Age
Past 
dominance
.234
-.475
-.364
.089
.000
.010
.102* .478 .437***
* indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; *** indicates p < .001.
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and future in our patient population may suggest that it may be hard for patients to 
view the events in their lives as a coherent whole. This appeared not only to be the 
case for the advanced cancer patients where cancer would ultimately disrupt the 
flow of life and thus of time,33 but also in the cancer patients without evidence of 
disease. In fact, in a qualitative study in cancer survivors, respondents reported 
that the diagnosis of cancer had disrupted their experience of time.34 Even though 
in the ‘no evidence of disease group’ patients may not die of cancer, cancer has 
irrevocably interrupted the flow of time for them, too. After having completed 
treatment, survivors still have to deal with the cancer diagnosis and the fear of 
recurrence and are faced with issues like sense of ‘loss of control’ of their life, 
increased health worries, loss of energy, tiredness, sexuality and infertility 
problems, anxiety and depression.35 In the words of a cancer survivor: ‘It is definitely 
a new time. There is the time before I became ill and the time after.’36   
 A significant difference between cancer patients without evidence of disease 
and advanced cancer patients was observed for time dominance: the future was 
dominant in the group of patients without evidence of disease whereas the present 
33 Hayout I, 1999. Roy DJ. Waiting for the (un) expected. Experiences of time in palliative care. J Palliat Care. 
1998;14:3-4.
34 Rasmussen DM, 2007.
35 Fredette SL. Breast cancer survivors: concerns and coping. Cancer Nurs. 1995;18:35-46.
36 Rasmussen DM, 2007.
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Table 5   Fisher’s r-to-Z analysis of correlation coefficients. Partial correlation 
coefficients are indicated only when they were significantly different 
between the curative and palliative patient group according to Fisher's 
r-to-Z formula. 
 
Present dominance Speed of time
cur pal cur pal
Global health status r .213 .575
sig .055 .000
Social functioning r .139 .508
sig .212 .001
Emotional functioning r .078 .561
sig .485 .000
Constipation r -.043 -.414
sig .701 .008
Depression r -.037 -.555
sig .741 .000
Hopelessness r .057 .479
sig .655 .004
Abbreviations: cur, curative group; pal, palliative group.
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was dominant in the group of patients with advanced cancer. Similar results were 
obtained for temporal extension: the relative length of the future was longer in the 
group of patients without evidence of disease, whereas the relative length of the 
present was longer in the group of patients with advanced cancer. At first sight 
these results do not seem unexpected: patients without evidence of disease have 
conquered cancer and have good reasons to leave behind the difficult times and 
look for new chances into the future. In contrast, patients with advanced disease 
know that the times ahead are limited and, therefore, for them it is of no use to 
concentrate on the future. Despite its appeal, this explanation may need to be 
nuanced, as it does not explain why in patients with advanced disease the present 
is dominant, rather than the past. The observed relation between time dominance 
and distress may shed further light on this issue, as we will discuss below. The 
significant difference in the experience of the speed of time between the cancer 
patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients will also be 
discussed in the light of the experience of distress.
 
6.5.2. Time perception and distress
In the group of cancer patients without evidence of disease the longer the relative 
length of the future was drawn on the life line, the less distress was reported. 
Although in the advanced cancer group the association between relative length of 
the future and distress did not meet our preset criteria of significance, the results 
pointed towards a similar conclusion and Fisher’s r-to-Z formula did not indicate a 
significant difference between the ‘no evidence of disease’ and ‘advanced cancer’ 
group in this respect. Vice versa, in the group of patients with advanced cancer the 
longer the relative length of the past was indicated, the more distress was reported 
and this relation was not significantly different from the results in the group of 
patients without evidence of disease. This implies, first of all, that having some kind 
of future perspective is essential for patients, both in the curative and in the 
palliative setting. Even though the advanced cancer patients are very well aware 
that their future life span is limited (on average the relative length of the future was 
shorter in the advanced cancer group than in the group of patients without evidence 
of disease), if they have a perspective of at least some time ahead, this may be 
associated with less distress. These results also imply that having one’s focus 
primarily on the past may not be beneficial for patients. This is illustrated by 
previous studies in terminally ill cancer patients  which showed that life reviews 
may be beneficial.37 In life reviews the past is reviewed with questions like ‘What is 
the most important thing in your life and why?’  ‘What are the most vivid or 
impressive memories in your life?’ However, in this review process the present and 
future are also incorporated with questions like: ‘Is there anything about you 
37 Steinhauser KE, Alexander SC, Byock IR et al. Do preparation and life completion discussions improve 
functioning and quality of life in seriously ill patients? Pilot randomized control trial. J Palliat Med. 
2008;11:1234-1240. Ando M, Morita T, Akechi T et al. Efficacy of short-term life-review interviews on the 
spiritual well-being of terminally ill cancer patients. J Pain Symptom Manage. 2010;39:993-1002.
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that your family needs to know?’ ‘Are there things you want to tell them and are 
there things you want them to remember?’ ‘What advice or words of guidance do 
you have for the important people in your life or for the younger generation?’38 In 
this way, patients are assisted in maintaining a sense of purpose in life, and thus a 
focus on the present and even the future which is concordant with their changed 
circumstances.39
 In the group of patients with advanced cancer speed of time was experienced 
significantly different from the group of patients without evidence of disease: the 
past week had seemed significantly longer to advanced cancer patients. Looking at 
the association between speed of time and distress (the slower time seemed to 
move, the more distress was reported) the difference between patients with 
advanced cancer and patients without evidence of disease could be explained by 
differences in distress levels.40 As we have shown previously, patients with 
advanced cancer reported higher levels of distress than patients without evidence 
of disease.41  Interestingly, the correlation between speed of time and distress was 
observed in the group of advanced cancer patients only and was significantly 
different from the group of patients without evidence of disease. This may be 
understood from the cognitive information processing point of view as in case of 
distress, time intervals may be perceived as lengthened (i.e. speed of time seems to 
slow down) compared to normal.42 However, when distress is absent this does not 
necessarily lead to a speeding up of time compared to normal.   
6.5.3. Limitations of the study
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution. A mixed convenience 
sample was used with a variety of cancer diagnoses. In the group of advanced 
cancer patients 56% of the patients returned and sufficiently completed the 
questionnaire. Although this percentage is reasonably good considering the 
patients’ phase of life, a selection bias may be present. Therefore, generalization of 
the results beyond the sample of this study is restricted. Since our patient groups 
were rather small, subtle differences between the groups or small, but relevant 
associations between time perception and distress may have remained undetected. 
6.5.4. Implications for practice and research
As time surrounds and embeds all human behavior, it requires special consideration 
within nursing, which is constantly concerned with human behavior in all its 
aspects.43  For professional caregivers it is important to realize that the diagnosis of 
38 Ando M, 2010.
39 Pinquart M, Silbereisen RK, Frohlich C. Life goals and purpose in life in cancer patients. Support Care 
Cancer. 2009;17:253-259.
40 Bayes R, 1995. Bayes R, 1997.
41 Van Laarhoven HW, 2011.
42 Ornstein RE, 1975. Scott DW, 1983. Somov PG, 2000.
43 Jones AR. Time to think: temporal considerations in nursing practice and research. J Adv Nurs. 2001;33:150-158.
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cancer may have a large impact on a patient’s time perception. Although patients 
with advanced cancer may be less future oriented than cancer patients without 
evidence of disease, for both groups a primary focus on the past may not be 
beneficial. In fact, it may be necessary for oncology nurses or other health care 
professionals to actively intervene in a patient’s time perception.44 However, as 
mentioned above, given the small sample size of our study, the generalization of 
our results is difficult. Therefore, as a first step for further research we would 
suggest a replication of our findings in a larger patient sample. Then, a prospective 
intervention study should be conducted investigating whether interventions 
focussing on the past have different effects on patients’ well-being than interventions 
focussing on present or future. In the meanwhile, nurses may explore the current 
communication of patients with family and friends and assist patients to tie together 
the loose ends of their lives. 
 As nurses are in a key position to incorporate psychosocial care in their daily 
practice, thereby diminishing patients’ distress,45 being attentive to signs and 
symptoms of distress in daily nursing practice is of great importance, along with 
formal evaluations of distress. Based on our results, nurses, specifically in a 
palliative care setting, should be aware that if patients experience time as dragging 
this may be a sign of distress and a further exploration of patients’ distress may be 
warranted. 
44 Fitzpatrick JJ, 1980.
45 King CR. Advances in how clinical nurses can evaluate and improve quality of life for individuals with 
cancer. Oncol Nurs Forum. 2006;33:5-12.
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Abstract 
Background: Attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness may be important factors 
determining distress in cancer patients. Direct comparative studies in patients with 
different life expectancies exploring attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness are 
lacking. Also, sociodemographic and religious characteristics determining the attitudes 
towards guilt and forgiveness are unknown. 
Objective: To compare attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness in cancer patients 
without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients. 
Methods: A descriptive research design was used. 97 patients without evidence of 
disease and 55 advanced cancer patients filled out the Dutch Guilt Measurement 
Instrument and the Forgiveness of Others scale. 
Results: Both groups had an attitude of non-religious guilt and forgiveness, but 
not of religious guilt. No significant differences in attitudes towards guilt and 
foregive ness were observed between the two groups. In contrast to sociodemo-
graphic characteristics, religious characteristics were relevant predictors for guilt 
and forgiveness. Significant differences in relations between images of God and 
attitudes towards guilt were observed between the two patient groups.
Conclusions: An attitude of non-religious guilt and forgiveness was found in cancer 
patients, irrespective of the stage of disease. Religious characteristics were significantly 
associated with attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. This correlation differed in the 
early and the advanced setting of disease. 
Implications for practice: The observed relations between religious characteristics 
and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness suggest that a careful examination of the role 
of religious beliefs and values is relevant in the clinical care of patients with cancer, 
both in the setting of early and advanced disease. 
Keywords
cancer; curative care; distress; forgiveness; guilt; palliative care; religion
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7.1  Introduction
One of the main goals for cancer nursing is the alleviation or amelioration of 
patients’ distress. Distress is a multifactorial unpleasant emotional experience of a 
psychological (cognitive, behavioral, emotional), social, and/or spiritual nature that 
may interfere with the ability to cope effectively with cancer, its physical symptoms 
and its treatment.1 The National Comprehensive Cancer Network classifies the 
experience of guilt as one of the important aspects that should be considered in 
distress management.2 The importance of this aspect is underscored by several 
studies which have assessed the relation between distress and feelings of guilt 
about one’s own role in the development of cancer. For example, breast cancer 
survivors who blamed themselves for their cancer reported more mood disturbance 
and poorer quality of life than women who did not blame themselves.3 Similarly, in 
a study of patients with lung cancer, breast cancer or prostate cancer the belief that 
one caused one’s own cancer was correlated with higher levels of anxiety, and 
depression.4 
 The concept of guilt is closely linked to forgiveness. There can be forgiveness 
only where we can accuse someone of something, presume someone to be guilty 
or declare him or her guilty.5 Several studies have shown that an attitude of 
forgiveness is associated with decreased distress. For example, in patients with 
coronary artery disease, higher levels of forgiveness were associated with lower 
levels of anxiety, depression, and perceived stress, as well as lower cholesterol 
levels.6 In fact, forgiveness may be related to less physiological reactivity to stress 
and improved mental health.7
 Both guilt and forgiveness may be regarded as basic psychosocial phenomena. 
Guilt can be defined as an affective state in which one experiences having done 
something that one believes one should not have done, or, vice versa, having not 
done something one believes one should have done. Thus, guilt may include a far 
1 National Comprehensive Cancer Network.  Distress Management. NCCN Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Oncology. v.1, 2008.
2 National Comprehensive Cancer Network, 2008.
3 Friedman LC, Barber CR, Chang J et al. Self-blame, self-forgiveness, and spirituality in breast cancer 
survivors in a public sector setting. J Cancer Educ. 2010;25:343-348.
4 LoConte NK, Else-Quest NM, Eickhoff J et al. Assessment of guilt and shame in patients with non-small-cell 
lung cancer compared with patients with breast and prostate cancer. Clin Lung Cancer. 2008;9:171-178.
5 Ricoeur P. Memory, history, forgetting. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. 2004; The University of 
Chicago Press.
6 Friedberg JP, Suchday S, Srinivas VS. Relationship between forgiveness and psychological and physiological 
indices in cardiac patients. Int J Behav Med. 2009;16:205-211. 
7 Lawler KA, Younger JW, Piferi RL et al. The unique effects of forgiveness on health: an exploration of 
pathways. J Behav Med. 2005;28:157-167. Witvliet CV, Phipps KA, Feldman ME et al. Posttraumatic mental 
and physical health correlates of forgiveness and religious coping in military veterans. J Trauma Stress. 
2004;17:269-273.
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broader range of experiences than self-blame about the cause of one’s cancer. 
Feelings of guilt may develop because of an argument with a friend, a marriage 
which did not persist, a task that could not be completed, a life that could not be 
lived according to one’s own ideals. As such, all these experiences of guilt may 
induce distress. From a psychosocial perspective, forgiveness may be regarded as 
an adaptive process of emotion-focused coping that has functional utility in 
overcoming negative mood states such as anger, anxiety, depression and guilt.8 It 
may serve as an antidote for toxic bitterness.9 Although experiences with both 
forgiveness of others and being forgiven may be encountered in clinical practice, in 
a previous study it has been shown that forgiving others was a more prominent 
issue for cancer patients.10
 However, guilt and forgiveness are not only basic psychosocial phenomena; 
they have another nature as well. The words guilt and forgiveness may evoke 
existential or spiritual and religious associations.11 From this perspective, guilt not 
only refers to an affective state, but also to the fundamental experience that human 
beings are fallible. Our very possibility to act, to live our lives in the way we do, 
implies we could also have acted and lived in a different way. 
If we do not manage to live a life that can hold up to our standards of sense and 
meaning, this can lead to the experience of guilt. In a religious context, guilt not 
only implies that our own personal or societal standards have not been met, but 
also that our relationship with God is disturbed by this failure.12 Guilt may be 
experienced in terms of sin. Similarly, forgiveness may not only function as an 
adaptive process to overcome negative mood states, but may also evoke the 
fundamental experience that one is accepted and loved despite one’s failings.13 
Forgiveness, then, refers to the power to unbind an agent from his act.14 In the 
world’s great monotheistic traditions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – God’s 
ability to forgive human beings is a central element of God’s character. In following 
God, the faithful are called to forgive transgressors as well.
 For patients with advanced cancer the last phase of their life is often a period 
of completion and preparation: completion of life by looking back to assess the life 
lived, preparation by looking forward to living one’s life for the remaining weeks or 
months. This process of completion and preparation occurs in the context of values 
8 Pargament KI. The Psychology of Religion and Coping. 1997; New York/London: The Guilford Press.
9 Wilson T, Milosevic A, Carroll M et al. Physical health status in relation to self-forgiveness and other-
forgiveness in healthy college students. J Health Psychol. 2008;13:798-803.
10 Mickley JR, Soeken K, Belcher A. Spiritual well-being, religiousness and hope among women with breast 
cancer. Image J Nurs Sch. 1992;24:267-272.
11 McCullough M, Worthington Jr E. Religion and the forgiving personality. Journal of Personality. 
1999;67:1141-1164.
12 Scherer-Rath M. Lebenssackgassen. Herausforderung für die pastorale Beratung und Begleitung von 
Menschen in Lebenskrisen. 2001; Münster/Hamburg/London: Lit Verlag.
13 Sulmasy DP. At wit’s end: forgiveness, dignity, and the care of the dying. J Gen Intern Med. 2001;16:335-
338.
14 Ricoeur P, 2004.
Chapter 7
157
and preferences of one’s whole life, but may also be placed within a traditional 
religious context.15 It includes issues of spending time with family and friends and 
saying good-bye, but also reviewing life, facing unresolved conflicts and unfulfilled 
life goals, achieving forgiveness.16 Thus, being attentive to issues of guilt and 
forgiveness is crucial in palliative cancer care. However, this may not only be 
relevant for patients with advanced disease. The cancer diagnosis itself may already 
serve as a ‘wake-up call’ necessitating re-examination of one’s life.17 Nevertheless, 
direct comparative studies in cancer patients with different life expectancies which 
explore their attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness are lacking. Also, the sociode-
mographic and religious characteristics which determine the attitudes of cancer 
patients towards guilt and forgiveness are unknown. 
7.2. Research questions
In this study we will explore the following research questions:
1. Which sociodemographic and religious characteristics are associated with 
attitudes of guilt and forgiveness in patients without evidence of disease and 
advanced cancer patients?
2. Do attitudes of guilt and forgiveness differ between patients without evidence 
of disease and advanced cancer patients?
3. Do relations between sociodemographic and religious characteristics on the 
one hand and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness on the other hand differ 
between patients without evidence of disease and patients with advanced 
cancer?
7.3. Methods
This study used a descriptive research design. The study was approved by the 
institutional Medical Ethical Board of our institute and all participating patients 
gave written informed consent. 
15 Steinhauser KE, Alexander SC, Byock IR et al. Do preparation and life completion discussions improve 
functioning and quality of life in seriously ill patients? Pilot randomized control trial. J Palliat Med. 
2008;11:1234-1240. Steinhauser KE, Christakis NA, Clipp EC et al. Factors considered important at the end 
of life by patients, family, physicians, and other care providers. JAMA. 2000;284:2476-2482. Steinhauser 
KE, Clipp EC, Bosworth HB et al. Measuring quality of life at the end of life: validation of the QUAL-E. Palliat 
Support Care. 2004;2:3-14.
16 Steinhauser KE, Christakis NA, Clipp EC et al. Factors considered important at the end of life by patients, 
family, physicians, and other care providers. JAMA. 2000;284:2476-2482. Steinhauser KE, Clipp EC, 
Bosworth HB et al. Measuring quality of life at the end of life: validation of the QUAL-E. Palliat Support 
Care. 2004;2:3-14. Penson RT, Partridge RA, Shah MA et al. Fear of death. Oncologist. 2005;10:160-169.
17 Mickley JR, 1992.
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7.3.1. Study sample
As part of a larger project on quality of life, a self-administered questionnaire was 
given out to patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients 
from the departments of Surgery, Urology, Gynaecology, Internal Medicine, Medical 
Oncology and the Palliative Care unit of one university and two general hospitals, 
two hospices, and a regional consultation service for palliative care in the 
Netherlands. The inclusion criteria for patients without evidence of disease were: 
patients with a history of treatment with curative intent for a solid tumor; end of 
treatment less than one year ago; no signs of acute treatment toxicities and no 
evidence of disease activity. Patients who were on adjuvant hormonal therapy 
could also be included in this group. The inclusion criteria for the advanced cancer 
patients were: patients with advanced solid tumors; not receiving anti-tumor 
therapies; recovered from acute treatment toxicities. Exclusion criteria for both 
groups were: inability to read Dutch or extreme morbidity precluding filling out a 
questionnaire.
 A questionnaire was sent to 236 eligible patients, 123 patients without evidence 
of disease and 113 advanced cancer patients. Twenty-three patients without 
evidence of disease and 40 advanced cancer patients did not return the 
questionnaire. In both groups the most important reason (50% in the no evidence 
of disease group, 39% in the advanced cancer group) for not participating was not 
specified (‘I just don’t feel like filling out the papers anymore’). Eleven patients in 
the advanced cancer group deteriorated or died before they could return the 
questionnaire. Three patients without evidence of disease and 18 advanced cancer 
patients did not fully complete the scales on guilt and forgiveness and were 
excluded from the analysis. Thus, data of 97 patients without evidence of disease 
and 55 advanced cancer patients were available for analysis. These patients did not 
significantly differ by sex from eligible patients for whom data were not available 
for analysis, but the latter were on average three years older (mean 60 ± 1 versus 57 
± 1 years, p < .05). 
7.3.2. Measurement instruments
Basic sociodemographic data including age, sex, marital status and educational 
level were collected from all participants. To measure religious characteristics 
patients were asked how important religion was to them in their daily lives (religious 
salience), whether they regarded themselves as member of a Christian church or a 
religious or spiritual group and how often they visited church. Also, patients 
completed the Images of God Scale, a Dutch 14-item instrument which has been 
used, among others, in a representative national survey (n=1008) on Socio-Cultural 
Developments in the Netherlands.18 It assesses adherence to a personal image of 
God (e.g. ‘God knows and understands me’), a non-personal image of God (e.g. 
‘There is Something higher that unites people with the world’) and an unknowable 
18 Van der Ven JA. God reinvented? A theological search in texts and tables. 1998; Leiden: Brill. Van der Ven 
JA, Dreyer J, Pieterse H. Is there a God of human rights? 2004; Leiden: Brill.
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image of God (e.g. ‘There is Something higher we cannot even imagine’) (cf. Table 1 
for an English translation).19 The internal consistency (Crohnbach’s α) of the scales 
of images of God was .98 for a personal image of God, .93 for a non-personal image 
of God and .81 for an unknowable image of God. Images of God were scored from 1, 
19 Zaccaria F. Participation and Beliefs in Popular Religiosity. An Empirical-theological Exploration among 
Italian Catholics. 2010; Leiden: Brill.
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Table 1   Images of God Scale. 
 
1. God set the world in motion and left it to humans, giving them the task to take 
care of it.
2. God knows and understands me.
3. When people are friends, God’s love is at work.
4. I experience God’s presence in the beauty of nature.
5. God got the world going and left it to the responsibility of humans.
6. I trust God will never abandon me.
7. When people live in friendship, God’s love is present.
8. I experience God’s goodness in the peace of nature.
9. There is Something higher that started the world.
10. There is Something higher that unites people with the world.
11. There is Something higher which we cannot name at all.
12. There is Something higher that links people with the world.
13. There is Something higher through which the world started and was then left 
to just go on.
14. There is Something higher that we cannot even imagine.
Table 2   Dutch Guilt Measurement Instrument. 
 
I would feel guilty...
1. ... if I were unfaithful to my own convictions.
2. ... towards others if I were responsible for a quarrel with them.
3. ... towards God if I let other people down.
4. ... towards God if I betray my own ideals.
5. ... if I do not act according to my own convictions.
6. ... towards God if I were unjust for other people.
7. ... if I went against my own ideals.
8. ... towards God if I abandon my path of life.
9. ... towards God if I act against my convictions.
10.  ... towards others if I damage my relationship with them.
11. ... towards God if I cause quarrels with others.
12. ... towards others if I put insufficient effort for a good relationship with them.
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totally disagree, to 5, fully agree.20
To measure guilt we used the Dutch Guilt Measurement Instrument developed 
by Scherer-Rath for patients who were in the middle of a suicide crisis.21 Although 
the situation of patients in a suicide crisis may be quite different from patients 
confronted with cancer, the common denominator in these two patient populations 
is that they are both confronted with a radical, existential life event. To accommodate 
potential differences between the two groups we have performed a new factor 
analysis on the original items of the instrument (free factor analysis, oblimin 
rotation, communality ≥ .2, factor loading ≥ .4) Two different attitudes of guilt were 
distinguished: a religious attitude and a non-religious attitude (cumulative explained 
variance 70.3%). The religious attitude referred to guilt as guilt towards God 
(Crohnbach’s a = .98), whereas the non-religious attitude referred to guilt towards 
oneself or others (Crohnbach’s a = .86). In the data-set of Scherer-Rath both the 
religious attitude and non-religious attitudes could be further differentiated into 
intrapersonal and interpersonal attitudes of guilt. However, we could not replicate 
these more fine-grained differentiations for our patient population and these were, 
therefore, not used in the present study. Each attitude was scored on a scale from 
1 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree) (cf. Table 2 for an English translation). 
 Forgiveness was measured with the Forgiveness of others scale.22 In a previous 
study with 237 clients in an outpatient counseling clinic Crohnbach’s a was .79 and 
the test-retest reliability was .94. In our study Crohnbach’s a was .71) A sum score 
was calculated ranging from 15 to 30, with higher scores indicating a more forgiving 
attitude. 
7.3.3. Statistical analysis
To answer the first research question – which sociodemographic and religious char-
acteristics are associated with attitudes of guilt and forgiveness in patients without 
evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients? – we looked at associations 
between guilt (low versus high), forgiveness (low versus high) and patient charac-
teristics using χ2, and t tests when appropriate. Guilt was computed ‘low’ if a patient 
scored <3.5 and ‘high’ if a patient scored ≥ 3.5 (on a scale from 1-5). Forgiveness was 
computed ‘low’ if a patient scored <23 and ‘high’ if a patient scored ≥ 23 (on a scale 
from 15-30). To assess which sociodemographic and religious variables were most 
relevant for attitudes of guilt and forgiveness we performed stepwise regression, 
including the sociodemographic and religious factors which were associated with 
guilt and forgiveness as independent variables and guilt and forgiveness as 
dependent variables. In stepwise regression in SPSS each variable is entered in 
sequence and its value is assessed. If adding the variable contributes to the model 
20 Van Laarhoven HW, Schilderman J, Vissers KC et al. Images of God in relation to coping strategies of 
palliative cancer patients. J Pain Symptom Manage. 2010;40:495-501.
21 Scherer-Rath M, 2001.
22 Mauger PA, Perry JE, Freeman T et al. Measurement of Forgiveness: Prelimenary Research. Journal of 
Psychology and Christianity. 1992;11:170-180.
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then it is retained, but all other variables in the model are then re-tested to see if 
they are still contributing to the success of the model. If they no longer contribute 
significantly they are removed. This method ensures we will end up with the 
simplest equation with the best predictive power. 
 To answer the second research question - do attitudes of guilt and forgiveness 
differ between patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients? 
– differences in means between the two groups were assessed using analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA). As covariates we used the most relevant sociodemographic 
and religious variables which were determined above in the stepwise regression 
analysis (research question 1).
 To answer the third research question - do relations between sociodemograph-
ic and religious characteristics on the one hand and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness 
on the other hand differ between patients without evidence of disease and patients 
with advanced cancer – we calculated correlation coefficients between the relevant 
sociodemographic or religious variables as determined from the stepwise regression 
analysis and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. We then assessed whether a 
correlation coefficient identified in one patient group was significantly different 
from the partial correlation coefficient in the other patient group using Fisher’s 
r-to-Z formula.23 
 All statistical analyses were performed with SPSS (version 16.0.1). Statistical 
inferences were based on 2-sided tests with p < .05 considered to be statistically 
significant.
7.4. Results
7.4.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 152 patients, 72 males and 80 females. The mean age (± SD) 
was 56 years (± 13 years). Baseline characteristics of the sample designated by 
disease setting (no evidence of disease versus advanced cancer) are presented in 
Table 3.
7.4.2.  Research question 1 
We first identified relevant sociodemographic and religious characteristics by 
looking at associations between attitudes of guilt and forgiveness of others (low 
versus high) and patient characteristics. (Table 4) In both the no evidence of disease 
group and the advanced cancer group, patients who scored high on religious guilt 
were significantly older than patients who scored low. Furthermore, in both patient 
groups high scores on religious guilt were associated with higher religious salience, 
membership of a Christian church or a religious or spiritual group, frequent church 
23 Cohen J, Cohen P, West SG et al. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral 
Sciences. 2003; Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
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visits and stronger adherence to a personal or non-personal God. In the advanced 
cancer group, patients who scored high on religious guilt also scored significantly 
higher on adherence to an image of an unknowable God. 
 For non-religious guilt and forgiveness of others no significant associations were 
observed with the sociodemographic variables. However, in the advanced cancer 
Chapter 7
Table 3   Population characteristics. Where appropriate frequencies are presented 
with valid percentages in brackets. 
 
No evidence  
of disease  
n = 97 (%)
Advanced cancer 
n = 55 (%)
Total ( n = 152)
Male
Female 
43 (44.3)
54 (55.7)
29 (52.7)
26 (47.3)
72 (47.4)
80 (52.6)
Age Mean
St dev
53.4
13.5
62.0
9.9
56.5
13.0
Relationship Living with a 
partner
Living alone
81 (85.3)
14 (14.7)
39 (72.2)
15 (27.8)
120 (80.5)
 29 (19.5)
Education Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
23 (24.0)
48 (50.0)
25 (26.0)
9 (16.7)
34 (63.0)
11 (20.4)
32 (21.3)
82 (54.7)
36 (24.0)
Employment Paid job
No paid job
41 (42.3)
56 (57.7)
16 (29.1)
39 (70.9)
57 (37.5)
95 (62.5)
Religious salience Mean
St dev
2.5
1.0
2.6
1.1
2.5
1.2
Member of a 
Christian church/
religious/spiritual 
group
Yes
No
62 (63.9)
35 (36.1)
38 (69.1)
17 (30.9)
100 (65.8)
52 (54.2)
Kind of Christian 
church/
religious/spiritual 
group
Roman-catholic
Protestant
Other
48 (77.4)
8  (8.2)
6  (9.7)
29 (72.5)
8 (14.5)
3  (5.5)
77 (75.5)
16 (15.7)
9  (8.8)
Frequent church 
visitor (monthly  
at least)
Yes
No
17 (17.5)
80 (82.5)
7 (12.7)
48 (87.3)
24 (15.8)
128 (84.2)
Adherence to a 
personal God
Mean
St dev
3.0
1.0
3.2
1.2
3.1
1.1
Adherence to a  
non-personal God
Mean
St dev
3.0
1.0
3.7
1.1
3.5
1.0
Adherence to an 
apophatic God
Mean
St dev
3.8
0.9
3.6
1.3
3.7
1.0
Tumor type Breast
Prostate
Testis
Lung
Colon/rectum
Melanoma
Other 
36 (37.1)
16 (16.5)
13 (13.4)
9  (9.3)
4  (4.1)
6  (6.2)
13 (13.4)
7 (12.7)
2  (3.6)
/
9 (16.4)
12 (21.8)
3  (5.5)
19 (36.5)
43 (28.3)
18 (11.8)
13  (8.6)
18 (11.8)
16 (10.5)
9  (5.9)
35 (23.1)
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group, patients who scored high on non-religious guilt also scored significantly 
higher on adherence to a non-personal image of God. Also, advanced cancer 
patients who scored high on forgiveness of others scored significantly higher on 
religious salience and adherence to an image of an unknowable God.
 To assess which sociodemographic and religious variables were most relevant 
for attitudes of guilt and forgiveness of others we performed stepwise regression, 
including patient’s age, membership of a church or a religious or spiritual group, 
frequent church visits, and adherence to a personal, non-personal and an 
unknowable God as independent variables and guilt and forgiveness as dependent 
variables. Table 5 shows the results of the regression analyses. In the group of 
patients without evidence of disease religious salience and adherence to a personal 
God best explained religious guilt, whereas in the advanced cancer group also 
adherence to an unknowable God was included in the model. Significant models for 
non-religious guilt and forgiveness of others could only be built for the group of 
patients with advanced cancer. Non-religious guilt was best explained by adherence 
to a non-personal God, whereas forgiveness was explained by religious salience.
7.4.3.  Research question 2 
On average, both the group of patients without evidence of disease and the group 
of patients with advanced cancer did not show an attitude of religious guilt (mean ± 
standard error 2.7 ± 0.1 and 2.0 ± 0.1, respectively). (Table 6) In contrast, both 
groups were found to have an attitude of non-religious guilt (mean ± standard error 
3.8 ± 0.1 in both groups). Also, both groups agreed with a forgiving attitude towards 
others (mean ± standard error 25.4 ± 0.3 and 25.5 ± 0.4, respectively). No significant 
differences in attitudes of guilt and forgiveness of others were observed between 
the group of patients without evidence of disease and the group of patients with 
advanced cancer.
7.4.4.  Research question 3 
To answer the third research question we first calculated correlation coefficients 
for those religious characteristics which were identified in the regression analysis 
as being relevant for attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. (Table 7; cf. Table 5) Then, 
we assessed whether correlation coefficients in the no evidence of disease group 
and the advanced cancer group were significantly according to Fisher’s r-to-Z 
formula. In the group of patients with advanced cancer, the correlation between 
religious guilt and adherence to an image of an unknowable God was significantly 
different from the group of patients without evidence of disease. Similarly, in the 
advanced cancer group the correlation between non-religious guilt and adherence 
to a non-personal image of God was significantly different from the group of 
patients without evidence of disease. Although a significant correlation was 
observed between forgiveness and religious salience in the advanced cancer group, 
which was not observed in the no evidence of disease group, the numerical 
difference in correlation coefficients between the two groups was not significantly 
different according to Fisher’s r-to-Z formula.
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7.5. Discussion
7.5.1. Guilt and forgiveness
This is the first study to directly compare attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness in 
cancer patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients. On 
average no differences were observed between the two groups with respect to 
attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness. This confirms the results of a prior 
qualitative study which showed that a cancer diagnosis promoted the rethinking of 
life priorities regardless of the stage of disease.24 However, in our study the 
24 Mickley JR, 1992.
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Table 4   Sociodemographic and religious characteristics by level of agreement with 
guilt and forgiveness. 
 
Guilt and 
forgiveness
Patient 
group
Score Age
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with a 
partner
(%, n)
Education: 
less than 
vocational 
training
(%, n)
Employ
ment
(%, n)
Religious 
salience
(st dev, n)
Church/ 
religious/ 
spiritual 
group 
member
(%, n)
Frequent 
church visitor
(%, n)
Personal God
(st dev, n)
Non- 
personal God
(st dev, n)
Apophatic 
God
(st dev, n)
Religious guilt No evidence  
of disease
Low 51.7**
 (14.3, 76) 
35
(46.1, 76)
64
(86.5, 74)
30
(40.0, 75)
33
(43.4, 76)
2.1***
(0.8, 72)
41***
(53.9, 76)
6***
(7.9, 76)
2.8***
(1.0, 76)
3.4*
(0.9, 76)
3.8
(0.8, 75)
High 59.3
(7.9, 21)
8
(38.1, 21)
17
(81.0, 21)
8
(38.1, 21)
8
(38.1, 21)
3.6
(1.0, 21)
21
(100, 21)
11
(52.4, 21)
3.9
(0.5, 21)
3.8
(0.9, 21)
3.8
(1.0, 20)
Advanced 
cancer
Low 59.0*
(8.6, 29)
14
(48.3, 29)
20
(71.4, 28)
15
(51.7, 29)
 8
(27.6, 29)
2.0***
(0.9, 28)
15**
(51.7, 29)
1*
(3.4, 29)
2.5***
(1.1, 29)
3.2***
(1.1, 29)
3.1**
(1.2, 28)
High 65.4
(10.3, 26)
15
(57.7, 26)
19
(73.1, 26)
11
(44.0, 25)
8
(30.8, 26)
3.3
(0.9, 26)
23
(88.5, 26)
6
(23.1, 26)
4.0
(0.8, 26)
4.2
(0.8, 26)
4.1
(1.2, 26)
Non-religious guilt No evidence  
of disease
Low 52.6
(18.6, 22)
11
(50.0, 22)
17
(81.0, 21)
9
(40.9, 22)
9
(40.9, 22)
2.3
(0.9, 20)
15
(68.2, 22)
4
(18.2, 22)
3.1
(1.1, 22)
3.4
(1.0, 22)
3.7
(0.9, 21)
High 53.6
(11.7, 75)
32
(42.7, 75)
64
(86.5, 74)
29
(39.2, 74)
32
(42.7, 75)
2.5
(1.1, 73)
47
(62.7, 75)
13
(17.3, 75)
3.0
(1.0, 75)
3.5
(0.9. 75)
3.8
(0.9, 74)
Advanced 
cancer
Low 59.0
(9.9, 12)
5
(41.7, 12)
6
(50.0, 12)
6
(50.0, 12)
4
(33.3, 12)
2.1
(0.8, 12)
7
(58.3, 12)
0
(0, 12)
2.8
(1.2, 12)
3.1*
(1.2, 12)
3.0
(1.3, 12)
High 62.8
(9.8, 43)
24
(55.8, 43)
33
(78.6, 42)
20
(47.6, 42)
12
(27.9, 43)
2.8
(1.1, 42)
31
(72.1, 43)
7
(16.3, 43)
3.4
(1.2, 43)
3.8
(1.0, 43)
3.8
(1.2, 42)
Forgiveness No evidence  
of disease
Low 51.3
(17.3, 16)
9
(56.2, 16)
14
(87.5, 16)
10
(62.5, 16)
9
(56.2, 16)
2.5
(0.9, 14)
12
(75.0, 16)
2
(12.5, 16)
3.2
(0.9, 16)
3.6
(0.8, 16)
3.8
(0.7, 16)
High 53.8
(12.7, 81)
34
(42.0, 81)
67
(84.8, 79)
28
(35.0, 80)
32
(39.5, 81)
2.5
(1.1, 79)
50
(61.7, 81)
15
(18.5, 81)
3.0
(1.1, 81)
3.4
(1.0, 81)
3.8
(0.9, 79)
Advanced 
cancer
Low 59.8
(7.9, 11)
6
(54.5, 11)
8
(80.0, 10)
7
(63.6, 11)
1
(9.1, 11)
1.8**
(1.0, 11)
5
(45.5, 11)
0
(0, 11)
2.7
(1.3, 11)
3.3
(1.1, 11)
2.8*
(1.5, 11)
High 62.6
(10.3, 44)
23
(52.3, 44)
31
(70.5, 44)
19
(44.2, 43)
15
(34.1, 44)
2.8
(1.0, 43)
33
(75.0, 44)
7
(15.9, 44)
3.4
(1.2, 44)
3.8
(1.1, 44)
3.8
(1.2, 43)
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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predictors of attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness were significantly different 
between the patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients.
In general, patients were found to have an attitude of non-religious guilt. This 
underscores that guilt is implied in every contingent situation.25 However, patients 
did not agree with an attitude of religious guilt; they did not place their failures to 
live up to their personal or societal ideals in a context of a disturbed relationship 
with God. This could be interpreted as a sign of secularization, i.e. the decreased 
influence of (institutionalized) religion on individuals and society as a whole. In a 
secularized world experiences are interpreted from a psychological, sociological, or 
25 Ricoeur P, 2004.
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Table 4   Sociodemographic and religious characteristics by level of agreement with 
guilt and forgiveness. 
 
Guilt and 
forgiveness
Patient 
group
Score Age
(st dev, n)
Male sex
(%, n)
Living with a 
partner
(%, n)
Education: 
less than 
vocational 
training
(%, n)
Employ
ment
(%, n)
Religious 
salience
(st dev, n)
Church/ 
religious/ 
spiritual 
group 
member
(%, n)
Frequent 
church visitor
(%, n)
Personal God
(st dev, n)
Non- 
personal God
(st dev, n)
Apophatic 
God
(st dev, n)
Religious guilt No evidence  
of disease
Low 51.7**
 (14.3, 76) 
35
(46.1, 76)
64
(86.5, 74)
30
(40.0, 75)
33
(43.4, 76)
2.1***
(0.8, 72)
41***
(53.9, 76)
6***
(7.9, 76)
2.8***
(1.0, 76)
3.4*
(0.9, 76)
3.8
(0.8, 75)
High 59.3
(7.9, 21)
8
(38.1, 21)
17
(81.0, 21)
8
(38.1, 21)
8
(38.1, 21)
3.6
(1.0, 21)
21
(100, 21)
11
(52.4, 21)
3.9
(0.5, 21)
3.8
(0.9, 21)
3.8
(1.0, 20)
Advanced 
cancer
Low 59.0*
(8.6, 29)
14
(48.3, 29)
20
(71.4, 28)
15
(51.7, 29)
 8
(27.6, 29)
2.0***
(0.9, 28)
15**
(51.7, 29)
1*
(3.4, 29)
2.5***
(1.1, 29)
3.2***
(1.1, 29)
3.1**
(1.2, 28)
High 65.4
(10.3, 26)
15
(57.7, 26)
19
(73.1, 26)
11
(44.0, 25)
8
(30.8, 26)
3.3
(0.9, 26)
23
(88.5, 26)
6
(23.1, 26)
4.0
(0.8, 26)
4.2
(0.8, 26)
4.1
(1.2, 26)
Non-religious guilt No evidence  
of disease
Low 52.6
(18.6, 22)
11
(50.0, 22)
17
(81.0, 21)
9
(40.9, 22)
9
(40.9, 22)
2.3
(0.9, 20)
15
(68.2, 22)
4
(18.2, 22)
3.1
(1.1, 22)
3.4
(1.0, 22)
3.7
(0.9, 21)
High 53.6
(11.7, 75)
32
(42.7, 75)
64
(86.5, 74)
29
(39.2, 74)
32
(42.7, 75)
2.5
(1.1, 73)
47
(62.7, 75)
13
(17.3, 75)
3.0
(1.0, 75)
3.5
(0.9. 75)
3.8
(0.9, 74)
Advanced 
cancer
Low 59.0
(9.9, 12)
5
(41.7, 12)
6
(50.0, 12)
6
(50.0, 12)
4
(33.3, 12)
2.1
(0.8, 12)
7
(58.3, 12)
0
(0, 12)
2.8
(1.2, 12)
3.1*
(1.2, 12)
3.0
(1.3, 12)
High 62.8
(9.8, 43)
24
(55.8, 43)
33
(78.6, 42)
20
(47.6, 42)
12
(27.9, 43)
2.8
(1.1, 42)
31
(72.1, 43)
7
(16.3, 43)
3.4
(1.2, 43)
3.8
(1.0, 43)
3.8
(1.2, 42)
Forgiveness No evidence  
of disease
Low 51.3
(17.3, 16)
9
(56.2, 16)
14
(87.5, 16)
10
(62.5, 16)
9
(56.2, 16)
2.5
(0.9, 14)
12
(75.0, 16)
2
(12.5, 16)
3.2
(0.9, 16)
3.6
(0.8, 16)
3.8
(0.7, 16)
High 53.8
(12.7, 81)
34
(42.0, 81)
67
(84.8, 79)
28
(35.0, 80)
32
(39.5, 81)
2.5
(1.1, 79)
50
(61.7, 81)
15
(18.5, 81)
3.0
(1.1, 81)
3.4
(1.0, 81)
3.8
(0.9, 79)
Advanced 
cancer
Low 59.8
(7.9, 11)
6
(54.5, 11)
8
(80.0, 10)
7
(63.6, 11)
1
(9.1, 11)
1.8**
(1.0, 11)
5
(45.5, 11)
0
(0, 11)
2.7
(1.3, 11)
3.3
(1.1, 11)
2.8*
(1.5, 11)
High 62.6
(10.3, 44)
23
(52.3, 44)
31
(70.5, 44)
19
(44.2, 43)
15
(34.1, 44)
2.8
(1.0, 43)
33
(75.0, 44)
7
(15.9, 44)
3.4
(1.2, 44)
3.8
(1.1, 44)
3.8
(1.2, 43)
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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scientific point of view, rather than in a religious context.26 However, this does not 
imply that there is no role left for religion in our modern society, but rather that the 
role of religion has changed.27 In fact, our study also showed that religious charac-
teristics significantly explained attitudes of both religious and non-religious guilt as 
well as forgiveness, while no relationship was observed between sociodemograph-
ic variables and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. 
 Previously, conflicting results have been reported on the relation between 
gender and forgiveness: women may be more forgiving than men,28 but it has also 
26 Norris P, Inglehart R. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. 2004; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
27 Borgman E. Metamorfosen. Over religie en modere cultuur. [Metamorphoses. About religion and modern 
culture]. 2006; Kampen: Uitgeverij Klement.
28 Finkel EJ, Rusbult CE, Kumashiro M et al. Dealing with betrayal in close relationships: does commitment 
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Table 5   Stepwise regression analysis of sociodemographic and religious character-
istics and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. Stepwise regression analysis 
was performed of sociodemographic and religious characteristics on 
attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. Patient age, religious salience, member - 
ship of a church or a religious or spiritual group, frequent church visits, 
and adherence to a personal, non-personal and apophatic God were 
entered in each model as independent sociodemographic and religious 
variables (see also above, Table 2). Per outcome variable, all significant 
models are shown with the independent variables which were entered 
successively. 
 
Dependent 
variable
Group Model Independent 
variables
Standardized 
Coefficients
Beta
Sig. R2
change
R2 Adjusted 
R2 
Religious 
guilt
No 
evidence of 
disease
1 Personal God .717 .000 .515*** .515*** .509
2 Personal God
Salience
.490
.333
.000
.001
.059** .574*** .564
Advanced 
cancer
1 Salience .736 .000 .541*** .541*** .532
2 Salience
Apophatic God
.643
.300
.000
.002
.081*** .623*** .608
3 Salience
Apophatic God
Personal God
.434
.247
.301
.001
.009
.024
.038*** .660*** .639
Non-
religious 
guilt
Advanced 
cancer
1 Non-personal 
God
.425 .002 .180** .180*** .164
Forgiveness Advanced 
cancer
1 Salience .348 .011 .121* .121* .104
*  indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; *** indicates p < .001.
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promote forgiveness? J Pers Soc Psychol. 2002;82:956-974. Mullet E, Houdbine A, Laumonier S et 
al. Forgiveness: factor structure in a sample of young, middle-aged, and elderly adults. European 
Psychologists. 1998;3:289-297. Orathinkal J, Vansteenwegen A, Burggraeve R. Are demographics important 
for forgiveness? The Family Journal: Counseling and Therapy for Couples and Families. 2008;16:20-27.
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Table 6   Mean values of the attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. Mean scores and 
standard errors of attitudes of guilt and forgiveness are given for the 
group of patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer 
patients. Mean values are corrected for the variables religious salience 
and adherence to a personal, non-personal and apophatic God that were 
most relevant for attitudes of guilt and forgiveness (cf. Table 3). For scale 
ranges see Material and Methods. To assess differences in means 
covariance analysis was performed. No significant differences between 
the two patient groups were observed. 
 
No evidence  
of disease
Advanced cancer
Religious guilt Mean
St error
2.7
0.1
2.9
0.1
Non-religious guilt Mean
St error
3.8
0.1
3.8
0.1
Forgiveness Mean
St error
25.4
0.3
25.5
0.4
Table 7   Fisher’s r-to-Z analysis of correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients 
are given for religious characteristics which were identified in the regression 
analysis as being relevant for attitudes of guilt and forgiveness (cf. Table 3). 
 
Religious 
guilt
Non-religious 
guilt
Forgiveness
Religious salience No evidence of 
disease
.689 .056
Advanced cancer .743 .332
Adherence to a 
personal God
No evidence of 
disease
.735
Advanced cancer .736
Adherence to a  
non-personal God
No evidence of 
disease
.060
Advanced cancer .396*
Adherence to an 
apophatic God
No evidence of 
disease
.009
Advanced cancer .499**
* indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01.
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been suggested that there is no actual gender difference.29 Also, older studies have 
suggested that as people grow older they tend to become more forgiving.30 However, 
none of these studies have been carried out in a population of cancer patients.
 When looking in more detail into the observed relationship between religious 
characteristics and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness, it is relevant to note that not 
only the importance of religion for one’s personal life (religious salience) is related 
to attitudes of guilt and forgiveness, but also belief in specific images of God. The 
relation between religious salience and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness may not 
be unsurprising, given the historical links between religion, guilt and forgiveness in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition.31 If people have internalized these religious values 
and norms, it may be expected that they are both more aware of the fallibility of 
men and more forgiving. However, the relation between belief in specific images of 
God and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness suggests that not only religion in the 
broad sense of values and norms are relevant for guilt and forgiveness, but also 
one’s personal relation to God. Apparently, even though personal failures are not 
interpreted in a context of a disturbed relationship with God (see above), belief in 
God - possibly including God’s ability to forgive – also inspires to acknowledge one’s 
mistakes and to adopt a more forgiving attitude. 
 Of note, in the group of advanced cancer patients this belief in God is not restricted 
to one image only like a belief in God as someone who personally interacts with 
individual human beings, but may be combined with an image like a God which is 
regarded as Something higher or as a God that surpasses all our powers of imagination.32 
Indeed, according to empirical research people may have various images of God that 
may or may not exist simultaneously.33 Compared to the group of patients without 
evidence of disease, in the group of advanced patients a more diverse palette of 
religious characteristics was related to attitudes of guilt and forgiveness, not only 
including religious salience and a belief in a personal God, but also belief in a 
non-personal and an unknowable God. This may suggest that when one is faced with 
imminent death, sources to find meaning and value not only become a more central 
focus of attention, but may also imply a more differentiated religious imagery.34 
7.5.2. Limitations of the study
Our study is limited both by the national context of the study, and the fact that the 
majority of participants were Roman Catholic. Therefore, generalization of the 
29 Enright RD, Zell RL. Problems encountered when we forgive one another. Journal of Psychology and 
Christianity. 1989;8:52-60.
30 Enright RD, 1989. Girard M, Mullet E. Forgiveness in adolescents, young, middle-aged, and older adults. 
Journal of Adult Development. 1997;4:209-220.
31 McCullough M, 1999.
32 Van Laarhoven, 2010.
33 Van der Ven JA, 1998. Van der Ven JA, 2004.
34 Sulmasy DP. Spiritual issues in the care of dying patients: “... it’s okay between me and god”. JAMA. 
2006;296:1385-1392.
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results of our study beyond our study population is restricted. Also, our patient 
groups were relatively small, precluding the detection of subtle differences between 
the groups or small, but relevant associations between sociodemographic or 
religious characteristics and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. To allow for more 
definite conclusions, our results should be validated in a second independent set of 
data with a larger and more heterogeneous study sample. Ideally, to answer our 
research questions a longitudinal survey would be preferable. However, this would 
require the inclusion of a very large population of patients shortly after treatment 
(i.e. without evidence of disease) which would have to be followed for a long time 
in order to obtain sufficient patients with advanced disease in the course of time to 
allow for meaningful statistical comparisons.
 Our study of attitudes of guilt and forgiveness was limited to patients. However, 
guilt and forgiveness are relational concepts and incorporation of attitudes towards 
guilt and forgiveness of partners, relatives and friends may further shed light on 
these concepts. This is illustrated by a Swedish study that showed that men who 
had lost their wives due to cancer and did not have end-of-life discussions with 
their wives during the last three months before her death may be subject to a 
significantly greater risk of experiencing feelings of guilt or regret in widowhood 
than men who did engage in such discussions.35 Also, we measured guilt and 
forgiveness as general dispositions. Measurement of specific experiences of guilt 
and forgiveness may lead to different results. For example, for patients with 
non-small cell lung cancer it has been shown that they had higher levels of 
embarrassment related to one’s cancer than patients with prostate cancer or breast 
cancer, but not higher baseline generalized levels of shame and guilt.36
 Finally, from this study a causal relationship between religious characteristics 
and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness cannot be established, since, for example, 
there may have been an unknown third variable influencing both. Nevertheless, 
this study does offer an explorative insight into the relation between religious char-
acteristics and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness.
7.5.3. Implications for practice and research
In several ways, the results of this work merit attention for daily clinical practice 
(Table 6). First of all, nurses should be aware that a relevant proportion of patients 
endorses attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. In our study, this was not only the case 
in the group of patients with advanced cancer, but also in the group of patients 
without evidence of disease. 
 It should be noted that, despite the religious connotation of the concepts guilt 
and forgiveness, they may be experienced in a non-religious way. Nevertheless, our 
35 Jonasson JM, Hauksdottir A, Nemes S et al. Couples’ communication before the wife’s death to cancer and 
the widower’s feelings of guilt or regret after the loss - A population-based investigation. Eur J Cancer. 
2011;47:1564-70.
36 LoConte NK, Else-Quest NM, Eickhoff J et al. Assessment of guilt and shame in patients with non-small-cell 
lung cancer compared with patients with breast and prostate cancer. Clin Lung Cancer. 2008;9:171-178.
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study showed that religious characteristics were the most relevant predictors for 
guilt and forgiveness. Moreover, significant differences in relations between 
religious characteristics and attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness were observed. 
In the group of patients with advanced cancer, the correlation between religious 
guilt was significantly correlated with adherence to an image of an unknowable God 
which was not the case in the group of patients without evidence of disease. Also, 
in the advanced cancer group non-religious guilt was significantly correlated to 
adherence to a non-personal image of God which was not the case in the group of 
patients without evidence of disease. This suggests that a careful examination of 
religious beliefs and values is of importance in the clinical care of patients with 
cancer and nurses should be attentive to the fact that the relevance of religious 
beliefs and values for guilt and forgiveness may differ dependent on disease stage.37 
 Coping with feelings of guilt and going through the process of forgiving may be 
strenuous and may require professional support. Because of their unique knowledge 
of the impact of a cancer diagnosis, oncology nurses can be pivotal in assisting 
patients in these processes. However, patients may not bring up issues about guilt 
and forgiveness spontaneously.38 Also, caregivers may experience difficulties in 
raising issues about religious beliefs and values and speaking about guilt and 
forgiveness in a constructive sense. Therefore, we advocate that caregivers are 
trained to support patients on these issues.39 Moreover, nurses could discuss with 
their local chaplains or spiritual caregivers how they could share their knowledge 
and experience on these issues in the care for patients with cancer. Finally, it is 
important to realize that an open and listening attitude, which is one of the central 
features of nursing practice in general, is already a first step towards offering 
patients space for raising issues of guilt and forgiveness. 
  The impact of changes in attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness on distress 
cannot be assessed from this study. Recently, it was shown that a four-week 
forgiveness therapy demonstrated psychological benefits for elderly terminally ill 
cancer patients.40 However, in a recent study it was also shown that forgiveness 
increased the likelihood of subsequent partner transgressions in marriage.41 We 
believe that the theme of guilt and forgiveness would merit further research, 
including both quantitative and qualitative research methods. From the qualitative 
data a conceptual model could be developed to understand the relation between 
distress and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness, which could then, in a quantitative 
37 Van Laarhoven HW, 2010.
38 Sulmasy DP. At wit’s end: forgiveness, dignity, and the care of the dying. J Gen Intern Med. 2001;16:335-
338.
39 Kollbrunner J. Guilt: the taboo of modern psychooncology? Support Care Cancer. 1996;4:67-70. Recine 
AG, Werner JS, Recine L. Concept analysis of forgiveness with a multi-cultural emphasis. J Adv Nurs. 
2007;59:308-316.
40 Hansen MJ, Enright RD, Baskin TW et al. A palliative care intervention in forgiveness therapy for elderly 
terminally ill cancer patients. J Palliat Care. 2009;25:51-60.
41 McNulty JK. Forgiveness increases the likelihood of subsequent partner transgressions in marriage. J Fam 
Psychol. 2010;24:787-790.
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survey be further substantiated. Thus, further study is required to assess whether 
direct counseling of patients on attitudes of guilt and forgiveness, either in the early 
or advanced cancer setting, will reduce distress.
Guilt and forgiveness
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8.1. Summary
This thesis started from the observation that experiences of physical and mental 
pain, a sense of loss, frustration, and vulnerability to adverse effects is relevant for 
cancer patients and are covered by the term distress (chapter 1). Aspects that may 
be related to these experiences of loss and vulnerability, such as the question about 
God and the experience of time, are themes that are at home in the field of religious 
studies. Thus, thinking about distress may benefit from insights from both religious 
studies and medicine. Therefore, the general aim of this thesis was to perform 
research into this experience of human vulnerability and fragility from an inter-
disciplinary – religious studies and medicine - perspective. Distress was defined 
as a subject’s incapability to constructively accommodate negatively charged 
experiences into his or her own life. However, several questions about the meaning 
of the term remained. Therefore, the first specific aim of this thesis was to explore 
the meaning of the term distress using a capability approach. The second specific 
aim was to expand our understanding of distress from an empirical point of view, 
based on currently available insights in religious studies and medical sciences.
 To reach our second specific aim, we adopted a descriptive model comprising 
several aspects in relation to distress, drawn from the medical sciences as well as 
religious studies. Using available approaches from the European Organization of 
Research and Treatment of Cancer and the National Comprehensive Cancer 
Network, we identified physical, psychological and sociological symptoms and loss 
of functioning, guilt and forgiveness and ‘overall’ quality of life as relevant elements 
of distress. Based on our starting-point of experiences of vulnerability and fragility 
of human life and, thus, the finitude and transitoriness of human life, we singled 
out attitudes towards mortality and time perception as as relevant  variables, as 
well as images of God. Finally, we included variables regarding the distinction 
between oncological treatment with curative or palliative intent and coping.  
 To reach the first specific aim - to explore the meaning of the term distress from 
a capability perspective - we looked into a capability approach of distress based on 
the philosophies of Sen and Nussbaum (chapter 2, paragraph 2.2). Although Sen 
originally developed the capability approach in an economical context of evaluating 
inequality, Nussbaum has broadened the applicability of the capability approach to 
all situations of struggle for an adequate personal quality of life, dignity, justice and 
human flourishing. As, following Sen and Nussbaum, human flourishing can be 
understood in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings, I proposed 
to describe distress by phrasing it the other way around: distress is the incapability 
to achieve valuable functionings. In this way, ‘incapability’ became the leading 
notion to understand distress, as was already suggested by our nominal definition 
of distress as the ‘incapability’ to constructively accommodate negatively charged 
experiences into one’s own life. However, in this approach the question remained 
why specific (in)capabilities should be selected to understand distress. Moreover, 
from a capability approach based on Sen and Nussbaum solely, the potentially 
relevant relation between time and distress could not be accounted for. Since 
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capabilities identify a person by what one is able to do or be, we hypothesized that 
a hermeneutical inquiry into the question of human identity could be supportive. 
 Therefore, we turned towards the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, as his hermeneutical 
approach of identity can also account for the relevance of time in relation to 
capabilities (chapter 2, paragraphs 2.3-2.7). The problem of selfhood was approached 
via different ways, summarized by a three-step rhythm of describing, narrating, and 
prescribing. Although description by specific characteristics of and actions performed 
by a person is a first step to identify that person, it is insufficient to designate a 
person as a self. As actions can only take place in time, to understand personal 
identity the temporal dimension of human existence should be introduced. According 
to Ricoeur, a temporal dimension is introduced by means of narrative. That is, time 
becomes human time to the extent that time is organized after the manner of a 
narrative. In a narrative seemingly separate, arbitrary events striking you in the 
course of time (mimesis1) are configured into an intelligible whole (mimesis2), and are 
then brought back to the world of action (mimesis3). This last step, mimesis3, 
introduces the ethical, prescriptive element of selfhood into the discussion, as in 
action there is not only something to be recounted, but also something asking to be 
justified. Thus, in terms of human capabilities the identity of the self, understood in 
the three-step rhythm of describing, narrating and prescribing, implies that the 
capacity to say, the capacity to act, and the capacity to recount are part of the 
typological outline of basic human capacities. More specifically, distress may be 
defined as the infringement of capabilities which puts the self at stake and makes 
identity questionable. When referring to distress we are not discussing a random set 
of incapabilities, but ultimately concerned with incapabilities to be a self. Following 
Ricoeur’s ontology of the self, we identified the incapabilities to attest to myself in 
confrontation with the otherness of my body, me in front of the other, and my 
conscience as the basic incapabilities constituting distress (chapter 2, paragraph 2.7). 
Reaching back to our tentative nominal definition of distress, attestation may be 
regarded as the elaboration of the ‘constructive accommodation of negatively 
charged experiences’.
 To achieve our second specific aim - the expansion of our understanding of 
distress from an empirical point of view, based on currently available insights in 
religious studies and medical sciences – we formulated twelve research questions. 
First of all, we examined the relation between coping, distress and images of God 
and answered the following research questions:
1. Do coping strategies differ between patients who are treated curatively for 
cancer compared to cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
2. What is the relation between coping strategies, quality of life, depression and 
hopelessness in patients who are treated curatively for cancer and cancer 
patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting? 
3. Do relations between coping strategies on the one hand and quality of life, 
depression and hopelessness on the other hand differ between patients who 
are treated curatively for cancer compared to cancer patients in the palliative, 
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end-of-life care setting?
4. What is the relation between adherence to a personal, non-personal and 
unknowable image of God and coping strategies in advanced cancer patients in 
the palliative, end-of-life care setting?
In chapter 3, we focused on research questions 1-3 and observed that both in 
patients without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients, active coping 
strategies and acceptance decreased distress, unlike avoidant coping strategies 
and venting of emotions. Advanced cancer patients scored higher on the coping 
strategy seeking moral support. For the outcome-variable emotional functioning, 
significant interactions were observed between the variable no evidence of 
disease/advanced setting and the coping strategy seeking moral support. For the 
outcome-variable role functioning, significant interactions were observed between 
the variable no evidence of disease/advanced setting and the coping strategy 
waiting. In chapter 4, research question 4 was answered. We showed that in 
advanced cancer patients a non-personal image of God was a significant positive 
predictor for the coping strategies seeking advice and information, seeking moral 
support, and denial, and a negative predictor for the coping strategy humor. A 
personal image of God was a significant positive predictor for the coping strategy 
turning to religion. Age was the most important socio-demographic predictor for 
coping and had negative predictive value for seeking advice and information and 
seeking moral support.
 We then turned to the relation between experience of time and distress, and 
answered the following research questions:
5. Do attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife differ between cancer 
patients without evidence of disease compared to advanced cancer patients 
who are facing death?
6. Are these attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife related to patients’ 
distress, operationalized as quality of life, depression and hopelessness? 
7. Do relations of attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife with distress 
differ between cancer patients without evidence of disease and advanced 
cancer patients?
8. What is the relation between time perception and distress in disease-free 
cancer patients and advanced cancer patients in the palliative, end-of-life care 
setting? 
9. Do relations between time perception and distress differ between disease-free 
cancer patients without evidence of disease compared to advanced cancer 
patients in the palliative, end-of-life care setting?
Research questions 5-7 were answered in chapter 5. We observed that average 
scores on attitudes and emotions towards death and afterlife were not significantly 
different between cancer patients without evidence of disease compared to 
advanced cancer patients who are facing death. However, in the ‘no evidence of 
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disease’ group a negative association between negative emotions and social 
functioning was observed which was not present in the group of patients with 
advanced cancer. In the ‘advanced’ group associations were observed which were 
not present in the ‘no evidence of disease’ group: positive associations between 
the explicitly religious attitude and global health status, and between reincarnation 
belief and role and cognitive functioning; a negative association between 
other-directed emotions and social functioning. Thus, when there was no evidence 
of disease negative emotions played the most important role, whereas in the 
advanced cancer situation attitudes towards death and afterlife which may provide 
meaning and value became more prominent.
 In chapter 6, we assessed the relation between time perception and distress 
(research questions 8 and 9) and observed that in patients without evidence of 
disease future dominance was most often observed, whereas in advanced cancer 
patients the present was the dominant time segment. In both groups a focus on the 
past was associated with distress. In contrast with patients without evidence of 
disease, advanced cancer patients perceived time as moving slowly and this was 
correlated with distress. We concluded that time perception of cancer patients 
without evidence of disease and advanced cancer patients was significantly 
different and related to distress. 
 Lastly, as the study of guilt and forgiveness in the context of distress is relatively 
new in the field of oncology, we identified the following research questions:
10. Which sociodemographic and religious characteristics are associated with 
attitudes of guilt and forgiveness in patients without evidence of disease and 
advanced cancer patients?
11. Do attitudes of guilt and forgiveness differ between patients without evidence 
of disease and advanced cancer patients?
12. Do relations between sociodemographic and religious characteristics on the 
one hand and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness on the other hand differ 
between patients without evidence of disease and patients with advanced 
cancer?
These research questions were answered in chapter 7. Both the group of patients 
without evidence of disease and patients with advanced disease had an attitude of 
non-religious guilt and forgiveness, but not of religious guilt. No significant 
differences in attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness were observed between the 
two groups. In contrast to sociodemographic characteristics, religious characteris-
tics were relevant predictors for guilt and forgiveness. In the group of patients with 
advanced cancer, the correlation between religious guilt and adherence to an 
unknowable God was significantly different from the group of patients without 
evidence of disease. Similarly, in the advanced cancer group the correlation 
between non-religious guilt and adherence to a non-personal image of God was 
significantly different from the group of patients without evidence of disease.
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8.2. General discussion and directions for future research 
The general aim of this thesis was to perform research into the experience of 
human vulnerability and fragility from an interdisciplinary perspective. We started 
with an exploration of the term distress using a capability approach based on Sen 
and Nussbaum as well as a hermeneutical approach of the self by Ricoeur. This 
exploration yielded two results which are relevant for the field of religious studies 
and medicine. First of all, we were able to define distress as the incapability to 
attest to myself in terms of the otherness of my body, me in front of the other, and 
my conscience. In this way, incapabilities pertinent for distress can be identified 
and ordered. They may function as a basis for further research into distress. 
Secondly, by placing the emphasis on the question of selfhood in the understanding 
of distress, the relevance of the experience of time for distress – which we come 
across in daily practice, as sketched in the backgroud of the study (1.1.) -  was 
supported. The relevance of time experience, and more specifically finitude, has 
not been reported in relation to distress before. This finding may further explored 
in further research projects. 
 In chapters 3-7, where we presented our empirical data, we already discussed 
the significance of our findings for clinical practice and offered some first 
suggestions for further research. Therefore, in this paragraph I will follow-up on the 
implications of our findings for further interdisciplinary research in the field of 
(empirical) religious studies and medicine. First, I will come back to distress as the 
incapability to attest to myself in terms of otherness of body, other and conscience 
and then briefly discuss the significance of the observed relation between 
experience of time and distress.
8.2.1. Distress
In chapter 2 we defined distress as the incapability to attest to myself in terms of 
the otherness of my body, me in front of the other, and my conscience. Our empirical 
studies on distress can be regarded as a focus on the measurement of the ‘otherness 
of my body, me in front of the other, and my conscience’ in this definition of 
distress. However, we left aside the first part of the definition, ‘the incapability to 
attest to myself’. In fact, conceptualization and operationalization of attestation as 
well as the (in)capability to attest to oneself has not been taken up in this thesis and 
should be examined in a separate research project. Nevertheless, a few words can 
already be said. Attestation can be defined as “the assurance of being oneself 
acting and suffering.”1 Acknowledging that, according to Ricoeur, attestation is the 
ontological basis of the self and the identity of the self is to be understood 
narratively, it may be hypothesized that attestation itself is a narrative operation. 
Indeed, as already suggested by our nominal definition of distress - the incapability 
to constructively accommodate negatively charged experiences into one’s life – 
attestation implies constructive activity. In order to be able to attest to oneself, 
1 OA, p.22.
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one has to be capable to construct one’s story of life and get handle on the 
fragmented nature of time. For this purpose, we need the help of stories of others 
to provide us with figures of emplotment, to supply us with narrative beginnings 
and provisional ends. The intertwining of life stories helps us to retrospectively 
organize our lives and prospectively project expectations and anticipations towards 
the future.2 We are “in Geschichten verstrickt: caught up, entangled in histories.”3 
Indepth qualitative research is required to explore attestation as a narrative 
operation and examine the interrelation with different stories of life.
 Also, taking on this perspective, the role of religion comes to the fore, as 
religious stories can have their place in the whole network of histories that are told 
by people. Religious stories may aid in the construction of one’s own story of life 
and, thereby, in the capability to attest to oneself. Of note, religious stories have 
not been plucked out of thin air. These narratives have been constructed by 
individuals and communities and passed over from generation to generation.4 They 
embody the dynamic discourse about divine acts and roles, and about interactions 
between God and men. In a religiously pluralistic society, as we are living in, current 
narratives will be nourished by new religious narratives, changing the images of 
God and the relationship of God with the world. This is demonstrated by our 
empirical studies on the role of images of God in relation to coping strategies 
(chapter 4) and attitudes towards guilt and forgiveness (chapter 7). As we noted in 
both chapter 4 and 7, especially in the group of advanced cancer patients, not only 
an anthropomorphic image of God, but also a non-anthropomorphic and even 
apophatic image of God played a significant and distinguishable role in relation to 
the outcome variables (coping strategies, and guilt and forgiveness, respectively). It 
may seem contraintuitive to connect everyday human life with an abstract image of 
a God placed at a distance. As Karen Armstrong holds: “A God who stands miles 
away from people […] can never be the inspiration for a spiritual quest.”5 Or, more 
focused on our research on distress, it may be asked how a God placed at a distance 
can be relevant for our experiences of distress. An apophatic image of God can 
hardly be reconciled with a theodicy which regards God as ‘the fellow sufferer who 
understands’.6
 Nevertheless, our findings fit well in the general tendency in the Netherlands of 
the past forty years, showing a decrease in the belief that God is personally occupied 
with each individual human being (from 47% in 1966 to 24% in 2006) and an 
increase in the belief in a non-personal higher power (from 31% in 1966 to 36% in 
2 OA, p.162-163.
3 OA, p.161.
4 Van der Lans J. Empirical Research into the Human Images of God. A Review and some Considerations. In: 
Ziebertz H-G, Schweitzer F, Häring H et al., eds. The Human Image of God. 2001; Leiden: Brill, p.358.
5 Armstrong K. A history of God: from Abraham to the present: the 4000-year quest for God. Vintage. 1999; 
London, p.65.
6 Vermeer P. Learning Theodicy. The Problem of Evil and the Praxis of Religious Education. 1999; Leiden: Brill. 
Zuidgeest P. The absence of God. Exploring the christian tradition in a situation of mourning. 2001; Leiden/
Boston/Köln: Brill.
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2006).7 At the same time the percentage of non-believers and agnosticists also 
increased (from 6% in 1966 to 14% in 2006 and from 16% to 26% in 2006, 
respectively). Abandonment of the anthropomorphic images of God, which have 
been adhered to for centuries, has been part of the modernization and individuali-
zation processes of Western European countries.8 However, as can been seen from 
the abovementioned numbers, this is not a one-dimensional process of a decrease 
in believe in God. Moreover, as was shown in our patient population, a God placed 
at a distance or even a God that surpasses our imagination can be of relevance for 
our everyday life. Further research into the intertwining of religious stories and 
stories of life in relation to distress may aid in the understanding of these findings.
As said above, our empirical studies on distress can be considered as a focus on the 
measurement of the otherness of my body, me in front of the other, and my 
conscience. To assess otherness in terms of body and other we made use of 
validated measurement instruments that are commonly used in oncological 
research and practice, such as the EORTC Quality of Life Questionnaire, Beck’s 
Depression Inventory and Beck’s Hopelessness scale. Our results on the experience 
of physical and psychological symptoms and impaired functioning – as a reflection 
of the otherness of the body – as well as social symptoms and impaired functioning 
– representing the confrontation with otherness of other people – fit well with 
previous studies on distress carried out in the oncological field.9  Clearly, the 
breadth and depth of Ricoeur’s approach to figures of otherness are not fully 
accounted for by these instruments. However, in this way a first connection can be 
made between a capability approach of distress and research on distress in the 
medical field, allowing for an interdisciplinary discussion and dissemination of the 
results of our study as described in chapter 3-7. 
 For our study of otherness in terms of conscience, drafted as attitudes of guilt 
and forgiveness, we could not draw back on questionnaires on guilt and forgiveness 
which are commonly used in oncological research. This is probably due to the fact 
that research on guilt and forgiveness is relatively new in the medical field. 
Nevertheless, the NCCN guideline on distress explicitly addresses the issue of 
7 Dekker G, Hart Jd, and Peters J. God in Nederland. 1966-1996. 1997; Amsterdam, Anthos, p.18. Bernts T, 
Dekker G, and de Hart J. God in Nederland, 1996-2006. 2007; Kampen, Ten Have, p. 40.
8 Van der Lans J, p.347-60. Van der Ven JA. Ecclesiologie in context. 1993; Kampen, Kok.
9 See for example: Fredette SL. Breast cancer survivors: concerns and coping. Cancer Nurs. 1995;18:35-
46. Peuckmann V, Ekholm O, Rasmussen NK et al. Chronic pain and other sequelae in long-term breast 
cancer survivors: nationwide survey in Denmark. Eur J Pain. 2009;13:478-485. Servaes P, Gielissen MF, 
Verhagen S et al. The course of severe fatigue in disease-free breast cancer patients: a longitudinal study. 
Psychooncology. 2007;16:787-795. Servaes P, Verhagen S, Bleijenberg G. Determinants of chronic fatigue 
in disease-free breast cancer patients: a cross-sectional study. Ann Oncol. 2002;13:589-598. Dow KH, 
Ferrell BR, Leigh S et al. An evaluation of the quality of life among long-term survivors of breast cancer. 
Breast Cancer Res Treat. 1996;39:261-273. Hansen JA, Feuerstein M, Calvio LC et al. Breast cancer survivors 
at work. J Occup Environ Med. 2008;50:777-784. Lavigne JE, Griggs JJ, Tu XM et al. Hot flashes, fatigue, 
treatment exposures and work productivity in breast cancer survivors. J Cancer Surviv. 2008;2:296-302.
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guilt.10 In the NCCN guideline, guilt is placed under the heading of spirituality and 
religion.11 This requires further thought, as from our research results a direct 
connection between guilt/forgiveness and religion should be nuanced. As we saw 
in chapter 2, guilt and forgiveness can be approached quite well without making 
reference to figures of religion. The fallibility of men is implied in every contingent 
situation.12 Also, as we observed in chapter 7, the patients in our study had an 
attitude of non-religious guilt rather than an attitude of religious guilt. Therefore, 
directly placing guilt and forgiveness under the heading of religion does not do 
justice to the moral autonomy experienced by patients. Nevertheless, we showed 
that religious characteristics significantly explained attitudes of both religious and 
non-religious guilt as well as forgiveness, while no relationship was observed 
between sociodemographic variables and attitudes of guilt and forgiveness. 
Apparently, even though guilt itself is untied from a direct religious connotation, 
the historical link between religion, guilt and forgiveness in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition may still sensitize religious people for one’s attitude towards guilt.13 
 Also, it may be hypothesized that the relation between religion, guilt and 
forgiveness stems from a figurative function of Christian religion, containing 
pre-moral, radical-moral and meta-moral aspects.14 The pre-moral aspect refers to 
the installation of men and women as autonomous selves; they have the freedom 
to act, even before beliefs, values and norms about right and wrong, good and bad. 
In the radical-moral sense religious stories question the validity of general aims and 
norms in view of the contingency of specific situations and for the sake of the 
particular. Religious stories invite us to criticize, radicalize and innovate. In the 
meta-moral sense, religious stories point out to us the ultimate fragility and 
brokenness of the world and prepare us for this ambivalent aspect of human 
existence. They provide interpretations for paradoxical and aporiacal situations 
that moral discourse is confronted with, but cannot overcome. The relation 
between pre-moral, radical-moral and meta-moral aspects of religion and 
experiences of guilt and forgiveness may be subject of future research.
8.2.2. Time experience and distress
Based on our observations in clinical practice we suggested that the experience of 
time – both in terms of human mortality and the perception of the passage of time 
– could be relevant for distress. The key role that is played by ‘time’ in Ricoeur’s 
10 National Comprehensive Cancer Network.  Distress Management. NCCN Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Oncology. v.1, 2008.
11 The terms spirituality and religion are often used interchangeably, but may also be regarded as distinct 
concepts. In this chapter we will not elaborate on this distinction, but restrict ourselves to the use of the 
term religion.
12 Ricoeur P. Memory, history, forgetting. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. 2004; Chicago, London: 
The University of Chicago Press.
13 McCullough M, Worthington Jr E. Religion and the forgiving personality. Journal of Personality. 
1999;67:1141-1164.
14 Van der Ven JA. Formation of the Moral Self. 1998; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, p.13-21.
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hermeneutics of the self corroborated this idea. Indeed, when looking at our 
empirical results, attitudes and emotions about death and afterlife as well as time 
perception were significantly correlated with distress. However, as we already 
noted in our empirical studies, by using a cross-sectional design no definite 
conclusions can be drawn about the causal or influential relationship between the 
experience of time and distress. An intervention study, aimed at the modification of 
(certain aspects) of time experience, leading to a reduction of distress, could shed 
further light on this issue. For this purpose, I would like to suggest three aspects of 
time experience that would be worthwhile to pursue in further research.
First of all, we observed that in the group of patients without evidence of disease 
negative emotions played the most important role in relation to distress, while in 
the advanced cancer situation attitudes towards death and afterlife which may 
provide meaning and value became more prominent. However, interventions 
aimed at changing emotions about death and modifying attitudes may be difficult, 
especially in a situation of advanced cancer where the time available for an 
intervention is limited. Therefore, as a first step, further understanding is required 
of the specific content of the emotions involved and the meaning that is attached 
by patients to images of death and afterlife that are related to distress. This may be 
especially relevant for belief in reincarnation, as we observed that this was the only 
attitude towards death which was associated with lower scores on measures of 
distress and remained significant in the regression analysis. 
 Belief in reincarnation is often associated with Eastern religions, such as 
Hinduism, but also in the western tradition reincarnation theories have been 
drafted. In the 18th and 19th century German philosophers and poets like Lessing, 
Kant and Goethe believed in reincarnation and in the twentieth century Rudolf 
Steiner and the anthroposophical movement were the most obvious proponents.15 
Based on a qualitative empirical study in England it has been suggested that 
reincarnation is an idea that respondents simply found intellectually attractive and 
had no significant effect on one’s life.16 It was concluded that reincarnation belief 
“is similar to old style folk religion in that it need not be integrated into a systematic 
worldview, but is unlike folk religion in that it is not handed down within a local 
community. It is perhaps the folk religion of the media age, where the television, 
the bookshop, and the internet transmit bites of religious ‘information’ in which 
private individuals take an interest, without any demonstrable consequences for 
their behavior, conversation, or affiliations. It is the ultimate detached, private 
belief.”17 However, a survey of the Dutch population up to 40 years of age showed 
that approximately 18% of the respondents support the statement that belief in 
15 Huber F. Die Reinkarnationsvorstellungen in den asiatischen Religionen und im Europa. Zeitschrift für 
Religions- und Geistesgeschichte. 1992;44:15-32.
16 Walter T, Waterhouse H. A Very Private Belief: Reincarnation in Contemporary England. Sociology of 
Religion 1999;60 (2) 187-197. 
17 Walter T, 1999, p.197.
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reincarnation contributes to a meaningful and good life.18 As we saw in chapter 5, 
also our research findings contradict the conclusion that reincarnation belief is of 
no relevance for daily life, at least in terms of the experience of distress. However, 
despite these results, the reasons why belief in reincarnation is related to a meaningful 
and good life remain speculative. Therefore, a further exploration of this relation is 
required. 
 Moreover, it should be noted that although belief in reincarnation refers to a 
transcendence of death as the natural ending of human life and a continuation of 
human time, it seems opposed to classical Christian views on life after death, such 
as the belief that after death people have to give an account for their lives. This 
account may be envisioned in a court of justice where individuals meet God, and 
Christ will judge the life of each individual. In the words of the new testament: “For 
we must all appear before the judgement seat of Christ; that every one may receive 
the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or 
bad.”19 This draws back on the belief that, in the end, justice will triumph, because 
it cannot be true that the tyrant will outrun its victim forever. In contrast, 
reincarnation belief asserts that human persons after death, which is regarded as 
the end of one’s embodiment or incarnation, are then embodied or reincarnated in 
another body.20 Although this view does not allow for a verdict of final justice, it 
does foresee the possibility of new chances in new embodiments. Could it be that 
in our modern, secularized times a view that allows for second chances that one can 
hold in one’s own hands, is more attractive and more consoling than a court of 
justice? Or are the traditional Christian views on life after death still too closely 
connected to the old images of hell and purgatory and the accompanying feelings 
of fear and vengeance to be able to offer solace in times of distress? Following from 
these questions, subsequent hypotheses may be put to the test in further research. 
A second observation that warrants further study, is our finding that a focus on the 
past was associated with distress. The majority of patients experienced past, present 
and future as discrete temporal segments. This implies that what has happened in 
the past, is definitely finished. Due to the relentless passage of time in every instant 
one gets further distanced from the past. Why would a focus on that past be 
associated with the experience of distress? Because one tries to hold firm what 
cannot be fixed? Because one gets stuck in past memories, ruminating bad 
experiences that cannot be restored? Because when contemplating ‘the good old 
times’ it stands out clearly that those days will never come back? We can only 
speculate what the reason might be. Probably, a combination of factors like fixation, 
rumination, and regret plays a role. Elucidation of these factors may be helpful to 
18 Kregting J, Sanders J. ‘Waar moeten ze het zoeken?’ Vindplaatsen van religie en zingeving bij jongvolwassenen. 
2003; Nijmegen: Kaski. Beleidsonderzoek naar godsdienst en levensbeschouwing.
19 2 Cor. 5,10.
20 Reasoner P. Reincarnation and Karma. In: Taliaferro C, Draper P, Quinn PL, eds. A Companion to Philosophy 
of Religion. 2010; Singapore: Blackwell Publishing, p.640.
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understand distress and may help to develop an intervention to reduce distress. 
 In this respect it may also be useful to analyze the role and relevance of a focus 
on past, present, and future in interventions that have already been proven 
successful to reduce distress in cancer patients. In chapter 6 we already mentioned 
the beneficial effect of life reviews in terminally ill cancer patients.21 In life reviews 
the past is reviewed, but in this review process the present and future are also 
incorporated with questions like: ‘Is there anything about you that your family 
needs to know?’ ‘Are there things you want to tell them and are there things you 
want them to remember?’ ‘What advice or words of guidance do you have for the 
important people in your life or for the younger generation?’22 Further analysis of 
these data could shed light on the question whether shifting the attention of 
patients from past memories to present hopes and future expectations, contributes 
to a reduction in distress. A similar analysis could be carried out for an intervention 
based on mindfulness and meditation. Mindfulness, including meditation, has been 
shown to be effective in reducing distress in cancer patients.23 It can be defined as 
an open and receptive attention to and awareness of what is occurring in the 
present moment.24 Evaluation of the mediators of changes in distress due to 
mindfulness training, specifically considering the role of the focus on the present, 
may further elucidate the relation between time experience and distress.
 Finally, as in most patients the perception of past, present and future is based 
on a linear conception of time, not only the effect of shifting one’s focus from past 
to present and future may be relevant for further study, but also the effect of 
departing from the predominance of time experienced as linear. This may be 
exemplified by the experience of time as kairos as opposed to chronos. Chronos 
expresses the conception of time as a linear measure, a quantity of duration.25 In 
‘kairos’ three distinct aspects are involved.26 First, it means the ‘right time’ for 
21 Steinhauser KE, Alexander SC, Byock IR et al. Do preparation and life completion discussions improve 
functioning and quality of life in seriously ill patients? Pilot randomized control trial. J Palliat Med. 
2008;11:1234-1240. Ando M, Morita T, Akechi T et al. Efficacy of short-term life-review interviews on the 
spiritual well-being of terminally ill cancer patients. J Pain Symptom Manage. 2010;39:993-1002.
22 Ando M, 2010.
23 See, for example, Speca M, Carlson LE, Goodey E, et al. A randomized, wait-list controlled clinical trial: the 
effect of a mindfulness meditation-based stress reduction program on mood and symptoms of stress in 
cancer outpatients. Psychosomatic Medicine 2000;62:613-622.  
24 Brown KW, Ryan RM. Perils and Promise in Defining and Measuring Mindfulness: Observations From 
Experience. Clin Psychol Sci Prac. 2004;11:242-248.
25 Smith JE. Time, Times and the ‘Right Time’; Chronos and Kairos. Monist. 1969;53:1-13, p.1.
26 Smith JE, 1969, p.6. 
 In the New Testament  these different notions of kairos are taken up and, in fact, kairos can have a multiplicity 
of meanings. Sullivan distinguishes four uses of the term: “One is simply a neutral, non-rhetorical, word 
for time, a meaning that is relatively rare. … The other three meanings of kairos, which are rhethorical in 
their associations, can be distributed along a continuum of time lengths, from a single point, to a season 
to a time of fulfillment, but they all suggest that there is an opportune time for something to occur, that 
there are special times determined by God, shown by God, and filled by God.” Sullivan DL. Kairos and the 
rhetoric of belief. Quarterly Journal of Speech. 1992;78:317-332, p.321. In these meanings, kairos becomes 
eschatological time. 
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something to happen, in contrast with ‘any time’. Secondly, it incorporates the 
notion of tension or conflict; a time of crisis which calls for a decision at that time. 
Finally, kairos means the time when an opportunity for accomplishing some purpose 
has opened up as a result of the problem that led to the crisis. In the last sense, it 
refers to the fullness of time; the propitious moment for the performance of an 
action or the coming into being of a new state.27 Clearly, an indepth investigation of 
these different notions of kairos is needed before an intervention based on this 
concept could be developed. As a first step, further research could be focussed on 
the question what leads to experiences of time as kairos, in order to pin down these 
experiences to, for example, certain events, (religious) experiences, or specific 
values.
The last observation that requires further thought is our finding that the perception 
of time moving slowly is associated with distress. At first sight, an intervention 
aimed at changing one’s perception of the speed of time seems hard to conceive. 
Also, in chapter 6, we interpreted our findings from a cognitive information 
processing point of view: in case of distress, time intervals may be perceived as 
lengthened (i.e. speed of time seems to slow down) compared to normal. In contrast 
to our conceptual model, this interpretation could suggest that distress is influencing 
time perception, rather than vice versa. Therefore, before an intervention aimed at 
changing one’s perception of the speed of time in order to decrease distress can be 
developed, more insight is needed into the relation between perceived speed of 
time and distress. In this context the role of desire may be relevant, as described by 
Paul van Tongeren: “The speed of time has probably to do with our desire: our 
desire to do more than time allows, or the desire to stay and not to pass away. Our 
desire can also cause time to slow down. As long as we still believe in the fulfillment 
of our desire and the fulfillment does not seem to end, we want to move towards 
this fulfillment as fast as possible; we want to move towards the fulfillment with 
such a speed that time seems to move too slowly. In fact, it is desire that makes 
time move slowly.”28 Thus, it may be hypothesized that our desire plays an important 
role in our perception of the speed of time and that, in fact, changes in our desire 
may ultimately be a way to influence distress.
 In order to provide direction and focus to further research into desire as 
mediating factor between time experience and distress, the literature on life goals 
 For an overview of meanings of the word kairos in the New Testament, see Sipiora P, Kairos: The Rhetoric 
of Time and Timing in the New Testament. In:  Sipiora P, Baumlin JS, eds, Rhetoric and Kairos. Essays in 
History, Theory and Practice. 2002; Albany: State Univeristy of New York Press.
27 Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/, last accessed 12 February 2012.
28 Van Tongeren P. Over het verstrijken van de tijd. Een kleine ethiek van de tijdservaring. 2002; Nijmegen: 
Valkhofpers, p.29-30. “De snelheid van de tijd zal wel te maken hebben met ons verlangen: het verlangen 
om meer te doen dan de tijd toelaat, of het verlangen om te blijven en niet voorbij te gaan. Ons verlangen 
kan er echter ook voor zorgen dat de tijd juist trager gaat. Zolang we nog in de vervulling van het verlangen 
geloven en niet alweer het einde daarvan zien, willen we er zo snel mogelijk naar toe; zo snel dat de tijd 
ons steeds te langzaam gaat. Eigenlijk is het ons verlangen zelf dat de tijd trager doet gaan.”
Chapter 8
189
can be helpful.29 Desire could be regarded as a striving after personal goals. The 
intensity of the desire may depend on the value that is implicitly or explicitly 
attached to the personal goal one is striving after. In fact, personal goals that people 
strive after may often be implicit only.30 Personal goals are hierarchically arranged 
and one goal may be a means to achieve another goal, leading to a complex network 
of personal goals. In this network of personal goals an important role is played by 
so-called ultimate goals. These ultimate goals – also called source interests,31 final 
goals32 or ultimate life goals33 - are the most important goals that people strive 
after. They offer continuity, stability and direction to the hierarchy of goals. Ultimate 
life goals stem from the development of competences, which, in turn, depend on 
individual talents, dispositions and support by one’s environment.34 Ultimate life 
goals may be grounded in a foundational reality which can either be a transcendent 
reality (a personal or impersonal supreme spiritual being) or an immanent reality, 
referring to nature, the cosmos or fellow human beings. Further exploration of the 
network of personal goals that patients strive after, may aid in the development of 
an intervention directed at desire, the experience of speed of time, and ultimately, 
the reduction of distress. 
29 These thought on life goals are derived from the research project Spiritual care for cancer patients: the 
role of an assisted structured reflection on ultimate life goals to improve quality of life and empowerment 
(principal investigators dr. H.W.M. van Laarhoven. Dr. M. Scherer-Rath, prof. dr. J.B.A.M. Schilderman) that 
has been granted by the Dutch Cancer Society (UVA 2011-5311) and will start in 2012.
30 Emmons RA. The Psychology of Ultimate Concerns: motivation and spirituality in personality. 1999; New 
York: The Guilford Press. Emmons RA. Striving for the sacred: personal goals, life meaning, and religion. 
Journal of Social Issues. 2005;4:731-745.   
31 Frijda NH. The law of emotion. 2007; Mahwah/New Jersey/London: Erlbaum Associates.
32 Verschuren P. Probleemanalyse in organisatie- en beleidsonderzoek. 2008; Amsterdam: Boom Academic.
33 Emmons RA, 1999.
34 Frijda NH, 2007.
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Het uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift is dat ervaringen van lichamelijke en geestelijke 
pijn, een gevoel van verlies, beperking en kwetsbaarheid relevant zijn om te door - 
denken zowel vanuit de religiewetenschappen als vanuit de medische weten- 
schappen (hoofdstuk 1). Het algemene doel van dit proefschrift is dan ook om 
onderzoek te verrichten naar deze ervaringen vanuit een interdisciplinair perspectief, 
namelijk de religiewetenschappen en de medische wetenschappen. Binnen de 
medische wetenschappen worden bovengenoemde ervaringen aangeduid met de 
term distress. Als voorlopige definitie van distress hanteren we ‘het niet in staat zijn 
van een persoon om negatieve ervaringen, zoals verlies en kwetsbaarheid, 
constructief in te passen in zijn/haar leven’. Hoewel het begrip distress veel wordt 
gebruikt in de medisch wetenschappelijke literatuur, zijn er nog veel vragen over de 
betekenis van het begrip. Daarom is het eerste, specifieke doel van dit proefschrift 
om het begrip distress te exploreren vanuit een zogenaamde ‘capability approach’. 
Het tweede specifieke doel van dit proefschrift is om onze kennis over distress 
vanuit empirisch gezichtspunt uit te breiden, gebruik makend van reeds aanwezige 
inzichten binnen de religiewetenschappen en medische wetenschappen.
 Ten behoeve van dit laatste hebben we een beschrijvend model ontworpen dat 
bestaat uit verschillende variabelen, samengevat onder twee overkoepelende 
termen: ‘patiëntkarakteristieken’ en ‘distress’. Voor de patiëntkarakteristieken 
maken we gebruik van zowel medische variabelen (het onderscheid tussen een in 
opzet curatieve en palliatieve behandeling; coping strategieën) als variabelen uit de 
religiewetenschappen (beelden van God; de ervaring van tijd). De ervaring van tijd 
valt uiteen in houdingen ten opzichte van de dood/leven na de dood en perceptie 
van tijd. Voor distress hebben we, gebruik makend van bestaande kaders ontworpen 
door de European Organization of Research and Treatment of Cancer en de National 
Comprehensive Cancer Network, de volgende relevante elementen onderscheiden: 
fysieke, psychologische en sociologische symptomen en functieverlies, schuld en 
vergeving en ‘overall’  kwaliteit van leven. 
 Om ons eerste specifieke doel te bereiken – de exploratie van het begrip 
distress vanuit een ‘capability approach’ – hebben we gebruik gemaakt van een 
zogenaamde ‘capability approach’ van distress gebaseerd op de filosofieën van Sen 
en Nussbaum (hoofdstuk 2, paragraaf 2.2). Oorspronkelijk heeft Sen deze 
benadering ontwikkeld om na te denken over ongelijkheid binnen een economische 
context. Nussbaum heeft de toepassing verbreed naar al die situaties waarin wordt 
gestreden voor een adequate persoonlijke kwaliteit van  leven, waardigheid, recht-
vaardigheid en welzijn. Volgens Sen en Nussbaum kan menselijk welzijn worden 
verstaan als het vermogen om waardevol functioneren (‘functionings’)  te bereiken. 
Ik stel voor om distress als het omgekeerde te beschrijven: distress is het onvermogen 
om waardevol functioneren te bereiken. Op deze manier wordt ‘(on)vermogen’ de 
leidende term om distress te begrijpen. Dit werd ook al gesuggereerd door onze 
nominale definitie van distress als het onvermogen van een persoon om negatieve 
ervaringen, zoals verlies en kwetsbaarheid, constructief in te passen in zijn/haar 
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leven. De vraag blijft echter welke (on)vermogens in acht genomen moeten worden 
om distress te begrijpen. Bovendien wordt in bovenstaande benadering geen 
rekening gehouden met de potentieel relevante relatie tussen de ervaring van tijd 
en distress. Aangezien de identiteit van een persoon bepaald wordt door zijn 
vermogens, dat wil zeggen door wat iemand kan zijn of doen, zou een hermeneutische 
benadering van ‘identiteit’ nog nader licht op deze zaken kunnen werpen.
 In hoofdstuk 2, paragrafen 2.3-2.7, hebben we ons daarom gericht op de 
filosofie van Paul Ricoeur. Zijn filosofie draait om menselijke vermogens (‘human 
capabilities’) en zijn hermeneutische benadering van identiteit kan recht doen aan 
de relatie tussen de ervaring van tijd en menselijk vermogen. Ricoeur benadert het 
probleem van het zelf via verschillende wegen die samengevat kunnen worden in 
de drieslag: beschrijven, vertellen en voorschrijven. De beschrijving van een 
persoon in termen van specifieke karakteristieken en acties die hij/zij onderneemt 
is een eerste stap om die persoon te identificeren. Een dergelijke beschrijving is 
echter onvoldoende om een persoon als een zelf te kunnen zien. Aangezien acties 
alleen in tijd kunnen plaatsvinden, is het voor het begrijpen van persoonlijke 
identiteit van belang om de temporele dimensie van het menselijk bestaan te 
introduceren. Volgens Ricoeur wordt deze temporele dimensie geïntroduceerd 
door een verhaal. Tijd wordt menselijke tijd in die mate dat tijd op een narratieve 
manier is georganiseerd. In een verhaal worden schijnbaar willekeurige 
gebeurtenissen die je in de loop van de tijd treffen (mimesis1), samengebracht in 
een begrijpelijke geheel (mimesis2) en vervolgens teruggebracht in de wereld van 
actie (mimesis3). Deze laatste stap, mimesis3, brengt een ethisch, voorschrijvend 
element in het geheel, aangezien actie hiermee niet alleen iets is wat vrijblijvend 
wordt verteld, maar ook iets wat dient te worden verantwoord. Dit impliceert dat 
in termen van menselijke vermogens, persoonlijke identiteit - begrepen vanuit de 
eerdergenoemde drieslag - het vermogen inhoudt om te spreken, te handelen en te 
vertellen. Distress kan dan worden verstaan als een overschrijding van de vermogens 
van het zelf, die het zelf op het spel zetten en zijn identiteit onder druk zetten. 
Wanneer het gaat over distress, hebben we het niet over een willekeurige set van 
onvermogens, maar gaat het uiteindelijk om het onvermogen om een zelf te kunnen 
zijn. Ricoeurs ontologie van het zelf volgend, kan het onvermogen om van mijzelf te 
getuigen in confrontatie met mijn lichaam, in confrontatie met de ander en in 
confrontatie met mijn geweten beschouwd worden als het meest basale 
onvermogen dat distress kenschetst (hoofdstuk 2, paragraaf 2.7). Teruggrijpend op 
onze nominale definitie van distress kan getuigenis (‘attestation’) opgevat worden 
als de uitwerking van het ‘constructief in passen van ervaringen van verlies en 
kwetsbaarheid in je leven’.
 Om ons tweede specifieke doel te bereiken - onze kennis over distress vanuit 
empirisch gezichtspunt uit te breiden, gebruik makend van reeds aanwezige 
inzichten binnen de religiewetenschappen en medische wetenschappen – hebben 
we twaalf onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd die we in de hoofdstukken 3-7 hebben 
beantwoord. Als eerste onderzochten we in hoofdstuk 3 de relatie tussen coping 
strategieën en distress bij zowel curatief als palliatief behandelde patiënten. In 
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beide groepen waren actieve coping strategieën en acceptatie gerelateerd aan een 
vermindering van distress. Voor vermijdende coping strategieën en het uiten van 
emoties zagen we het tegendeel. We stelden ook vast dat de relaties tussen distress 
en specifieke coping strategieën, zoals het zoeken van morele support en afwachten, 
verschilden tussen de groep curatief en palliatief behandelde patiënten. In 
hoofdstuk 4 lieten we zien dat bij palliatief behandelde patiënten instemming met 
een beeld van God als non-persoonlijk was geassocieerd met verschillende coping 
strategieën, zoals het zoeken van advies en informatie, het zoeken van morele 
ondersteuning, ontkenning en, in negatieve zin, met humor. Instemming met een 
persoonlijk beeld van God was alleen geassocieerd met de coping strategie zich 
wenden tot religie. Van de sociodemografische achtergrond variabelen was leeftijd 
de belangrijkste voorspeller van coping strategieën. 
 Ten aanzien van de relatie tussen de ervaring van tijd en distress, hebben we op 
de eerste plaats houdingen ten opzichte van en emoties over de dood en leven na 
de dood onderzocht (hoofdstuk 5). We zagen dat gemiddeld gesproken deze 
houdingen en emoties niet significant verschilden tussen de in opzet curatief en 
palliatief behandelde patiënten. Echter, de relaties tussen distress en houdingen/
emoties verschilden tussen de groep curatief en palliatief behandelde patiënten. In 
de in opzet curatieve situatie speelden negatieve emoties ten opzichte van de dood 
de belangrijkste rol, terwijl in de palliatieve situatie houdingen ten opzichte van de 
dood en leven na de dood die betekenis en waarde geven meer van belang waren.
 In hoofdstuk 6 onderzochten we de relatie tussen perceptie van tijd en distress. 
Bij in opzet curatief behandelde patiënten was de toekomst het dominante 
tijdssegment, terwijl bij in opzet palliatief behandelde patiënten het heden het 
dominante tijdssegment was. In beide groepen was een focus op het verleden 
geassocieerd met distress. In tegenstelling tot in opzet curatief behandelde 
patiënten vergleed voor in opzet palliatief behandelde patiënten de tijd langzamer; 
dit was gecorreleerd met distress. We concludeerden derhalve dat de percepties 
van tijd verschilden tussen in opzet curatief en palliatief behandelde patiënten en 
dat dit samenhing met distress.
 Ten slotte hebben we ons in hoofdstuk 7 gericht op een specifiek aspect van 
distress, namelijk schuld en vergeving. We zagen dat zowel de in opzet curatief en 
palliatief behandelde patiënten met name kunnen instemmen met een niet-religi-
euze houding ten opzichte van schuld en vergeving, maar in mindere mate met een 
religieuze houding. In tegenstelling tot sociodemografische karakteristieken waren 
religieuze karakteristieken relevante voorspellers voor schuld en vergeving. De 
relatie tussen de mate van instemming met een bepaald beeld van God en een 
religieuze of niet-religieuze houding ten opzichte van schuld was significant 
verschillend tussen de curatief en palliatief behandelde groep patiënten. 
 Concluderend kan worden gesteld dat het onderzoek aan de hand van de eerste 
doelstelling van dit proefschrift – de exploratie van het begrip distress vanuit een 
‘capability approach’ – heeft geleid heeft tot twee belangrijke bevindingen. Op de 
eerste plaats hebben we distress kunnen definiëren als het onvermogen om van 
mijzelf te getuigen in confrontatie met mijn lichaam, in confrontatie met de ander 
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en in confrontatie met mijn geweten. Ten tweede hebben we, door de nadruk te 
leggen op de vraag naar identiteit in relatie tot distress, de relevantie van de 
ervaring van tijd voor distress meer theoretisch kunnen inbedden. Het onderzoek 
aan de hand van de tweede doelstelling van dit proefschrift - empirisch onderzoek 
naar distress – heeft de relatie tussen de ervaring van tijd en distress bevestigd, 
verschillen tussen curatief en palliatief behandelde patiënten aan het licht gebracht 
en de relevantie van het onderscheid tussen verschillende Godsbeelden onderstreept. 
Aan de hand van deze bevindingen kan vanuit de religiewetenschappen en medische 
wetenschappen verder onderzoek naar distress worden verricht dat uiteindelijk zou 
kunnen leiden tot interventies gericht op vermindering van distress bij patiënten 
met kanker.
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Een proefschrift komt tot stand met dank aan velen. Daarom staan op de eerste 
pagina de promotores, bij verschillende hoofdstukken co-auteurs en vaak  in de 
‘acknowledgments’ nog andere betrokkenen genoemd. Hier wil ik degenen danken 
die in het voorgaande niet bij name zijn genoemd: de patiënten en hun naasten die 
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Dank ook aan prof. dr. Hans van der Ven - met wie niet alleen dit onderzoek, maar 
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ondersteunde.
Dank ten slotte aan degenen met wie de tijd me het liefste is: vrienden, mijn moeder 
en bovenal Esther.
Dankwoord
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What, then, is time?
If no one asks me, I know;
If I want to explain it to someone who asks me,
I do not know.
St Augustine
